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 In this project, I examine the relationship between pain and pleasure on the 
early modern stage. I argue that this dynamic can be called a kind of proto-masochism. 
I also claim that this new form of masochism takes its logic and much of its language 
from the emerging early modern market. I chart the course of this development by 
reading a number of early modern plays and poems. I begin with Shakespeare’s The 
Merchant of Venice, discussing how Jessica and Antonio both express masochistic 
desire in different ways. I then turn to the notion of wittols – willing and eager 
cuckolds – in Middleton’s A Chaste Maid In Cheapside. I finally end the project by 
discussing Ben Jonson’s Bartholomew Fair, a play that forges a masochistic 
relationship between the audience and stage, and hints at the idea of masochistic 
spectatorship. 
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  1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Early modernity and the history of masochism 
 
Masochism is one of the most contested and controversial topics in 
contemporary discussions about sex, desire, and psychology. Medical doctors, 
feminist theorists, psychoanalysts, and actual masochists have debated whether 
masochism is an oppressive or liberating experience. While some groups claim it is a 
powerful expression of personal agency, others argue that it is a deeply homophobic 
and misogynist practice. The extensive scholarship on masochism alternately asserts 
that it is subversive, acting to undermine existing systems of power, or is an insidious 
tool of power, an articulation of the most fundamentally conservative traditions. 
Writers, thinkers and activists are at odds about whether masochism is tragic and 
shameful or one of the only true sources of sexual gratification available to people in 
modern society. There is some further confusion about what constitutes masochism: 
when and how does masochism express itself? Is sadism necessary for masochism to 
exist? Can the two concepts operate apart from one another, or is a sadist always 
required for a masochist to feel pleasure? This is even more complicated by the fact 
that sadism and masochism are not concretely defined terms, and may have different 
meanings according to context.1 In the wake of these debates and confusions, Victor 
Taylor asserts that there is not “one theoretical perspective that adequately discerns all 
configurations of an S&M dynamic.”2 Masochism, it would appear, is much too 
variable and complicated to properly define; it seems impossible to come to any 
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critical, theoretical or practical consensus on what masochism ultimately means. The 
first stage of my project will attempt to, instead, paint the contours of how masochism 
has been conceived and how people have thought of and tried to explain it. 
 This project hopes not only to paint these contours but to suggest where they 
originated and to chart something of their historical development. If I locate much of 
these origins in the early modern period and particularly in England, I do not want to 
assert that masochism is an English phenomenon or to make a polemical claim that 
early modernity birthed masochism. I want to, instead, present a reading of early 
modern English life that demonstrates how it suggests and is ultimately implicated in 
the multifaceted understanding of masochism that we have today. I argue that the early 
modern period had a unique approach to the concepts of pleasure and pain, and that 
early modern persons found many avenues through which to depict pain as a 
pleasurable experience. This approach came from several sources: a classical and 
medieval tradition that praised pain as essential for inner purity; a recent philosophical 
trend that saw cruelty as beneficial to the social good; and a theatrical culture that 
constantly staged scenes of horrific violence and psychological turmoil that were 
supposed to be pleasurable for the audience but also pleasurable for the characters who 
experienced these dramatic events. I also argue that this sense of pleasurable pain was 
influenced by the rise of the market, and that the logic and language of the market 
offered a new way of thinking about personal identity and what – or how – a person 
should feel about the negative events of everyday life. 
I will bring these diverse backgrounds together in an attempt to address the 
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very complicated question of why an early modern person might want to watch a play 
that would make him or her feel bad. Cynthia Marshall asks a similar question about 
King Lear: struggling to explain how the play's depressing action must have affected 
its first audiences, she asks “what sort of explanation can it be to assert that 
Shakespeare’s viewers willfully chose to endure an emotionally devastating few 
hours?”3 The early modern theater is, in fact, a very potent forum for masochistic 
images: early modern dramas are filled with characters that willingly and even happily 
abuse themselves, and audiences consistently subjected themselves to sequences that 
were almost literally painful to watch. The way that dramatic characters abuse 
themselves is sometimes emotional or spiritual, but it is often physical and even fatal, 
and they are regularly pleased about sticking swords in their chests, slitting their 
wrists, and drinking poison. They even experience pleasure when they are harmed by 
others – when they are humiliated, beaten, and tortured. They regard this pain with a 
kind of religious fervor and an almost orgasmic ecstasy, reveling in the fact that they 
are suffering. Masochism, as psychoanalysis conceptualizes it in the middle of the 
twentieth century, is a highly theatrical, heavily scripted form of desire; it relies on a 
series of performances, props, costumes and  set pieces in order to fully express itself. 
It is not simply about being hurt and finding that pleasurable: masochists need the 
scene to look right, need their abuser to say or even wear the right thing, need the 
specific people to be watching on as they are injured. Masochists are harmed as part of 
their sexual practice, but this harming is usually under their personal control and 
arranged by them in advance. It might be no surprise, then, that the same characters 
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who enjoy being injured and tortured are often the playwright figures in their 
respective dramas; they call the shots from the background, directing the action and 
designing the scenes in which they appear and are brutalized. These characters are 
prescient examples of the way that masochism would develop as a discourse over the 
next three centuries, and I use drama as an important example in pinpointing the early 
modern period as a key moment in the evolution of masochism. I focus my attention 
on a number of city comedies, a genre that shares this project's interests in pleasure 
and pain. 
 My other focus in this project is on the development of the early modern 
market and the cultural implications of nascent capitalism. I draw attention to the fact 
that dramatic depictions of pleasurable pain often relied on the language of the market; 
characters express their proto-masochistic feelings through economic metaphors, 
describing their desire in terms of value, currency, sale, contract, ownership, and 
property. Early modern England's cultural and social shifts were deeply impacted by 
the rise of the market; Martha Howell argues that the market became a central 
language in the period's “search for meaning.”4 I argue that this is especially relevant 
to the way that masochism grew and mutated as a discourse and a practice: Gilles 
Deleuze, whose work will be an essential context for my thinking about masochism, 
affirms that any expression of masochistic desire requires a set of “contractual 
relations”5 and economic guarantees in order to legitimate it. Deleuze argues that 
masochists desire to be thought of as pieces of property that can be bought, sold and 
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exchanged; they become anonymous products that are manhandled by their owners. I 
submit that the gestating concept of masochism found, in the early modern market, a 
perfect companion. The emergence of the market meant that people began to see 
themselves in terms of worth and value; they had this much or that much capital, and 
this capital made them worth this much or that much as a person. If a person could 
only be worth so much, it is possible that he might be worth nothing at all, and this is 
exactly the kind of logic that is essential to masochistic desire. The early modern 
theater was fascinated by this new and very alienating way of thinking about identity, 
and early modern dramas constantly staged scenes that dramatized the relationship 
between ordinary people and the market. This was particularly evident in city 
comedies, a fact that I highlight in the chapters that follow my introduction. 
 I argue that masochism would become one of the major ways that pleasure 
works in a capitalist context. Capitalism teaches that your body is something that can 
be manipulated, stomped on, tortured, and destroyed in the name of getting the latest 
products and all of the pleasure that these products will bring you. There is something 
masochistic about capitalism; both of these dynamics are based on the idea that the 
pressures of modern life can become fodder for personal pleasure, and that what looks 
oppressive and unpalatable can actually be the raw material for getting you what you 
want. I do not want to argue that masochism as we know it is entirely something new 
– self-flagellating or ascetic monks are just one example of the existence of the 
concept of pleasurable pain before the early modern period. I want to claim, instead, 
that the rise of the early modern market marked a pivotal development in the idea of 
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pleasurable pain. This is because the market gave this form of pleasure the language to 
express itself: anonymity, alienation, and the concept of personal value. Masochism 
also received an equal inheritance from the early modern theater: this is particularly 
evident in the theater’s interest in characters who script the action of the plays they are 
starring in, molding the plot to suit their own desires. I will discuss the theatricality of 
masochism in more detail at the end of this introduction, and will write at greater 
length on this theme in my fourth chapter.    
 I feel that it is important to be clear about one of my central terms before I 
continue with my overview of the dissertation. I will, throughout the project, use the 
term “the market” when discussing the early modern period’s emergent capitalism. 
When I use this term, I am referring to the dynamics that make up everyday life in a 
market-driven society: debts, lending money, buying property, signing contracts, and 
interacting with an understanding of personal value that is linked to how much money 
you have and how much you are “worth” in an economic sense. I will continually refer 
to these dynamics throughout my entire project: these economic processes are at the 
heart of all the masochistic desires that I will explore in the next four chapters. The 
market is in effect whenever a character spends money, makes a trade, or refers to his 
property and the goods that he has stocked up. These market scenes do not, however, 
always take place at an actual marketplace, and do not always involve the exchange of 
physical money or goods. What they do, instead, is evoke the market through 
allusions, jokes, and economic metaphors. This project deals with what might be 
called the little dramas of capitalist life: the moments in which you may not be directly 
dealing with the market, but in which the market has become a part of your language 
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and a perspective through which you see the world around you. This is especially 
evident in the masochistic characters that I will analyze in the next four chapters; these 
figures invite the imagery and logic of the market into their personal lives, and make 
that imagery and logic into key components of their erotic desires. 
 In this introduction, I will first provide an overview of early modern English 
society that focuses on corporeal punishment and the ubiquity of corrective violence. I 
will outline the development of the classical and medieval concept of punishment, 
drawing on work by medieval and early modern historians, and will argue that pain 
was characterized as something to be cultivated and prized. I will then turn to how 
these thoughts about pain and its benefits were expanded on and powerfully exploded 
by two writers working at the start of the sixteenth century, Machiavelli and Luther. I 
will perform a thorough close reading of Machiavelli's The Prince and Luther's On the 
Bondage of the Will, presenting two sides of a similar argument. These thinkers both 
claim that ordinary people need to submit their lives to a higher power, and must trust 
that it has their best interests at heart. If this higher power is cruel, harsh, inhuman or 
unjust, ordinary people should remember that they are too lowly and unworthy to 
question the judgment of anyone above them. The cruelty exerted against them is, 
ultimately, for their own good. In Machiavelli's tract, this higher power is the secular 
prince, who must be cruel to his own subjects so that their kingdom remains well-
ordered and peaceful. In Luther's work, the higher power is literally God, and any 
believer that questions God's justice as cruel or harsh is roundly condemned as an 
ingrate. This relationship to cruelty marks a transition point between medieval 
conceptions of cruelty and the early modern development of masochism that I am 
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charting in this project. These transition figures are helpful in the way that they 
provide so much of the logic of early modern masochism, but they are lacking a key 
feature: pleasure. I will conclude this chapter with an overview of recent work that has 
been done in psychoanalysis, feminist theory, cultural anthropology, and sex activism, 
detailing many recent theories about masochism pleasure. I will finally turn to the 
implications that masochistic pleasure has on the early modern theater; I argue that 
because the theater so often and so expertly combined the notions of pain and 
pleasure, it was the perfect forum for expressing masochistic desires and for 
developing the specifics of a new kind of masochistic logic.  
 My goal in this project has several dimensions. Firstly, I want to explore the 
history of a sexual discourse and practice that we largely consider to be a modern 
development. I want us to question some of the assumptions that we make when we 
talk about masochism and when we talk about the history of sexuality in general; these 
assumptions can sometimes become stale and too easily held, and I want to introduce 
some fresh texts and perspectives into the discussion. Secondly, I want to offer a 
reading of the pervasive violence, both emotional and physical, that dominates the 
early modern stage. Pain is one of the most ubiquitous forces in these early modern 
dramas, which are filled with characters that experience incredible suffering. 
Characters lose their homes, parents, spouses and children; are violently tortured in 
graphic detail; and are forced to undergo the most degrading humiliations. They are 
also depicted deeply enjoying this suffering, articulating something almost like sexual 
gratification when they are abused or when they abuse themselves. I want to suggest 
one reason for why this theme was so eminently popular, and why early modern 
  9 
playwrights turned to it over and over again. What were the cultural threads that made 
this popularity possible? Why was this an acceptable, appropriate and highly 
marketable topic? What were people reading, hearing and responding to that made 
these images palatable and even enjoyable? Why were these audiences willing to 
endure pain in their own right – to not only witness characters being tortured, but to be 
tortured themselves by sequences of great violence and brutality. One might imagine 
the audience wincing and flinching, or stirring uncomfortably in their seats, or moving 
back from the crowd gathered around the stage, needing some breathing room after 
witnessing a moment of particular intensity. How was this feeling enjoyable? How 
were audiences expected to like it, and how did they like it, as these plays were often 
frequented by thousands and even restaged to great success? I attempt to answer these 
questions in this project, or to at least suggest some possibilities for how we might 
begin to answer them. In the next section, I lay the groundwork for thinking about 
early modern England as a period that was conducive to the sort of proto-masochism I 
want to discuss. 
Pain, Pleasure and Early Modern England 
 
 Susan Amussen asserts that early modern England has been understood as a 
“violent, unloving, and uncaring”6 era, a period with little regard for the sanctity of 
human life and a strikingly brutal approach to torture and bodily dismemberment. 
While this period saw a rise in literacy, the popularization of humanism and the 
flourishing of classical ideals, critics such as Lawrence Stone and Francis Barker have 
demonstrated that, in practice, the political and social reality of early modernity was 
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harsh and incredibly vicious. It is important to note, however, that this violence was 
not random, but was a deeply institutional and normalized occurrence. Public 
floggings, tortuous executions, and lengthy imprisonments were facts of life, a 
constant presence in urban centers and villages alike, and were the unsurprising 
consequence of illegal activity. If a crime was brutally punished, English citizens 
would not have been shocked; Amussen’s research informs us that these citizens 
“expected correction to take place and knew that it involved violence.”7 I do not want 
to claim that this punishment was never seen as disturbing or that no one ever 
protested its intensity or legitimacy – there was a rich and sometimes successful 
precedent for protesting the use corporeal punishment in individual cases8 – but it was 
rarely regarded as an evil in and of itself. The conventional wisdom held that 
punishment was necessary and that society would ultimately benefit from it. 
Punishment, torture and execution were seen as a way to purge negative elements 
from the social body; Jody Enders finds that medieval texts imagined “torture as a 
social curative”9 and consistently argued that the pains of physical correction were “a 
means of fostering health.”10 For instance, Jerome claims that cruelty is justified if it 
heals the individual body, the social body or the larger body of the Church.11 The early 
modern period became increasingly interested in this vision of punishment, especially 
as writers, theorists, doctors and scientists focused more and more on the physical 
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1999) 181 
10
 Ibid. 183 
  11 
human body, how it worked, and how it might be shaped and manipulated.12 In this 
way, flogging a pickpocket or adulterer meant drumming the criminality out of his 
body; torturing and quartering a parricide meant erasing any memory that she ever 
existed, allowing the community to recover from the sickness that she represented. 
 There was a great deal of discussion, however, about just how much 
punishment was required in order to purge the sickness from an offending body. It 
could only be employed in particular cases, and the authority figure ordering 
punishment would have to justify that the crime merited physical discipline.13 There 
were crimes that did not warrant this sort of abuse, and these crimes were dealt with 
through fines, imprisonment, and less brutal forms of social shame. When it was 
employed, corporeal punishment could also only be so harsh and so painful; there 
were a number of what Daniel Baraz calls “quasi-scientific”14 studies that attempted to 
quantify and measure exactly how much punishment could be applied to someone in a 
given case. The violence and intensity of the punishment had to match the severity of 
the crime. Amussen states that corporeal punishment was only “legitimate when used 
by superiors against inferiors”15 – by a court, by a schoolmaster, by a husband, by a 
homeowner. It could not be used by just anyone, and it could certainly not be used 
against one's betters; if a man needed to be disciplined and rid of his criminality, he 
could not be beaten by his wife, children or servants, and only the justice system 
would have the right to beat, manhandle or impact his body. The right to purge society 
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of its negative elements fell exclusively to those in power, and this right could not be 
usurped by those without power. This fact scaled down through the line of social 
hierarchy, so that courts could punish anyone, wealthy men could beat lower-class 
men, men could beat their wives, and both parents could beat their children. 
Punishment was a force that could only be wielded by someone in a superior social 
status against someone with an inferior social status. 
 If a government executed its subjects or the master of a house beat his servants, 
this was not seen as vicious or hateful. It was one of the ways that people in power 
could convey that they cared about their charges, and that they were not going to let 
them become unhealthy. This relationship had its roots in Proverbs 13:24, which states 
that “he who spares the rod hates his child, but he who loves the child is careful to 
discipline him.”16 It was traditional for early modern parents to teach a beaten child 
that they were only beaten because their parents loved and wanted the best for them, 
and they relied on scripture for their evidence.17 Church sermons also encouraged 
children to submit to authority and to remember that parents always had their best 
interests at heart.18 Punishment was a demonstration of the deepest feeling and the 
most loving compassion; if parents did not beat their child, what might become of him 
or her in the future? What if the sickness continued, and the child developed into an ill 
and diseased member of society? Parents – as well as kings and governments, which 
served a parental role in the lives of their subjects and citizens – had a responsibility to 
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make sure that their children were healthy and adjusted. This meant proper discipline, 
and discipline was administered through physical pain. In this context, physical pain 
was a good and not an evil; it was something to be sought out and actively cultivated, 
not something to be avoided. It meant that you were loved and cared for, and that your 
betters were thinking of you and your spiritual health. The church, rhetoricians, 
political writers, and pedagogical manuals routinely argued that inflicting pain was the 
only true way to show you cared; the outer flesh might be bruised, but the inner soul 
would be cleansed. The authors of hagiographies, for example, would often present 
suffering as “a kind of reward for the victim”,19 a sign that any moral and spiritual 
failings were being purged away in a flurry of violent torture. The saints in these 
narratives might be crippled, ruined and dismembered, but their souls have actually 
been treated with the greatest warmth and kindness. 
 The pain of physical discipline, then, was a sort of social glue. It protected the 
soul, kept the community healthy, and edified anyone who watched it taking place. If 
early modern writers are to be believed, punishment was the greatest thing that could 
possibly happen to somebody; the experience of being tortured and beaten was 
alternately described as being “joyful, beautiful, civilizing, cathartic, curative, and 
even musical.”20 If this was true, however, was there ever a situation in which pain 
was not pleasurable? If it is used legitimately, and a person of a higher social standing 
beats a person of a lower social standing, does the beaten person always need to 
imagine that he has been cleansed and spiritually enriched? Melissa Sanchez argues 
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that this leads to a very dangerous way of thinking; if the most brutal torture and 
heightened suffering are not only good but are actively desirable, “it becomes hard to 
determine when injustice calls for resistance.”21 Should people always submit to 
punishment? Should they ever fight back and question whether or not this punishment 
is actually good for them? In the eyes of Machiavelli and Luther, two of the most 
foundational thinkers of the early modern period, these questions miss the point and 
expose just how ignorant ordinary people are. They both argue that those in power are 
always acting in the best interest of their subjects and followers, and that everything 
they do, no matter how cruel it may seem, is for the common good. They claim that 
ordinary people must believe in their rulers and trust that what seems like cruelty is 
actually a sort of curative that is being dispensed so that society will remain healthy 
and prosperous. Machiavelli argues that people should put their trust in princes like 
Cesare Borgia, while Luther asserts that they must trust in God. 
Machiavelli, Luther, and the Necessity of Cruelty 
 
Machiavelli’s Florence was a very dangerous place. Its political arena was 
highly competitive and marked by extreme paranoia, and public life, even for the 
average citizen, meant watching one’s words and being careful about making political 
statements. The wrong words could result in imprisonment, exile (eventually 
Machiavelli’s own fate) and even death; Nicholas Scott Baker records that “from 1480 
to 1560, sixty-two men from the Florentine office-holding class were executed within 
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the city and its territory for identifiably political reasons.”22 This violence was the 
result of territorial conflicts and constant power shifts in the Florentine government, 
and there was a trend of “increasing cruelty”23 as the city awkwardly groped toward 
stability. Machiavelli, writing after the Medicis had violently come to power, argues in 
The Prince that cruelty and swift violence are the only ways to achieve a stable 
government. Cruelty is necessary to quiet down an unruly population, to quell 
uprisings, and to intimidate political enemies. If people are allowed to get restless, if 
peasants are allowed to rebel, if political factions are allowed to develop and thrive, a 
prosperous and successful state of rule could be disrupted. Cruelty is the most efficient 
path to achieving this end; if it is distasteful, it is nevertheless a necessary evil, and 
Machiavelli feels that the ends more than justify the means. What is most important 
for Machiavelli is the outcome of a decision and not the means that were taken to get 
there; if political stability requires torture and executions, princes need to stifle their 
softer natures and wield all the cruelty that they need to use. 
Cruel princes are, in this sense, much kinder than a ruler who is overly 
merciful and thus fails to establish order and the rule of law. Machiavelli offers the 
example of Cesare Borgia, who violently brought the disorderly, fractious Romanga 
people under his rule. Machiavelli admits that Borgia’s methods were cruel, but 
reminds his reader that this cruelty “reorganized the Romagna, united it, and 
established it in peace and loyalty.”24 In Machiavelli’s eyes, Borgia was “much more 
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merciful than the people of Florence, who, to avoid the reputation of cruelty, allowed 
Pistoia to be destroyed.”25 This refers to an incident in which the town of Pistoia 
separated into two rival factions, the Panciatichi and Cancellieri; the two groups were 
so violent that, by the end of their struggle, nearly the entire town had been killed. The 
town was one of Florence’s satellite territories, but the Florentine council preferred not 
to intervene rather than look like they were intrusively meddling in the affairs of other 
people.26 Machiavelli feels that this is not only an incredibly weak political maneuver, 
but that the supposed mercy shown by Florence actually ended up harming the 
Pistoian people. He asserts that gaining a reputation for cruelty is not necessarily a bad 
thing, especially if a little cruelty now can save a lot of lives later: “no prince should 
mind being called cruel for what he does to keep his subjects united and loyal.”27 
Cruelty is, in fact, a great mercy; people should actually want their rulers to be as cruel 
as possible, because this cruelty will keep their community safe, secure and stable. 
The alternative is for citizens to put their trust in seemingly merciful leaders “who, in 
their tenderheartedness, allow disorders to occur, with their attendant murders and 
lootings.”28 Mercy, in the end, does more harm than good, while cruelty does more 
good than harm; mercy might feel good now, but it will hurt in the end, while cruelty 
is a momentary pain that will ultimately provide comfort. 
This cruelty could not, however, be arbitrary; it had to have a certain logic, and 
it had to follow particular rules. Machiavelli states that, when Cesare Borgia wanted to 
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“establish peace and reduce the land to obedience”29, he relied on the cruelty and 
viciousness of an underling named Remirro de Orco. Remirro succeeded in his 
mission, and in short time a number of unruly regions had been pacified into 
submission. Borgia realized that “the recent harshness had generated some hatred” in 
the minds of the people, and wanted to appease them now that such “excessive 
authority was no longer necessary.”30 He therefore had Remirro murdered, and placed 
his dismembered body “on the public square of Cesena one morning, in two pieces, 
with a piece of wood beside him and a bloody knife.”31 The morning in question was 
December 26th, and it was thus a sort of Christmas present, a festival offering by 
Borgia to the region’s citizens.32 John McCormick calls Remirro’s Christmas 
execution a kind of “covenant, a promise of faith”,33 a message from Borgia to his 
people that cruelty will only ever go so far. When it is no longer needed, it will be torn 
down and demolished. The irony, of course, is that this message is conveyed through a 
tortured, mangled body; it seems that when cruelty wants to talk about itself, it can 
only do so through the language and imagery of cruelty. Cruelty is always helpful, no 
matter the context; it is used to bring stability to a region, and is then used again to 
convey that cruelty will no longer be needed. The people are left “at once stunned and 
satisfied”34 by Remirro’s brutal murder, shocked by its ferocity and appeased in their 
former bitterness. This act has had a “reparative purpose”,35 healing the community 
and bringing them together in a state of peaceful rule. What might be lost in this 
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moment is the fact that the earlier acts of cruelty were reparative too; this murder has 
satisfied the anger of the grumbling villagers, but the cruelty it was meant to repair 
was itself done for the common good. 
Machiavelli’s writing is an important background for this project to consider: it 
is the first sustained consideration of why political cruelty is useful and how people 
benefit from it. The essential thing is that Machiavelli’s model is instrumental; it is 
presented as a way to think about everyday life.36 If you feel that you have been 
unjustly imprisoned, if one of your family members is flogged by a police offer, if a 
neighbor is tortured and executed in the town square, these are good things and things 
that you want to happen. The next step, if we carry this logic a bit further, is 
understanding all acts of cruelty as secret mercies. This is the stance that Luther takes. 
He argues that every moment of cruelty or injustice that occurs in life might actually 
be a part of God’s ultimate plan, and that we can not presume to understand the way 
that God works or why he makes the choices that he does. If we call God cruel, this 
means that we know his motivations and can analyze his divine reasoning; Luther 
finds this notion both impossible and offensive. We must trust and believe that 
anything cruel or painful that happens to us might be for our own good – not doing so 
would be sacrilegious and presumptuous. Cruelty, then, could be even more than just a 
useful political tool; it might be an intrinsic part of God’s plan. If we resist or fight 
back against cruelty, we are claiming to know better than God what is good for us. We 
need to submit and trust that these things happen for our benefit. 
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Luther asserts that there is no free will and argues that good works cannot free 
the soul from sin. Luther and Erasmus debate this point in a series of exchanges that 
end in Luther’s On the Bondage of the Will. In this treatise, Luther rejects Erasmus’ 
assertion that “there is strength within us”37 that leads to free will. Erasmus claims 
that, if one is strong enough, free will can be “active in matters pertaining to eternal 
salvation”38 and that striving long enough and fighting hard enough can win eternal 
life. Luther agrees that there is a will of some sort, but finds that, due to original sin, it 
has been “adjudged ungodly, unrighteous, and evil”39 from the very moment of birth. 
There is nothing a person can do to change this status; a person can work with all his 
or her strength, but these “works are nothing but sins, evil and ungodly in God’s 
sight.”40 The only hope for salvation is to submit oneself to the mercy and grace of 
God. If one does no good works, but has belief in God, that is enough: “righteousness 
is not reckoned to him that worketh, but is reckoned to him that worketh not, if only he 
believes.”41 This is not a bad thing, and one should not feel that human life is therefore 
pointless: it should bring about a sense of relief that salvation is subject to the 
incomprehensible plans of God and not the chance and randomness of human action. 
Luther admits that “even if it could be, I should not want ‘free-will’ to be given me, 
nor anything to be left in my own hands to endeavor after salvation.”42 God is merciful 
because one does not need to perform works to be saved: all that is needed is 
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accepting one’s “utter unworthiness”43 and falling before God in total humility. God 
shows, in this sense, the most powerful display of mercy: he saves the sinful simply 
because of their belief and their willingness to submit themselves. 
God’s mercy, so contradictory and mysterious, cannot quite be understood. 
There might be times when life can seem less than merciful, or perhaps even cruel. If 
life appears unjust – if bad people gain success and riches, while the good are 
miserable and oppressed – one needs to have faith that God’s mercy is behind it all. 
People of true faith must remember their submission and not presume to question 
God’s judgment. God must never be blamed, because his plans are beyond our ken to 
understand, much less criticize. Luther asserts that, if God’s “justice were such as 
could be adjudged just by human reckoning, it clearly would not be divine; it would in 
no way differ from human justice.”44 It does differ, of course, and this sort of justice is 
of a much higher order than anything that humans can produce. God may not 
necessarily be the person who does the punishing, but this punishment is a part of his 
larger plan. If one questions this judgment, if one calls life cruel or complains about 
injustice, it demonstrates a great lack of faith. Luther rails against this, condemning 
anyone who presumes to think that God is cruel or unjust: “To think that we cannot for 
a little while believe that He is just, when He has actually promised us that when He 
reveals His glory we shall all clearly see that He both was and is just!”45 In due time, 
at the end of days, the clouds will part and the light of revelation will “reveal God, to 
whom alone belongs a judgment whose justice is incomprehensible, as a God Whose 
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justice is most righteous and evident – provided only that in the meanwhile we believe 
it, as we are instructed and encouraged to do.”46 Cruelty, pain, injustice, suffering, and 
other hardships might actually be instances of God’s incomprehensible mercy. We 
can’t ever understand for sure – or, at least, we won’t be able to until the end of the 
world – and so we have no right to call anything that happens to us cruel. The cruelty 
we feel might be, when God’s plan is fully revealed, the moment that made our life 
meaningful. 
We need to believe that cruelty is good for us, even if we do not understand the 
process by which cruelty is converted into mercy. Luther argues that this belief must 
be placed in God, while Machiavelli claims that the secular prince is that figure that 
should relied on to provide a healthy, merciful cruelty. However, despite this 
difference, both of these thinkers share the view that people do not know what is good 
for them, and that they should start to recognize the cruelty inflicted on them as 
something beneficial. This is an important development when compared to the 
classical thought that preceded it; Seneca and Jerome were only interested in the way 
that cruelty was used by rulers,47 but Luther and Machiavelli are equally concerned 
with the way it is received by the people it is used against. How are ordinary people 
affected by cruelty? How do they feel about it, and how should they feel about it? 
What use might cruelty have in a person’s life, and how could a certain relationship to 
cruelty define an individual’s worldview? Luther and Machiavelli might seem sadistic 
at times, but I argue that they are not writing about sadism. They do not claim that the 
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prince or God enjoy the experience of being cruel, and they do not claim that they 
themselves enjoy the idea of cruelty. What they describe is, instead, a kind of proto-
masochism that analyses the benefits of cruelty and hardship. This analysis is, 
however, entirely social and political; neither thinker considers the idea that someone 
could take actual pleasure in the torture and punishment that they receive. Cruelty is 
good for the soul, it is a useful spiritual exercise, it is essential for social harmony, but 
it is not exactly something to luxuriate in and enjoy.  People should want cruelty to 
happen to them; this is a sign that rulers are working tirelessly in order to ensure 
political stability and public safety. Punishment, torture, discipline, and imprisonment 
are serious matters – they are not a hobby, they are not exciting or sexy, and they are 
not meant to be enjoyed. Cruelty, torture and corporeal punishment are, in their eyes, 
solemn necessities: they are valuable and important, but they are not titillating or fun. 
How could cruelty be fun, then? How could it become the foundation of a new 
kind of desire and the root of a new kind of sexual practice? How could Luther and 
Machiavelli’s logic of cruelty and submission actually be pleasurable? Luther and 
Machiavelli are transition figures in the development of masochism: they help to 
provide the logic of masochism, but they do not offer any of the pleasure that is so 
essential to masochistic desire. Masochism is not simply about obedience, submission, 
or recognizing that obedience and submission are good for you and society. It is about 
experiencing the most intense pleasure when you being submissive and obedient, 
about enjoying the fact that you have scripted this experience for yourself, and about 
appreciating and luxuriating in the shame and guilt that accompanies that experience. 
Luther and Machiavelli do not account for the fact that their logic can feel good, and 
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this is the key development that I will turn to in the next section of this introduction. 
Where did this pleasure come from, and how was it articulated in early modern 
culture? Where did it grow, what did it consist of, and who had access to it? How was 
it recognized in society, and how were people taught to relate to it? I claim that there 
was a particularly early modern quality to this pleasure, and that it was specifically 
connected to two early modern innovations. 
The first of these innovations is the nascent capitalist market, and the second is 
the popularization of the theater as a major art form and an increasingly vital cultural 
touchstone. The rise of the market allowed people to start to think of themselves as 
pieces of property: the idea of the self became something that could be bought and 
sold, and personal identity began to carry an economic value. If a person became 
embroiled in debt, this debt was an intrinsic part of their experience of the world, and 
defined how they felt about themselves and how other people treated and regarded 
them. Debtors were ridiculed and humiliated, were seen as a leech on the community, 
and were dragged into court and forced to defend their interests. The important thing 
to note about these hardships and impositions is that people were personally 
responsible for them. They were not imposed from above; ordinary people regularly 
signed themselves into economic, legal and marital situations that resulted in pain, 
shame and imprisonment, connecting them to these conditions in a very personal way. 
Early modern dramas were obsessed with this idea, and constantly depicted characters 
that understood themselves as deeply bound to the logic of the market. These 
characters tend to find pleasure in the constraints and hardships of the contracts they 
have made, and there is a sense that they make bad contracts specifically so that can 
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feel this pleasure. The condition of being in debt, of being humiliated and abused, is a 
source of pleasure and, in some cases, the foundation of an erotic fantasy. This trend is 
especially noticeable in city comedies, due to their frequent staging of the market, 
fascination with contracts and debt, and the many little cruelties that are so crucial to 
their comic effect. 
In the next sections of this introduction, I will do three things. First of all, I 
will discuss the rise of the early modern market, its impact on early modern identity, 
and the way that it interacted with the early modern theater. I will then pause my 
historical discussion to discuss how we think about masochistic pleasure today; I will 
provide an overview of contemporary writing about masochism, drawing on diverse 
material from psychoanalysis, feminist theory, queer studies, sex activism, and related 
disciplines. It is important that I refer to a wide variety of thinkers, and that I do not 
put the idea of masochism or masochistic desire into a simple box where it can be 
easily explained away. I will offer a range of views, exploring different opinions about 
the significance of masochism, the effect that it has on people, its role in society, and 
so on. This will be an essential background for the rest of the project, and I will often 
refer to the thinkers and theories that I outline here. I will finally, in the third and last 
section, return to early modern England, and will discuss how the early modern 
theater, informed by the market, began to illustrate and dramatize the kind of 
masochistic pleasures that we normally think of as such a modern concept. This does 
not mean that I will make an anachronistic argument about early modernity’s 
relationship to masochism; I do not want to assert that early modernity “created” the 
discourse of masochism as we think of it today, or that psychoanalysts and queer 
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theorists are rehearsing ideas that were already spelled out hundreds of years earlier. I 
want to suggest, instead, that these two areas of thought are continuum points on the 
historical development of masochism, and that we can understand each one better by 
discussing them at the same time. This discussion of masochistic pleasure and the 
early modern theater will conclude with a description of the four chapters that make 
up the body of my dissertation; I will review the texts that I will be working with and 
will explain the approach that I will take to these texts.  
The Market and the Theater 
 The development of the capitalist market marked a huge transformation in the 
way that people lived and spoke to one another; Martha Howell determines that the 
language of the economy, including the “language of business and social theory, the 
language of the accountant, the language of the measurer or surveyor”,48 and the 
language of buying and selling, quickly became the essential vocabularies for 
interacting with society and communicating with other people. Jonathan Gil Harris 
claims that there was also a transformation on a more national scale, as England came 
to be “defined in terms of its wealth within a global framework”49 and not as an 
isolated island. The growth of the market was not simply an economic shift: it 
involved a shift in the “existing habits and factors of thought”50 that characterized 
daily life. One of the reasons for the enormity of this shift was the fact that property 
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became movable instead of immovable, easily sold and traded.51 Amiya Kumar 
Bagchi, writing about the history of capitalism, argues that this led to everything in the 
environment becomes a good that could be bought or sold.52 If it is yours, it could be 
bought or sold for the going market rate. This meant that ownership was no longer a 
question of heritage, lineage or right, but of a fluctuating value that had to be 
calculated and monitored. If you own something, you no longer own it in perpetuity; 
property and goods could be sold, traded, exchanged and repossessed, and “rightful” 
ownership of a piece of property could change hands many times in a relatively short 
amount of time. The economy went from being extremely static to extremely fluid, 
constantly changing and evolving, and this condition of incessant change had a major 
impact on the social and cultural landscape of the period. It was, on the one hand, a 
powerful leveler, as it allowed for a new social mobility, but on the other hand it led to 
widespread disenfranchisement and alienation, people losing their goods and property, 
and a record number of people living in poverty. 
 In this atmosphere, even personal identity could become a commodity to be 
traded and bartered with. In the wake of “repressive Tudor and Stuart legislation 
directed against the dispossessed classes”53 that included sumptuary laws and drastic 
punishments for theft and trespassing, ordinary people were asked to think of 
themselves in terms of worth and value. I am worth this much because I have this 
much property and this much money, because I wear these clothes, because I do or do 
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not do this kind of job, and so on. Karmen MacKendrick argues that ordinary people 
began to be “identified by and as consumer objects”54 and were imagined to be as 
much a part of the market as the things that they bought and sold. You owned 
something but could also own someone, and could be owned in your own right. You 
could be “owned” if you signed yourself into a contract that you could not get yourself 
out of, or if you got yourself into such a deep debt that you could not pay it back. This 
was less about literal ownership, as in actual slavery, and more about the rhetorical 
idea that a person was worth a certain amount and could be therefore bought and sold 
for a certain value. If someone was poor, this meant that he or she was a slave at heart, 
and that being owned was a part of his or her natural condition. If you had no money 
or property, this meant that you were cowardly, impotent, and morally bankrupt, and 
that your poverty was a natural extension of the internal poverty that governed your 
inner life. This sort of rhetoric had already existed in terms of class and the way that 
the aristocracy spoke about peasants and commoners, but it was now specifically 
grounded in the language of the market and the way that the market understood how 
much something – or someone – was worth.  
 The culture of the period was equally invested in notions of worth and value. 
Douglas Bruster’s work has been instrumental in informing my understanding of this 
economic dynamic and how it affected the early modern culture. He states, for 
instance, that the act of writing and performing plays shifted from being the product of 
itinerant companies to being the profitable and highly popular enterprise of a series of 
stable theaters located right in the capital. Theater companies did not have to roam 
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from village to village, putting on different shows, and theaters instead became 
“regular fixtures in the urban geography of Renaissance London.”55 The process of 
putting on a play turned into a solid business decision, as the audience was now much 
larger and tended to have access to a greater amount of spare time and money for 
leisure activities. Plays had to sell themselves to these urban audiences, and the 
content of these plays had to cast a wide net to entice as many audience members as 
possible: the poor, the wealthy, men, women, children, business owners, lawyers, 
fishmongers, laborers, and so on.  Bruster argues that theaters had to appeal to so 
many people, in fact, that they were “frequently characterized, by detractors and 
supporters alike, as markets in miniature.”56 There was a pressing demand for an 
increasing amount of variety, and the number of genres that were staged – historical 
dramas, revenge tragedies, romances, tragicomedies – speak to an incessant search to 
find what would catch with audiences and what would prove popular. Plays were 
“described in terms of their exchange value”57 and how likely they were to make back 
their money. These plays were performed with an eye to being as profitable as 
possible, and theaters were very much places of business. In this way, theaters were 
“both responsive and responsible to the desires of their playgoing publics”58 and 
catered to the varied expectations of many different kinds of people. It was possible to 
go to a theater and, like a shopper at a market, choose the particular drama that most 
interested you.  
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 The content of these plays was, therefore, wrapped up in the demands of the 
market, and they constantly staged scenes of what might be called the dramatic 
material of nascent capitalism: contract disputes, market haggling, trade negotiations, 
money problems, falling into debt, etc. These scenes occur in dramas as disparate as 
revenge tragedies (Iago instructing Roderigo to put money in his purse in Othello) and 
screwball comedies (Sir Petronel Flash conning his new wife out of her property in 
Eastward Hoe), reflecting a persistent interest in the little episodes that define life in a 
setting that has undergone such a dramatic economic shift. These scenes were not 
necessarily set in banks, credit offices, or actual marketplaces, but were spread 
throughout the urban landscape: early modern plays demonstrated that bars, hotels, 
churches and brothels were as implicated in the logic and language of the market as 
the market itself; this leads Bruster to suggest that the “market was as much a concept 
as a place.”59 The theater, often referred to as a kind of market in its own right, 
produced plays with a unique awareness that market activities could take occur in all 
sorts of places, and many of these plays brought economic logic and language into 
unexpected areas like the prison, the pillory, the torture chamber, and the bedroom. 
The drama of the period insisted that the market was still relevant in even the most 
extreme moments of sex and violence, and tended to punctuate the most graphic or 
brutal scenes with metaphors and images that evoked debt, trade, property, and value. 
The market was still present when people were experiencing the greatest pain or the 
most heightened pleasure; this was, at least, what these plays consistently wanted to 
argue.  
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 If a scene of violence or humiliation used economic metaphors, that violence 
and humiliation tended to be coded as comic or erotic. These plays are filled with 
characters taking pleasure in suffering, and this is particularly true when that suffering 
involves any invocation of the market. Melissa Sanchez finds that images of 
pleasurable pain “repeatedly supplant those of courtship and marriage”60 in the work 
of early modern playwrights, and this was especially the case when these images were 
paired with the language of the market. MacKendrick insightfully argues that the 
period’s drama continually suggests that “pleasure is governed by a capitalist 
economic of trade and gain”61 so that even what seems painful, hurtful or undesirable 
can feel good when it is delivered in an economic package. How did an invocation of 
the market make something that should be painful into something pleasurable? There 
are several reasons why playwrights may have been so interested in this relationship 
between pain, pleasure and the workings of the market. It was, first of all, in the 
interest of theaters to convince audiences that paying for a negative experience could 
have a positive outcome. The theater was, after all, a dangerous place, where 
pickpockets, pimps, con artists, and other criminals roamed in search of distracted 
onlookers and simple-minded marks. It was also possible to catch the plague, and 
theaters were often shut down due to plague outbreaks; the amount of people that 
crowded into these theaters was a recipe for spreading disease.62 If paying to go to the 
theater was a dangerous enterprise, the theater was interested in conveying the idea 
that engaging in risky economic transactions – including those transactions that, like 
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attending a play, could possibly lead to theft or bodily harm – might be great fun even 
if you do wind up getting conned or injured. In fact, getting conned or injured might 
be very unique sources of pleasure, and worth experiencing. The period’s plays 
suggest that being duped, conned, cheated and humiliated are integral parts of urban 
life, and that everyone will have a negative encounter with the market at one point or 
another; if the theater could potentially be one of those negative encounters, it was 
better to think of economic negativity as amusing and urbanely pleasurable. 
These plays teach their audiences that the cramped, pestilent, and dangerous 
conditions of modern life can be thought of as amusing and outright pleasurable. If 
people are exploited and taken advantage of, if they are robbed of their money and 
given no avenue to regain it, if they are trapped in a certain economic condition and 
find it difficult to break from of it, this is funny and part of the comedy of living in an 
urban setting. This dynamic is highlighted in an early scene from Beaumont and 
Fletcher’s tragicomedy A King and No King; it turns the oppressions and humiliations 
of economic upheaval and class stratification into comic material. In this scene, 
Arbaces, King of Iberia, has returned home after a long war campaign and greets his 
people in the street. The people crowd around him, interested to hear him speak and 
wondering what he has to say: 
Arbac.: All the account that I can render you 
For all the love you have bestowed on me, 
All your expenses to maintain my war, 
Is but a little word. You will imagine 
‘Tis slender payment, yet ‘tis such a word 
As is not to be bought without our bloods: 
   ‘Tis peace.63 
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Arbaces boasts that “peace” has been achieved and that all the economic hardship that 
his people have undergone has been worth the sacrifice. When he has made his spiel 
and left, a group of local women discuss his speech. They seem to be a little confused, 
however, about exactly what Arbaces has brought them back in exchange for their tax 
dollars: 
1 Wife: Did not his majesty say he had brought us home  
peas for all our money? 
 
2 Wife: Yes, marry, did he. 
 
1 Wife: They are the first I heard on this year, by my troth.  
I long’d for some of ‘em; did he not say we should have some? 
 
2 Wife: Yes, and so we shall anon, I warrant you, have every  
one a peck brought home to our houses.64 
 
Arbaces has brought nothing of substance to his people in return for their 
contributions, but has conquered his enemies and calls this “peace.” The women 
mishear him, and ruminate on the “peas” he is going to send them and their neighbors. 
The misunderstanding these women demonstrate is a fun little joke about language 
and homophones, but it is also a record of their distance from the people who manage 
and make use of their money. It depicts the fundamental separation between people 
who have to give up their wealth and people who exploit the wealth that is given up. 
There might be actual people in need of peas or food in general, but all the king has to 
offer is rhetoric and his own satisfaction with having used public funds as he has seen 
fit. This scene is also a record of the disparity between the heroic Arbaces, a war-
minded politician, and the gossiping housewives who are unable to understand his 
speech; men make the decisions that guide the development of a nation, and women 
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can only comment on what kind of produce they have to choose from.  The comic 
qualities of the scene sugarcoat the misogyny and economic alienation that it 
documents; it suggests that exploitation is a theatrical amusement and something 
charming and harmless. These women fail to interpret the language by which they are 
being sold political bluster in place of the material resources that they hoped to gain, 
and this is a joke that the audience is expected to be entertained by and even recognize 
from their own experience of urban life. 
 The insistence with which plays depicted the economic problems of modern 
life as pleasurable and comic was matched by the popularity of those plays, a dynamic 
that could itself be seen in economic terms of supply and demand. The audiences of 
early modern England were willing to continually patronize plays in which economic 
peril was used as a comic device or given an erotic charge. This may seem 
counterintuitive, but Karmen MacKendrick has given a name to these counterintuitive 
experiences: she calls them counterpleasures, and argues that these pleasures lead a 
person to feel good after an event or moment that should specifically not make him 
feel good.65 The idea of a counterpleasure is a perfect model for understanding the 
masochistic logic that I discuss throughout this project. MacKendrick’s term is 
particularly relevant because she states that counterpleasures are ultimately resistant to 
being given an exchange value. She claims that counterpleasures defy traditional 
narratives such as goals, or fulfilling any kind of objective.66 The point is not to get 
somewhere, but to luxuriate in a constant sensation of tension and expectation. These 
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pleasures are opposed, in other words, to normative institutions and social rules. It 
may seem ironic, then, that I want to argue that early modern dramas depict 
masochism through the language of the market; the market is an incredibly normative 
institution, and it is an institution that is specifically about achieving a very concrete 
profit. However, at the same time, this makes complete sense. This is because 
MacKendrick goes on to argue that counterpleasures can use the models that oppose 
them – capitalism, religion, governments, heteronormativity – to inform, alter, and 
enhance their transgressive power.67 MacKendrick asserts that counterpleasures gain 
their greatest effect when they are paired with the very discourses that would 
otherwise obstruct them or prevent them from being expressed. This is what gives the 
masochistic desire in these early modern dramas such an impact: this desire is paired 
with an economic language that would otherwise prevent its expression. Masochism 
gains its power by embracing the very language and logic that should oppose it. 
MacKendrick’s insight into what defines a counterpleasure will vitally influence my 
readings of early modern drama and how these dramas pair masochistic desire and the 
emerging market.    
In the next sections, I will go deeper into my review and analysis of 
masochistic pleasure. I will first discuss how thinkers and writers began to understand 
and critically discuss masochism in the twentieth century, and I will highlight how 
masochism has developed as a discourse and practice. This discussion will involve a 
number of different perspectives, and I will present two sides of a debate about 
masochism: one side claims that it is a transgressive force that subverts normative 
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expectations about sex and gender, while the other side claims that it actually 
contributes to (or, in some cases, is circumscribed by) the very political powers that it 
wants to destabilize and counteract, making it just as problematic and oppressive as 
any traditional discourse. I will finally end the chapter by closely reading why the 
early modern theater was such an ideal place for masochistic desire to develop and 
flourish. 
Freud and Deleuze on Masochism 
 Otto Kemberg provides the following definition of masochism: it is a form of 
sexual desire “in which some kind of pleasure is tied to the suffering or humiliation 
undergone by the subject.”68 This definition of masochism has undergone a series of 
transformations over the past four hundred years, and has been shaped by a number of 
cultural and social shifts.69 English medical textbooks in the seventeenth century, for 
instance, “referenced flagellation as a means to shorten the male refractory period and 
as a remedy for erectile dysfunction and female lack of desire.”70 It was a medical 
solution to a medical problem, but a few centuries later it would become a medical 
problem in its own right. The term has also changed in the way that people have 
incorporated it into their personal identities and thought of themselves as part of a 
group of other people who shared the same desires. Masochism in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries was a practice that took place in brothels or in private bedrooms, 
but by the early twentieth century it had become a central theme of sex clubs, social 
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networks and entire communities of like-minded individuals.71 The concept of 
masochism experienced its most seismic changes around this time, as Freud defined it 
as a psychoanalytic term and proposed an almost medical rationale behind why 
masochists invite and take pleasure in pain. I will begin this section by discussing 
Freud’s early writings on masochism, and will then move on to the way that Deleuze 
extends, complicates and alters Freud’s claims. I will then outline some of the major 
issues in contemporary conversations about masochism, highlighting such topics as 
consent, accusations of misogyny, and the debates about whether masochism is an act 
that speaks out against power or an act that actually reinscribes power at its deepest 
levels. 
 Freud is the first major thinker to offer a comprehensive view of what 
masochism is and how it works. He begins by claiming that it is inextricably linked to 
sadism; he claims that masochism is, in fact, sadism turned against the self.72 This 
transformation occurs at the end of a process in which the death instinct and the libido 
battle for control of the mind. Freud states that the death instinct tries to turn a 
person’s inherent instability, so changeable and constantly in flux, into the “inorganic 
stability” of death; the libido, on the other hand, attempts to render this death instinct 
into something productive and harmless.73 The libido does this by turning the death 
instinct back out against the world, and this is what leads to sadism: the need for 
destruction of the self has been converted into the need for destruction of others, 
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preserving the self and turning destruction into a form of sexual desire.74 However, it 
is possible that, when the death instinct has been directed outwards and becomes the 
central way that a person articulates his or her sexual desire, this instinct can be 
“turned inward again”75 and redirected against the self. In other words, masochism 
begins with a sadistic subject who makes himself the object of that sadism.76 The 
masochist receives pleasure by doing to himself what he would have done to others: 
masochistic fantasies involve “being pinioned, bound, beaten painfully, whipped, in 
some way mishandled, forced to obey unconditionally, defiled, degraded.”77 Freud 
argues that, while “physical pain and feelings of distress” are traditionally intended to 
be “signals of danger” and signs that someone should flee from a painful situation, for 
a masochist these signals are “ends in themselves”78 and not anything to be avoided. 
 Freud states that a masochist will often imagine himself as having “committed 
some crime…which is to be expiated by his undergoing pain and torture.”79 In this 
scenario, the masochist relishes the idea that he will be punished for this (often simply 
imagined) crime; he wants to be treated like a criminal, and to have the harshest and 
cruelest sentence brought down on his head. He must, therefore, recruit someone who 
will punish him and make him suffer. The masochist casts himself as an object, and 
someone else has to be the subject that will injure and humiliate this object.80 The 
                                                                                                                                            
73
 “The Economic Problem in Masochism.” General Psychological Theory: Papers on Metapsychology. 
Trans. Philip Rieff (New York: Touchstone, 1963) 194 
74
 Ibid. 
75
 Ibid. 195 
76
 “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes.” General Psychological Theory: Papers on Metapsychology. Trans. 
Philip Rieff (New York: Touchstone, 1963) 92 
77
 “The Economic Problem” 193 
78
 Ibid. 190 
79
 Ibid. 193 
80
 “Instincts” 92 
  38 
subject has all the rights and is a real person, while the object has no rights and can be 
treated as less than the lowest form of life. The masochist is compelled to think of 
himself as a criminal because of a “sense of guilt that is for the most part 
unconscious”81 and that drives him to try and make amends for the imaginary wrong 
that he has done. It is only through suffering that he can make these amends, and this 
suffering gives him great pleasure. If a masochist’s guilt is sufficiently intense, it does 
not really matter who punishes him; Freud states that “whether the sentence is cast by 
a loved or by an indifferent person is of no importance; it may even be caused by 
impersonal forces or circumstances.”82 Freud calls this latter form of masochism, in 
which the impersonal cruelties and embarrassments of everyday life inspire a sense of 
pleasure, a “moral masochism” that does not require pain or any type of physical 
contact.83 Freud also stresses, however, that no form of masochism places that much 
importance on pain; pain is only a means to an end, and it is “not the pain itself which 
is enjoyed, but the accompanying sexual excitement”84 that comes from expiating the 
imagined sense of guilt in the most shameful and humiliating way possible. In this 
sense, masochism is similar to the infantile fore-pleasures that Freud discusses in his 
essay “The Transformations of Puberty”: like masochism, these fore-pleasures are 
grounded in tension and expectation more than in traditional fulfillment.85 The 
masochist and infant are both content to remain in a state of suspension, never 
reaching the moment of normative orgasm. Humiliation and shame are enough for the 
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masochist; the more shameful and the more humiliating the better, because this will 
make the pleasure that the masochist feels all the more intense and pronounced.  
 Freud asserts that masochism must always originate in sadism: he argues that 
“a more direct masochistic satisfaction is highly doubtful”86 and does not believe that 
this masochistic logic can exist without a sadistic definition.”87 The transfer between 
sadism and masochism was the “economic problem” that Freud references in the title 
of one of his papers on masochism; he was never quite able to explain whether or not 
sadism entirely transforms into masochism, or if there is still a trace of sadism left 
behind in masochism. He finds that there is something left behind or something lost in 
the transfer from sadism to masochism, much like what happens when you use money 
to pay for something. The equivalence between what you buy and how much you pay 
for it is never exact, and there is always something lost or confused in this transaction, 
a remainder that cannot quite be accounted for. In this sense, the economy is more 
than just a convenient metaphor for talking about masochistic desire; Freud finds that 
there is something deeply economic about masochism itself, and that understanding 
masochism requires an understanding of value and exchange. I argue Freud is 
identifying something about the masochistic experience that was first explored by the 
early modern theater. Freud and the theater are both interested in the economic process 
of masochism, especially in the way that masochists value or do not value themselves, 
and how this sense of value plays into a masochist’s personal identity. Freud is attuned 
to the early modern fascination with how a masochist understands value and how 
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economic logic plays a factor in masochistic desire. Gilles Deleuze would later take up 
Freud’s economic interest, but would take this interest in more specific and rigorous 
direction. I find Deleuze’s masochistic model to be more compelling than Freud’s, but 
Deleuze is not as explicit about Freud about the idea that he is discussing an economic 
process. I will talk more about my critical stance on these two thinkers once I have 
discussed Deleuze’s own approach to masochism. 
 Gilles Deleuze counters and complicates many of Freud’s claims. He states, 
first of all, that masochism is not created out of any original sadism. Deleuze argues 
that while the sadist may enjoy being hurt, and the masochist may enjoy giving pain, 
they cannot be collapsed into each other; the pleasure the sadist receives from pain is 
different from the pleasure the masochist receives, and the pleasure the masochist 
receives from giving pain is different from the pleasure the sadist receives.88 Deleuze 
claims that the “sadist and the masochist might well be enacting separate dramas, each 
complete in itself, with different sets of characters and no possibility of 
communication between them.”89 Deleuze submits that the two forms of desire are too 
distant from one another to be related in any way. He claims that masochism operates 
through an entirely unique set of narratives and obsessions, and that these elements do 
not rely on any original sadism.  While sadism is the expression of an intensely 
destructive sensuality, in masochism there is a notable “desexualization of libidinal 
aggression”90 that is completely counter to the entire idea  of sadism. The coldness or 
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lack of emotion that a masochist shows is, in fact, a “disavowal of sensuality”91 and 
anything that might look or seem like traditional sexual pleasure.  
This does not mean, however, that there is nothing Freudian about Deleuze’s 
analysis of masochism. He offers an economic theory of his own, but he uses the 
language and logic of contracts instead Freud’s language and logic of value. Deleuze 
asserts that, in masochistic practice, the masochist and the torturer sign a contract in 
order to ensure that both parties agree to exactly what will take place and how the 
session will be conducted; this contract stipulates that at “a precise point in time and 
for a determinate period”92 the torturer will have the right to abuse, ridicule, punish, 
and control the masochist. The torturer’s actions, what he or she will wear, what he or 
she will say and do, must be “stated, promised, announced and carefully described”93 
in advance, and the session must not deviate from these established parameters. The 
masochist is oppressed and constrained by the terms of a contract that he has signed 
and, in most cases, written himself. These contracts use legalistic language and are 
extremely formal; this is necessary because these scenes entail an incredible amount of 
detail, and everything must be precisely in place in order for the scene to achieve its 
desired effect. If the contract is not adhered to, if the torturer says the wrong thing or 
uses the wrong tools or props, this is akin to breaking a law. The contract cannot be 
ignored or taken lightly; on the contrary, it should be followed to the letter in the most 
pedantic way, and it should be enforced with a merciless strictness that grows 
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“increasingly cruel and restrictive”94 as the session wears on. The masochist insists 
that the law of the contract is applied to him as rigidly as possible, and that he is given 
no quarter. There should be no emotional or sentimental interpretation of the 
contract’s words, and they should be followed without feeling sorry for the masochist 
who is being punished. 
Deleuze’s theory of the masochistic contract is incredibly compelling, and I 
have found it an insightful model for thinking about masochistic desire throughout this 
project. He does not, however, explicitly use the term “economic” or consider his 
theory in an economic light. I have called his analysis of masochistic contracts an 
economic model, but that term is the result of my own reading of his writing. Deleuze 
provides many sharp critiques of Freud’s work, but he does not specifically carry 
forward one of the lasting insights of Freud’s writings on masochism: the specifically 
economic quality of masochistic desire. In other words, Deleuze misses an essential 
link between the work that he has done and the Freudian work that he is critiquing and 
responding to. I find that while Deleuze’s model of masochism is more considered and 
intellectually rigorous, Freud’s explicitly economic language is a key background for 
how I think about masochism and how I will approach the various early modern texts 
that I read in the following chapters. Deleuze does not recognize, like Freud does, that 
there might be an “economic problem” at the core of masochistic desire; the contracts 
that he describes are extremely neat and tidy, and there is not the sort of loss or 
unaccounted remainder that Freud identifies in the masochistic understanding of value. 
I will follow Freud in arguing that masochistic exchanges are not always perfect and 
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exact, and that we must pay attention to the economic dynamics of masochistic logic. I 
want to notice, like Freud does, what is lost when someone expresses masochistic 
desire, and what they get in return. I will, therefore, work to bring more economic 
terms into Deleuze’s model of masochism, and I will repeatedly show how versions of 
Deleuze’s model are articulated on the early modern stage through dramatic scenes 
that feature buying, selling, contracts, and incurring and paying off debt. 
The next two sections will conclude my introduction. The first section reviews 
the critical understanding and reception of masochism during the twentieth century, 
while the second section will return us to an early modern context and focus more 
deeply on the theater’s relationship to masochism. I am especially interested in how 
the audience factors into this masochistic dynamic, and what sort of masochistic 
pleasure can be found in being a spectator. What is the difference between masochistic 
authorship and masochistic spectatorship? How does an audience receive masochistic 
pleasure by watching an erotic scene play out? This will be an essential question for 
my entire project, and I will especially pursue this thread in my fourth chapter. I feel 
that, before I begin to engage this key question, it will be important for me to pause 
and consider how we think about masochism today. 
The Critical Reception of Masochism 
There are two schools of thought about masochism: one states that masochism 
reinscribes lines of power and reinforces oppression, while the other claims that this 
practice radically destabilizes where power lies and how it can be used.95 Those that 
argue masochism is a transgressive act assert that it calls into question whether being 
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dominant is the only form of personal agency.96 These thinkers and practitioners claim 
that masochism poses “a radical challenge to the foundations of the political and 
cosmic order”97 and that it offers a very different narrative of power and submission. 
Deleuze claims that the masochist’s “apparent obedience conceals a criticism”98 of the 
way that governments expect their citizens to follow along and submit to their 
decisions without any questions. Deleuze argues that the attention to detail that 
masochists show, the specificity with which they adhere to the precise wording of 
their contracts, the intensity with which they mold the very particular mise en scene of 
an erotic moment, “is a demonstration of the law’s absurdity.”99 In these masochistic 
behaviors, the legalistic rigor of the language of power is revealed to be pedantic, 
impractical, and ultimately ridiculous. If a masochist experiences pleasure when he or 
she is abused by a torturer who speaks with the anonymous severity of the law, the 
masochist is provoking “the very disorder” that this anonymous severity “is intended 
to prevent.”100 The government, the courts, the police, and related institutions do not 
intend for people to feel good when they are punished and disciplined; punishment and 
discipline are supposed to be deterrents, not incitements, to committing improprieties 
and crimes. The thing that makes masochism so transgressive, then, is that masochists 
invite this punishment and discipline on their heads, suggesting that they can do 
whatever they want with the language of power. These masochists, in doing so, make 
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what Peter Cosgrove calls a “fantastic mockery”101 out of what is a solemn and serious 
assertion of domination and control. 
 Masochism is also transgressive because it suggests that sexual pleasure is not 
necessarily located in the genitals.102 It is instead spread throughout the skin and 
diffused throughout the body, so that pleasure can be felt in many places on the body 
that are not traditionally considered erotic.103 In the masochistic experience, the body 
does not necessarily need to end at the skin or the extremities. It is thrown all around 
the room, so that the masochist feels his body even in the props and other elements of 
the mise en scene that comprise his erotic scenario. This is a very different conception 
of how sex is supposed to work; it is distributed instead of focused, multiple instead of 
singular, and interested in tension instead of reaching a goal. This desire subverts 
conventional social expectations and asserts that sex does not have to be about 
completion or satisfaction. It also does not have to be about reproduction or customary 
gender roles, and it offers an alternative eroticism that is more personal and intense 
than normative desire. This, according to writers like Deleuze, Bersani and Zizek, 
makes masochism into a political act; participating in masochism is a statement 
against social norms and a critique of the burdens that are placed on people to behave 
like good citizens and produce children. It is also a critique of the logic of capitalism, 
and the incessant need for capitalist enterprises to have some kind of an objective or a 
point at which an endeavor is deemed successful. Masochism uses the capitalist tools 
of contracts, debt, and ownership in a way that is very different from their intended 
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purpose; there is no attempt to recover lost revenue or make good on loans and there is 
no interest in producing anything that can be used. The point is to linger in the 
language of the contract and relish the idea of debt, participating in these systems for 
their own sake and not in the hopes of acquiring or purchasing something. 
 The flipside to viewing masochism as transgressive and subversive is paying 
attention to the group of thinkers who consider it to be damaging and oppressive. 
Darren Langdridge and Meg Barker, for instance, criticize psychoanalysis for failing 
to draw “any clear distinction between acts which are transgressive and those which 
are coercive.”104 If someone enjoys the experience of being abused and demeaned, 
have they only been taught to feel this way by institutions of power? Is masochism 
really a commentary on power, or does it simply rehearse and problematically 
replicate the language of power? These questions suggest that masochism is an 
expression of a sort of false consciousness instituted by living in a state of political 
and social repression. These critics claim that masochists only believe that they are 
feeling pleasure because this is exactly the sort of logic that would emerge from a 
society that is so permeated by the abuses of power. It difficult, then, to determine 
whether or not masochists actually consent to the abuse and humiliation that they 
undergo; if a masochist signs himself into a contract and completely believes that this 
is what he wants to do, the agency that he is expressing may be entirely coerced and 
not truly his own. If this is true, masochists are only doing what the institutions of 
power want them to do, and they are not actually critiquing anything. Masochism, in 
this case, is not subversive at all; it actually helps support the discourses that it claims 
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to critique, and reinforces the power that those discourses have over the people who 
suffer under them.  
 Masochism is also critiqued for being a misogynist practice. Freud, Deleuze 
and other theorists refer to the masochist almost exclusively as “he” and to the torturer 
almost exclusively as “she” – the active role in this relationship is normally the male 
participant. Zizek argues that the female torturer in a masochistic fantasy receives her 
own identity and is fulfilling her own erotic interests,105 but Suzanne Stewart critiques 
him for describing these women as little more than props in a male masochist’s 
scenario. Zizek claims that the fact that this torturer is a prop in the masochist’s erotic 
scene, the fact that she appears to be in control but is actually acting out a script that 
the masochist has written, illustrates the “constructedness of gender relations”106 and 
exposes how control, consent and desire are performed fictions. If this is a compelling 
point, Stewart is not pleased about the fact that it does not truly explain away the 
problematic detail that women, even in an erotic structure that is supposed to explode 
traditional notions about sexuality, still need to take a submissive role in a man’s 
fantasy. This is compounded by the idea that whatever power a woman has in these 
scenarios is only given to them by a male partner, and it is this same male partner that 
takes that power away when the scene is over. These theorists do not entertain the 
conceit that a woman might be the one in control of a masochistic situation; Robert 
Tobin argues that the idea that a woman might be scripting the scene of her own 
pleasure and demonstrating an active desire makes many theorists uncomfortable, 
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even those theorists who claim that masochism is a subversion of gender roles.107 The 
very theorists that promote masochism as an alternative form of sexuality are also, it 
seems, the same writers that consign it to the normative narratives that it is intended to 
demolish. 
 I have taken this pause to discuss contemporary views on masochism because I 
feel that it is an important context for thinking about how masochism developed in 
early modernity. I wanted to make sure that I explored these contemporary views 
before I returned to the early modern period in the last part of this introduction; in 
other words, I have worked backwards in these last two sections, explaining how we 
think about masochism today before I turn again to how masochism was articulated on 
the early modern stage. The thinkers that I discussed in the preceding pages, 
particularly Deleuze and the writers that are inspired by him, will have an important 
role in my analysis of the early modern theater and its expression of masochism. 
Deleuze’s comments about masochistic theatricality and how masochists create an 
erotic mise en scene will be foundational for how I think about the early modern 
theater and uncover its emerging strands of masochistic desire. When I have finished 
this discussion, I will finally elaborate on the body of this project, and will break down 
each of my four chapters and what texts and themes will be important to each of them. 
Masochism and the Theater 
 One of the elements that makes masochism such a particular form of desire is 
its intense theatricality. Deleuze has done the most to theorize this approach to 
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masochism. He asserts that it is a formal event: everything must look and feel a certain 
way, and certain props and elements must be in place for the moment of desire to 
achieve its full effect. The masochist does not engage in a masochistic scene without a 
great deal of preparation; if such a scene appears to be spontaneous or random, it is 
only because it has been precisely arranged to appear that way. These scenes are 
extremely ritualistic, and everyone involved in them has to perform according to the 
pre-established script. The more precisely the torturer looks and behaves according to 
the terms of the ritual, the more potent and powerful the pleasure that the masochist 
feels. Deleuze finds that in these fantasies the torturer is often depicted as “frozen” or 
suspended in the poses or postures that are most erotic to the masochist.108 The 
masochist wants to freeze these moments and analyze them; he wishes to suspend 
reality so that he can better conduct a “scientific observation”109 of the exact seconds 
in which he is most ridiculed, most humiliated, most dominated, made to feel the most 
pain, and so on. In this way, pleasure is prolonged and postponed for as long as 
possible;110 the scene is split up into so many frozen images that the masochist might 
never even reach the moment of orgasm. 
Deleuze asserts that the staging of the masochistic drama, with all of its sets 
and props, is more “important to the masochist than the moment of orgasm.”111 This 
staging is so precise and ritualistic that the masochist cannot trust just anyone to 
torture and abuse him: he needs to find, recruit and train his torturer in order to make 
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sure that the scene is properly staged and the torturer plays the role in the right way.112 
The masochist is, in other words, a willing victim in search of a torturer, and the 
torturer that the masochist finds needs to be educated in how to correctly humiliate 
and punish him.113 The torturer in the masochistic experience is not always a sadist or 
someone who enjoys punishing and inflicting pain; she is an element in the 
experience, deeply embroiled in its structure.114 It may appear that the masochist is 
under the strict control of the torturer, but Deleuze states that it is actually the exact 
opposite; it is the masochist who “forms her, dresses her for the part and prompts the 
harsh words she addresses to him.”115 The masochist has control over the entire event, 
and he is its designer and director; part of the pleasure of these masochistic scenes, 
however, comes from a disavowal that he has any control at all, and from claiming 
that he is completely dominated by the torturer who seems to have such power over 
him. Peter Cosgrove offers an important insight here: he argues that the masochist is 
“simultaneously playwright and audience”116 because he crafts this scene but then 
appears to passively receive it as if he has had nothing to do its creation. He is an 
active participant in the pain that is inflicted on him, but it is vital to his fantasy that he 
looks like he is helpless and at the mercy of a much more powerful figure. The 
masochist would be upset if he is not beaten or humiliated in the right way, if he is not 
treated with the degree of harshness that he has instructed his torturer to use, and if the 
all props and essential elements of the mise en scene are not arranged in the specified 
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manner. 
The theatricality of masochistic desire is especially prominent on the early 
modern stage. Early modern dramas are filled with characters that script themselves 
into harmful or painful situations, precisely designing everything that happens to them 
and completely organizing these experiences. In The Merchant of Venice, for instance, 
Shylock’s daughter Jessica appears at first to be an innocent young woman who 
becomes caught up in the religious and legal struggle between her father and her new 
husband Lorenzo’s Christian comrades. She seems to be insulted and denigrated by 
Lorenzo and his friends, who treat her like an outcast. Jessica is not, however, simply 
an innocent victim: she has designed this entire narrative for herself, and the play is 
clear about the ways that she has dressed herself in certain clothes, crafted a particular 
mise en scene, and even anticipated the reactions and behaviors of other characters. 
The play suggests that she has recruited these Christian characters because marrying a 
Christian and surrounding herself with Christian invective will make her feel ashamed 
and humiliated. This is not, however, a bad thing: it is the way that this character 
expresses erotic desire. In the same play, Antonio’s desires are depicted with a similar 
masochistic logic. Antonio seeks out Shylock, the character most likely to hate him, 
and signs a contract that all but guarantees that his life will be in Shylock’s hands. If 
Antonio is the “willing victim in search of a torturer” that I referred to earlier, Shylock 
is a torturer that does not need to be trained; he is already disposed to be as cruel to 
Antonio as possible, and to pursue his contract to the strictest letter of the law. Jessica 
and Antonio both claim that they are at the mercy of someone else, when they are in 
fact the ones responsible for everything that has happened to them. 
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These characters author their own masochistic narratives; at the same time, 
however, they are also spectators, watching their narratives play out as they sit silently 
on the sidelines or occasionally contribute a self-pitying monologue to help move the 
action along and ensure that it reaches its desired conclusion. In these moments, the 
masochist appears to be simply “watching” what is happening and not “doing” 
anything. Jessica hangs back from her husband and his Christian friends, watching 
quietly as they abuse and harass her father – she does not even comment when they 
insult her, and instead defers to her husband or even joins in on their anti-Semitic 
language. Antonio constantly insists that he is a helpless victim, and leaves himself in 
the hands of Portia, Shylock and the court. He is like an animal being led to the 
slaughter, and everyone but him has a say in what will happen to him – he can only sit 
back and watch these events as they transpire. Jessica and Antonio are not, however, 
simply watching what happens; these scenes may stress their passivity, but they have 
both actually been the active figures all along, scripting and organizing everything that 
happens. What the early modern stage reveals, then, is that spectatorship does not 
necessarily have to be a passive role. It is possible to be an active viewer, fully 
implicated in what you are watching and even, in some way, responsible for the action 
that is being staged. Jessica and Antonio have crafted these scenes in such a way that 
they will be able to sit back as audience members and watch the plot as if they did not 
design it. In other words, if you want to see your kind of play, you’ll have to write it 
yourself – though, in this case, part of the appeal of creating the play is in claiming 
that you are simply an audience member and disavowing that you’ve had anything to 
do with its creation. 
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The masochist is always a spectator of the masochistic scene; he or she 
watches it unfold and acts like an audience member. Does this mean, however, that 
being an ordinary audience member – one who has not scripted the scene that is 
playing out in front of her, or who is not a masochist – can also be an active role? Is it 
possible for any audience member to be active? Is paying for a ticket and watching the 
play an active form of participation? Does it matter if an audience member says 
nothing or has no reaction? Does he or she need to laugh, cry, heckle, or comment on 
the play in order to be considered an active viewer? I argue that there were a number 
of early modern plays that invited any audience member to think of himself as an 
active viewer. I go further to claim that, because one of the early modern theater’s 
models for active spectatorship was masochism, this led to plays that created a 
masochistic dynamic between the stage and the audience. One example of this 
dynamic is Ben Jonson’s city comedy Bartholomew Fair, which opens with a long and 
dry induction; in this induction, the stage manager coerces the audience into signing a 
contract with the stage. The audience must agree to enjoy what they see, and, as the 
play is filled with insults, beatings and humiliations, much of this pleasure would 
come from moments of cruelty and hardship. This cruelty would not, however, be 
isolated to the stage; audience members would also be expected to take pleasure in the 
play being cruel to them, and to enjoy the play calling them naïve, foolish, and 
ignorant. This not the only model that the early modern stage offers us for thinking 
about active spectatorship, but it is surely one of the most compelling and original, and 
it allows us to see masochism as more than a structure of erotic desire – it can be a 
structure for watching and enjoying a play. 
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The first two chapters in this dissertation will both focus on Shakespeare’s The 
Merchant of Venice, and I will deeply discuss Jessica and Antonio’s masochistic 
desires. My first chapter, “Jessica, the lack of community, and the pleasures of 
shame”, will read Jessica’s humiliation and alienation at the hands of Lorenzo and his 
Christian cohort as a masochistic narrative that she has designed for herself. She 
betrays her father, gives up his wealth and marries Lorenzo, one of his enemies, in 
return receiving the pleasures of guilt and shame. In my second chapter, “Bondage, the 
public marketplace, and Antonio’s body as a commodity”, I highlight the bond that is 
made between Shylock and Antonio, and I demonstrate that Antonio intentionally 
binds himself into a situation that he is aware will lead to pain and suffering. He acts 
like he is completely helpless and totally at the mercy of Shylock and his rigorous 
legalese, but he has, in fact, entirely designed this situation for himself. In my third 
chapter, “The benefits of being a wittol in early modern city comedies”, I will 
concentrate on a striking figure from early modern culture; this figure is the wittol, or 
a cuckold who realizes that he is being cuckolded and actually enjoys the experience. 
The major example of this figure is the contented wittol Allwit in Middleton’s city 
comedy A Chaste Maid in Cheapside, who is more than happy that his wife is sleeping 
with her lover, the pimp and con artist Sir Walter Whorehound. In my last chapter, 
“Insulting the audience and masochistic spectatorship in Bartholomew Fair”, I will 
turn my attention to one of the most important characters in this project: the members 
of the early modern audience that attended all of these plays. I will especially focus on 
the bizarre induction to Jonson’s bitter comedy, and will describe the way that it 
coerces its audience into signing what ultimately amounts to a masochistic contract. 
  55 
This project is an attempt to rediscover masochism as a critical and literary 
term. I want to write and think about how an alternative form of desire gets expressed 
on the stage, and to tease out the different ways that this desire is acted out by literary 
characters, received by period audiences, and understood by contemporary critics. I 
also want to see this desire as an early modern concept, and to show how the early 
modern period was instrumental in creating the logic and language of pleasurable pain 
that we see today as the modern concept of masochism. My ultimate hope is that this 
project is a contribution to early modern studies and the way that critics approach 
depictions of sexuality in literary texts. I discuss these contributions at greater length 
in this project’s conclusion, in which I offer final thoughts and a summation of my 
argument that brings together the many claims I have made throughout my four 
chapters. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
Jessica, the lack of community, and the pleasures of shame in The Merchant of 
Venice 
 
Jessica has been of increasing interest to recent critics of The Merchant of 
Venice, who see her as an emblematic figure for the play’s uncomfortable 
disharmonies. Critics such as Mary Metzger, Julia Lupton and Janet Adelman have 
demonstrated that Jessica is caught between the Jewish ancestry she has rejected and 
the Christian community she has married into but that does not accept her. She 
remains an alien to her husband’s Christian friends; her Jewish origins hang over her 
head and make her ultimately impossible to integrate. Gratiano openly calls her an 
“infidel”,117 which, comic ribbing or not, reaffirms her essential strangeness in the 
company of trueborn Christians. Lorenzo’s other friends simply ignore her, and 
Adelman has considered the effect of Jessica being “physically isolated on the 
stage”118 for the majority of the last act, awkwardly speechless and clearly outside the 
privileged circle of comic banter and Christian camaraderie that connects the other 
characters. In addition, they point out that Jessica’s conversion affects more than her 
own identity and social position; it is the first nail in her father’s coffin, and he ends 
the play not only humiliated and spiritually lost but must face this trial without the 
support of his daughter. Heather Hirschfield finds that her conversion enhances the 
sting of Shylock’s financial and spiritual losses and gives them a violently debilitating 
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emotional meaning.119 In the end, Jessica is left an outsider to both of Venice’s 
represented communities. She has abandoned her father, rejected her ancestral 
tradition, and has no native community to return to. In return, she is surrounded by 
strangers and their unknown customs in a strange and alienating new context that will 
never really be her own – she is left alone, unwanted, and without the certainties she 
could once rely on. 
These critics have posited that Jessica receives a higher reward for her 
condition. If she is not accepted by the Christians, she has still been given membership 
in the normative religious and political world she had been excluded from. Lupton 
calls her a “citizen-saint”,120 her struggle almost a form of martyrdom that helps 
cement the idea of a civic community and makes smooth the road for future citizens 
and converters. She claims that Jessica suffers now so that it will be easier for others 
to convert later on in history. Jessica, in Lupton’s analysis, represents all the people 
who will one day give up their scattered, isolated and local beliefs so that they can 
enter a larger, unified nation and take on new, national traditions. But how does 
Jessica feel about her status as a proto-citizen? Is this political benefit, so abstract and 
intangible, the only benefit that Jessica receives from her situation? Does the play 
show that there is another benefit to the trial that she has undergone, a benefit that is 
more immediate and more her own? She appears to be wedged between figures who 
want to control her or who regard her with disdain or apathy, but could she gain 
something from these feelings? What other benefits might there be to feeling dejected 
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and isolated?  
I argue that Jessica receives a very specific, personal benefit from these 
feelings: pleasure. She is a self-willed character who takes what she wants, and she 
seems to have achieved what she wants by the end of the play. She is one of the play’s 
most determined and successful playwrights, and has minutely scripted much of what 
happens to her. The idea that she wants to feel lonely, exiled and humiliated might 
make readers confused or uncomfortable; if she has scripted these events for her own 
gain, this would mean that she actually desires hardship. How can these points be 
reconciled: Jessica's desires on the one hand, and the harsh condition she creates for 
herself and her father on the other? If critics are right that Jessica's conversion leaves 
her spiritually and socially lost – and I agree with them – how is it also true that she 
has apparently orchestrated this for herself? Is it possible that she finds pleasure in her 
conversion not despite all of its negative effects but, in fact, because of them? 
 If I call this masochism, it is not because I want to psychoanalyze Jessica or 
paint for her an inner life that may not have been there to begin with. I do not even 
want to claim that Jessica has set events in motion specifically for her erotic benefit. 
What I want to show is that Jessica has designed her situation herself. On the surface, 
it seems that nothing works out for her: her husband regards her as a piece of attractive 
property, the Christian community ignores or mocks her, and she has caused her father 
both emotional suffering and financial ruin. If we consider, however, that this status is 
the result of scenarios that Jessica has designed, directed, staged and performed in, we 
need to find another language to discuss what she wants and how she gets it. The 
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scenes she takes part in are often personally scripted by her, and are guided by a mise 
en scene that she has dictated and organized from afar. These scenes, with their 
precise attention to detail and staging, have the drive of masochistic fantasy. The 
process by which they lead to her social and religious situation at the end of the play – 
abject and ostracized – is like a chemical formula that has been calculated to yield as 
much unhappiness as possible.  
The use of the term “masochism” to discuss or explain this process might give 
some readers pause. I argue, however, that the language of masochism offers the ideal 
way to dissect and inspect the desires that are depicted in the play. I will draw on the 
psychoanalytic history of masochism that I outlined in the introduction, and will use 
its logic and terminology to understand the narrative that Jessica constructs. I find that 
her experience recalls the structures of masochism in three major ways. Firstly, she 
designs a unique mise en scene for herself with certain props, dialogue, actors, and so 
on; secondly, this mise en scene cultivates feelings of disgrace and rejection, such as 
having one's most vulnerable areas laid bare and mocked or being exposed before the 
community as a fraud and bastard; and thirdly, her experience is not random, arbitrary 
or unsystematic, but is grounded in the contracts, bonds and contractual thinking that 
defines the play. This last point is especially important, as Jessica is the most 
contractually-engaged character in the play – even more than Antonio and Shylock. 
The critical interest in the play's contracts has almost always been on the bond 
between Antonio and Shylock or on Portia and Bassanio’s marriage, but Jessica enters 
the lion's share of the play's contracts: she gets married, enters a new religion, 
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becomes a citizen and inserts herself into the volatile Venetian economy. If these 
contracts lead to her being oppressed, I want to discuss the other benefits that she may 
be receiving from them, or whether her oppression might be a benefit in itself 
 The suggestion that a character receives pleasure from or benefits from 
oppression is sure to be chafed against. This might be because scholars seem 
somewhat uncomfortable with the idea of masochistic pleasure. Masochism itself is 
not the issue – it is a character finding genuine pleasure in that masochism. Karmen 
MacKendrick notes that while desires like masochism have been legitimated in 
academic discourse, finding pleasure in those desires remains somehow aberrant and 
illegitimate.121 If critics are willing to discuss the effects of masochism, it is almost 
always in terms of its political ramifications and social implications. This is 
particularly true of an otherwise quite striking and rich series of articles about 
masochism, political community and The Merchant of Venice by Drew Daniel, 
Graham Hammill, and Jacques Lezra. The three critics respond to each other in a 
chain that begins with Daniel, mapping out how cruelty, whether originating in the law 
or self-inflicted, becomes integral to civic life. Daniel makes some provocative claims 
about Antonio’s ultimate desires, claiming he wants Bassanio to watch him as he is 
tortured.122 Daniel ultimately finds that what the play depicts is not necessarily an 
individual’s violent fantasy but “the subjection of civil subjects to the laws of the city, 
the subjection of humanity to divine justice.”123 Daniel’s subtle point draws out two 
very different kinds of subjection; in some ways, he makes a point that is very similar 
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to my earlier thoughts about Machiavelli, who demands obedience to the prince, and 
Luther, who demands obedience to God. I want to, however, make a more personal 
argument that focuses on a character and how her individual desire is dramatized. 
Hammil, in a similar fashion, also offers a fascinating insight into the play; he writes 
about how masochists might be attracted to figures that a government labels as 
dangerous, and he states that masochists defy these warnings and seek out 
relationships with such people, bringing down on their own heads the reprimand of the 
state while also giving them a sense of pleasure.124 I am very inspired by his reading, 
but this chapter will be more about personal pleasure than the political arena that 
Hammil is interested in. When he states that Venice’s masochism opens up “a space of 
civil exchange between Christian and Jew while preserving enmity and anti-
Semitism”,125 I want to see how this can be a pleasurable experience for a person or a 
character, and how it might have more meaning than as a theoretical exercise.  
My point is not to chastise these scholars for connecting masochism to political 
discourse, but to note that masochistic pleasure is not only about politics and theory. 
In this chapter, and throughout this project, I will show the ways that masochism is 
powerfully connected to and implicated in such early modern institutions as the 
market, the theater, the court, and so on. What is essential, however, is that I do not 
claim that people have been forced to understand their sexuality in terms of these 
institutions. If such institutions have become a part of their sexual lives, it might be 
that ordinary people found a way to use these institutions to fuel their personal 
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fantasies and desires. I argue that these social forces can be used and taken up by 
people, who can exploit them and turn them into something entirely different. I 
definitely do not want to claim that is possible to be completely outside of social or 
political power, but I do want to assert that we should pay attention to how people can 
be the driving force behind their own desires. 
 In this chapter, I offer a reading of Jessica that is attuned to masochism as 
more than just a political practice and that considers the experiences of shame and 
hardship as experiences of pleasure. This does not mean, however, that the political 
and social implications of masochism will not factor into this discussion. These 
contexts will be essential to understanding how Jessica styles herself in this 
masochistic narrative, how she crafts a “story” out of her surroundings, and how she 
bends the people, traditions and rituals of both the Christian and Jewish communities 
to her erotic interests. Her roles as a Venetian citizen, Christian convert, former Jew, 
newlywed and participant in the market are all raw material that informs and shapes 
the narrative she creates. I want to show how Jessica is not necessarily at the mercy of 
larger political forces, but how she employs and exploits those forces for her own 
pleasure. Does Jessica serve the Venetian government as a symbol of citizenship, 
helping to clear the way for future citizens, or does she use the apparatus of citizenship 
as a prop in her personal fantasies? This chapter will suggest that the latter 
interpretation is possible. I will open the chapter with a discussion of Helena from 
All’s Well That Ends Well. I argue that, while Jessica’s desires are rather complicated 
and will take some time to unpack, Helena’s masochistic interests are sharper and 
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more explicit. In exploring her desires and how she crafts her own mise en scene, I 
want to introduce some of the ideas that will be essential to my close reading of 
Jessica. I will show how Jessica designs the mise en scene of her elopement, and then 
outline the many consequences of the elopement for herself and her father. I will next 
discuss Jessica's treatment by the Christian community, especially focusing on her 
interactions with Portia. The final section of the chapter will detail how Jessica’s 
experiences can be understood as pleasurable when they are read as part of a 
masochistic narrative, and I will discuss the implications of her narrative on how we 
think about pleasure in early modern studies. 
Helena and Masochism 
 Helena of All’s Well That Ends Well is, in a sense, an even more abject figure 
than Jessica. She places herself into situations that will cause her absolutely explicit 
humiliation; the shame she suffers is palpably obvious, unlike the more subtle, implied 
shame and regret that we will discuss in Jessica’s narrative. Helena asks for Bertram’s 
hand in marriage; this is despite the fact that she comes from a lower social class, has 
no money of her own, and is a ward of the state. She compares him to “a bright 
particular star”126 that she can barely gaze at, much less hope to marry. He is like the 
“sun, that looks upon his worshipper/But knows of him no more”127 – a celestial object 
that does not or cannot take notice of the insignificant, smaller objects around him. By 
requesting his hand, Helena has consciously placed herself in an orbit that is 
dangerously beyond her ken. It may not be surprising to her, then, that Bertram reacts 
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to her request with a complete dismissal. He insults her social position and essentially 
asserts that it would be better to live in exile than to marry a woman like her. She is 
left thoroughly embarrassed; Bertram brings on his head the reprimand of the court 
and the wrath of the king, but all this is preferable to spending his life with her. His 
reaction is shared by at least two of the other lords that Helena examines as potential 
husbands;  David Kay argues that these two lords are just as reluctant to be married to 
Helena, but that they must hide their feelings in the name of decorum.128 The court is 
compelled to pity Helena, and she is turned into a sort of curiosity or sideshow that 
members of the court can stare at from the corner of their eye and whisper about to 
one another. The play is filled with scenes of gossip and characters reporting on what 
other characters are doing, where they are going and what people are saying about 
them; even if Helena is not maligned by every character in the play, she realizes that 
she will be pursued by “pitiful rumor”129 and that everyone will know about and 
comment on her predicament. Parolles spreads her story around Florence so that even 
Diana, who has no relationship to the Parisian court, is fully aware of what has 
happened and can express pity over it.130 Helena has no safe space to feel comfortable 
and secure, but is needled by condescending public scrutiny on the one hand and, on 
the other, assured that she is unwanted and undesired by the very man that she has 
built all of her fantasies around. 
 The play is insistent, however, in showing how prepared Helena has been for 
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this sort of reaction. When she offers to heal the king’s illness, he asks her what 
punishment she will undergo if she is unsuccessful. She answers that, in case of 
failure, she is willing to face all the shame and humiliation that the court and the 
public can muster against her: 
Tax of impudence, 
A strumpet's boldness, a divulged shame; 
Traduced by odious ballads, my maiden's name 
Sear’d otherwise, nay – worse of worst – extended 
With vilest torture.131 
 
Her operation is successful, but she ends up dealing with these very consequences 
when she asks for Bertram’s hand in marriage. The cause is different, but the result is 
exactly the same: her desires are revealed but tramped on, she is shamed in front of the 
court, and her name is dragged through the mud in public. She is mired in the 
adversities that she imagined for herself, and must undergo more if she is ever going 
to resolve these issues, but she has already steeled herself to face them. Helena 
resembles a medieval martyr, fully aware of all the trials that will be imposed on her 
but also prepared to suffer through them. There is certainly a religious quality to her 
situation, and Helena seems to embrace the language of religious martyrdom. She 
realizes she should not long for Bertram, but she states she is “Religious in mine 
error”,132 driven by divine attraction to love him. She undergoes her hardships with a 
religiously “zealous fervor”,133 worships his possessions and “relics”134 with an 
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“idolatrous fancy”,135 and curses herself as a wretched “caitiff”136 for having disturbed 
Bertram’s sacrosanct life. She makes plans to “barefoot plod…the cold ground”137 on 
an arduous religious pilgrimage to make amends for her irreligious behavior, holding 
in her heart a “sainted vow”138 to bring peace back to her idol. Helena is extremely 
competent in this religious language, and at times seems almost too prepared to accept 
the role of martyr. She immerses herself in this role, surrounding herself with its 
iconography, lacing her dialogue with its imagery and performing it with the energy of 
a true believer. The reader might begin to wonder whether this role has really been 
imposed on her, or whether she might be in some sense complicit with her situation.  
 This is because Helena has designed this role for herself. When she presents 
herself to Bertram as a groveling penitent and religiously dutiful servant, he has no 
idea how to respond. She calls herself his “obedient servant”,139 and assures him that 
she will, with “true observance”,140 honor the “great fortune”141 that her “homely 
stars”142 saw fit to grace her with by giving her his hand in marriage. Bertram can only 
awkwardly tell her to “Let that go”143 and ask her to stop using this sort of language – 
“Come, come, no more of that.”144 He does not know what to make of Helena’s 
behavior; it is clear that he has no interest in or any real understanding of her religious 
devotion and readiness for servitude. Bertram has not imposed this role on her; on the 
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contrary, she has personally sculpted and cultivated it, and insists on its use. She will 
tell anyone who listens that he is her “master” and “dear lord”,145 and that she “will his 
vassal die”;146 she dutifully reports that in “everything I wait upon his will”147 and that 
she will obey all of his desires. This is despite the fact that she has had barely any 
interactions with him in the play, and has little clue as to what his desires might be. It 
is not, then, Bertram’s desires that she is interested in, but her own. She barely needs 
Bertram to participate in her design, and certainly does not need even significant input 
from him; she is the one in control of her servitude, who decides its contents and how 
it is directed. Kathryn Schwarz offers a helpful insight when she claims that “Helena’s 
particular desire at once makes Bertram her master and marks him as a product of her 
own intractable compliance.”148 When Helena asks the king for Bertram’s hand, her 
language is very telling: “I dare not say I take you, but I give/Me and my service ever 
whilst I live/Into your guiding power.”149 Helena “dares not” admit that she is in the 
one in charge of this transaction, that she has drafted its terms and that it is in her 
power to begin and end, but her command of the situation is obvious even if implied. 
She takes control by giving herself, and it is Bertram, though ostensibly the master 
figure, who is enlisted for use in and made subservient to another’s erotic scheme. He 
will need to be properly trained as a master; when Michelle Dowd claims that “Helena 
takes on the task of educating the recalcitrant Bertram,”150 she does not mean that he 
has been placed in a masochistic situation, but her insight into the pedagogical 
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dynamic between the two characters is enlightening. Bertram must be molded into the 
master that Helena imagines for herself, a partner who can perform his role without 
being prompted. The characters around Helena are often pulled into her educational 
orbit; even the king is taken in by the pedagogical energy of her language, 
incorporating her unique phrases into his own dialogue and unknowingly making 
himself a part of her narrative design.151   
 Helena has constructed a masochistic narrative. What at first appears to have 
been inflicted on her is in fact the product of her personal design. If she is needled by 
hurtful rumors, she has spread many of them herself. If she is an object of public pity, 
she has organized this herself. If her inferiority to Bertram is not all in her imagination 
– he does, after all, flee from court rather than marry her – she has nevertheless 
designed this narrative herself, predicted how he would react to her request, and 
continued to instruct him in the properly masterful behavior that she fantasizes about. 
What does Helena gain in all this? I argue that she takes pleasure in this narrative, and 
that masochistic pleasure is the right term to use. She states that gazing at Bertram is 
“pretty, though plague”;152 it is a pleasurable experience, and makes her feel good, but 
it eats away at her life like a crippling disease. She feels shame, but she enjoys it, 
cultivates it and helps it to grow. She is humiliated, but is complicit in and helps to 
increase her own humiliation. Helena, late in the play, makes a statement that shows 
how deeply she understands these pleasures: “O strange men,/That can such sweet use 
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make of what they hate.”153 She is referring to Bertram’s unwitting tenderness toward 
her during the bed-trick, but this could just as easily apply to her own pleasures. If one 
has the right mindset and the right inclination, one can transform hateful experiences 
like shame, rejection and hardship into pleasures.  
It has been difficult for some critics to see the pleasure in Helena’s behavior. In 
an older argument on the play, Diane Elizabeth Dreher finds that Helena gets no 
pleasure from her pursuit of Bertram because she has “completely overlooked the 
ritualistic significance of courtship.”154 On the contrary, her courtship process is 
extremely ritualistic and systematic; it is simply difficult for critics to recognize 
because it does not look like traditional early modern courtship (though one of the 
arguments of this project is that this sort of courtship is more typical than it at first 
appears to be). Shame and hardship are not inconvenient accidents of this ritual, but 
are vitally central to it. Her narrative “ritualizes shame”,155 alongside all the rejection 
and humiliation she experiences, and turns them into a source of pleasure. If the 
Countess and Lavatch, her clown, seem the most sympathetic to Helena, it is perhaps 
because they understand something themselves about masochistic pleasures; the clown 
responds to some of the Countess’ comments by screaming “O Lord, sir! – Nay, put 
me to’t, I warrant you”156 and “O Lord, sir! – Spare not me”,157 treating her words as 
strokes from a whip and encouraging her to continue. The Countess notices that “your 
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‘O Lord, sir!’ is very sequent to your whipping”,158 and jokes that “You would answer 
very well to a whipping, if you were but bound to’t.”159 Lavatch reveals that he finds 
pleasure in being whipped by his masters, and the Countess, while amused, is not 
surprised. The two show an understanding of, if not out and out participation in, the 
experience of taking pleasure in pain – at least when it is in the proper context and on 
the masochist’s own terms. 
 Helena’s narrative is grounded in a deeply contractual thinking. Her pleasures 
are not anarchic or random, but are based on contracts that validate them and provide 
them with a guiding structure. The most obvious of these contracts is her marriage 
with Bertram, but she spends much of the play trying to make sure that this contract is 
upheld. This may be one of the reasons that critics are so quick to accuse Helena of 
being aggressive and mercenary; the contract that should underpin her masochistic 
narrative is on very shaky ground, and if the contract collapses or is rendered null then 
her pleasures will lack one of the lynchpins that drive a masochistic experience. It 
might seem, then, that Helena’s religiously fervent pursuit of Bertram is a desperate 
attempt to secure her masochistic pleasures through a valid contract. It is true, 
however, that she always has another contract supporting her during this pursuit: her 
agreement with the king. When she promises to heal the king in exchange for a reward 
of her own choosing – marriage to one of his aristocrats – she binds herself into a 
contract as solid and legally viable as the marriage contract itself. Her contract with 
the king is even more valid than a marriage contract, as it is formed between a 
sovereign and his subject. His word is law, and the court will not contradict or void a 
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contract that he has made. Helena is not simply pushing herself on Bertram without 
the legal wherewithal to back it up; she will always be able to point back to her 
contract with the king, legitimating her behavior that might otherwise be seen as 
indecorous or inappropriate (though many critics have nevertheless claimed exactly 
this). Helena’s narrative is never without one contract or the other to support and 
shape it; if her marriage contract with Bertram is disputed, she can rely on her 
agreement with the king. Kathryn Schwarz finds that there is even a third contract 
implicit in Helena’s contract with the king: it is an invisible “contract forged as much 
between actor and audience as between woman and man, subject and monarch, or 
physician and patient.”160 Helena’s claim that she will be able to heal an illness that 
has stumped every doctor in the kingdom requires our sympathy and suspension of 
disbelief, encouraging our investment in her character and her desires. The audience is 
thus made an unwitting guarantor on her masochistic narrative, offering her its implicit 
contractual obligation to believe in and uphold her narrative project. The audience, 
like so many other characters in the play, is enlisted as a coordinate in her masochistic 
mise en scene, and becomes a complicit co-signer on the contract she requires to carry 
out her narrative. 
 Scholars have been uncomfortable or confused when talking about the way that 
the play depicts Helena’s desires. She has been called an “androgynous” figure, 
feminine in her perceived passivity and masculine in her active pursuit of what she 
wants.161 Her will to servitude means that she cannot be labeled masculine, but her 
                                                                                                                                            
159
 2.2.47 
160
 “Constant Will” 214 
161
 Dreher 136 
  72 
independent attitude and the energy with which she pursues her interests means she 
cannot be labeled feminine. In an article on the bed-trick, David McCandless takes this 
reading a step further; he claims that Helena’s androgynous status actually 
“desexualizes her erotic agency”,162 making her into an almost sexless character who 
has no interest in her physical sexuality. Diana is her stand-in during the bed-trick 
because she is Helena’s “sexualized double”;163 she does not want to be associated 
with physical sexual activity until the last possible moment when she finally reveals 
that Bertram has gotten her pregnant. Kathryn Schwarz, on the other hand, asserts that 
Helena is the height of femininity, “an outrageously intentional, sexual, articulate, and 
efficient femininity that runs amok without doing anything wrong.”164 She takes 
stereotypical femininity to its masochistic limit, using subservience and compliance as 
tools in her almost subversive erotic scheme. Critics cannot seem to agree on how her 
desires mark her; she might be a woman, she might be both a woman and a man at 
once, or she might be neither. She is either extremely sexually assured, in complete 
control of her sexual life, or absolutely uninterested in having a sexual life in the first 
place.  
I feel that part of the reason for these divergent readings is a critical inability or 
discomfort with talking about or understanding masochism and masochistic pleasures 
(Schwarz gets close by detailing how Helena uses the expectations of femininity for 
her own purposes). If a character has an alternative way of expressing sexual desire, 
she may be androgynous; if a character organizes the terms in which her own 
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humiliation and shame take place, she may not actually like or understand sex at all. I 
find that thinking about Helena’s narrative as a masochistic experience is the closest 
way we have to reading how she expresses her desires and puts them into practice; the 
work these critics have done, while often sharp and insightful, can sometimes 
overstretch and miss the mark, so that the Helena that they describe and the Helena we 
see in the play are very different figures. It is, of course, a complicated subject. 
Pinpointing exactly how and why a character desires is, perhaps, a fool’s errand, and 
ascribing masochism to someone carries a great deal of intellectual and cultural 
baggage. How does a critic claim that a character not only enjoys the oppression and 
pain they are suffering, but has perhaps designed this suffering and brought it on their 
own heads? What are the ethical implications of a scholar making this sort of claim? I 
will spend the rest of this chapter on The Merchant of Venice and Jessica’s narrative, 
working to answer these questions and striving to notice the ways that pleasure might 
be present in the most counterintuitive situations.  
The Scene of the Crime 
 When Lorenzo and his cronies arrive at Shylock’s house to spirit Jessica away, 
they speak of their attempt in terms of hunting and thieving. Gratiano jokes that prey 
is “with more spirit chased than enjoyed”,165 implying that Lorenzo has pursued 
Jessica and now has her firmly in his trap (though the resulting sexual conquest won’t 
be as fulfilling as Lorenzo hopes and will leave him “Lean, rent, and beggared”166). 
Lorenzo, showing up late to find his friends prepared and anxiously waiting, assures 
                                                                                                                                            
164
 “Constant Will” 207 
165
 2.6.14 
166
 2.6.20 
  74 
them “When you please to play the thieves for wives,/I’ll watch as long for you 
then.”167 Their comments rehearse the typical rhetoric of sonnets – the beloved as prey 
to be tracked, chased and captured, or as a treasure to be stolen through wit and 
cunning. These romantic clichés suggest that Lorenzo and his group are the 
masterminds behind Jessica’s escape, but it is Jessica who has orchestrated this plot 
and personally designed its mise en scene. Early in the scene, Lorenzo confesses to his 
friends the extent to which Jessica has written the parts they are playing: 
  I must needs tell thee all: she hath directed 
  How I shall take her from her father’s house, 
  What gold and jewels she is furnished with, 
  What page’s suit she hath in readiness.168 
 
She has directed Lorenzo how to take her, and has decided on the props, the dialogue, 
the staging – you will arrive at this time, you will say this, this is how the scene will 
look, this is what I’ll be wearing, etc. If the scene sounds familiar, if it recalls the 
language and setting of sonnets or romances, if it seems sleazy or mercenary, she has 
designed it that way. In this tableau, she is both playwright and performer. Lorenzo 
appears at least dimly aware of this when he notes that his friends will someday play 
thieves for wives just as he does now; he is taking up the role of the thief in Jessica’s 
script, and his friends share the role of accomplices to the theft. Their role is even, in a 
sense, doubled. They are cast as watchmen and lookouts, but they are also an 
audience, there to watch and look on, seeing how Jessica is degrading herself and 
selling herself off to Lorenzo. Launcelot seems to already know the part that Jessica 
has assigned Lorenzo and his friends when he prophesizes that a Christian will 
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eventually “play the knave”169 and carry her off. If Lorenzo has not actually told 
Launcelot about the part that he has playing, the latter has perhaps intuited something 
about the desires of his master’s daughter. 
 Jessica plays a role as well; the play demonstrates how she casts herself as the 
remorseful daughter, afraid of betraying her father but also fascinated by Lorenzo and 
the community he represents. She may feel bad about leaving home, but she is 
compelled to do so by the allure of Christian salvation, rationalizing the “heinous 
sin”170 of abandoning her father as worth the chance to “Become a Christian 
and…loving wife.”171 If her father must suffer for conversion, this is part of the 
Christian plan and must be endured. Adelman finds that she “marries to convert 
instead of converting to marry”172, so drawn is she to Christianity and Christians. It is 
a matter almost beyond her control; if she is to experience the Christian life, she must 
put herself in the hands of providence, relying on “fortune”173 and the hope that 
Lorenzo will “keep [the] promise”174 of marriage that he has made to her. The scene of 
her escape, so illicit and scandalous, is unfortunate but necessary due to Shylock’s 
watchfulness and the implicitly prying eyes of community figures like Tubal and 
Chus, who are later on able to gather information about her behavior and report back 
to her father. Jessica’s role is predicated on the idea that one or all of these forces have 
backed her into a corner, and she now has no choice but to escape in the middle of the 
night. In the end, however, it is not Christian fortune, Lorenzo or her father that are 
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responsible for the scene. Jessica has sculpted its visual and narrative specifics from 
behind the curtain and continues to direct them even as she acts them out. 
 Jessica's role in the elopement makes her a criminal. This applies, of course, to 
the theft of her father’s money, but Shylock’s hoarding might be seen by the audience 
as counter to the public good and Jessica’s theft as a good deed that returns his ducats 
to a free-flowing economic network that could benefit Christian merchants.175 The 
more damning crime is elopement itself. Eloping with an heiress was a serious crime 
in the sixteenth century,176 linked with kidnapping and rape,177 and Jessica could be 
held accountable as a co-conspirator. Punishment would come from the state as well 
as the church, which held that elopements were sinfully clandestine and required 
penance from those involved.178 She has entered a new religion and immediately 
suffers a penalty from it. Jessica also faces the censure of her old religion, comparing 
unfavorably to Jewish heroines like Jephthah’s daughter, willing to sacrifice herself to 
honor her father's vow to God,179 and Laban’s daughter Rachel, who flees with Jacob 
but keeps her father’s household gods.180 Jessica instead disregards her father’s vows 
and rejects the sanctity of his house, which she claims is “hell.”181 She has abandoned 
her past ties so completely that Julia Lupton calls her conversion a “total eclipse”,182 
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an evacuation of the family loyalty and religious conviction that her father holds dear. 
Jessica’s wholesale severing of these past relationships has a precedent in saint’s 
lives,183 but, as noted, she enters Christianity as a thief and eloper who needs to be 
reprimanded, a criminal and at least morally suspect figure. She has discarded the 
biblical models of the obedient, pious Jewish daughter that Rachel and Jephthah’s 
daughter offer, but also finds no secure place in a Christian environment that chastises 
her actions and regards her with suspicion. She has no safe or recognizable role to 
play, but is stuck in an emotional and spiritual limbo. 
 The play is clear that Jessica is aware of the effect that her elopement will have 
on her father. Her escape seems to find inspiration in all of Shylock’s paranoid 
anxieties. He has asked his daughter to lock up his house and keep it safe, trusting her 
with its keys. She is implored to box up the “house’s ears”184 against the depraved 
racket of Christian partygoing; if even “the sound of shallow foppery”185 enters his 
house, its sobriety and piety will be disrupted. Shylock returns home to find his money 
stolen, Jessica gone, and his house’s windows presumably wide open. To make 
matters worse, Jessica has even married exactly one of the “Christian fools with 
varnished faces”186 that he warned her about. Shylock is left looking like the fool, and 
is exposed before his enemies as impotent. His much-vaunted thrift has not made him 
beloved to Jessica. Gil Anidjar notes that Shylock’s downfall begins with this failure 
to properly translate his customs and values, his Jewishness, onto his daughter.187 
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Jessica’s escape and theft paints Shylock as a bad investor; contrary to the joke he 
makes about breeding ducats together and producing interest,188 he has not been able 
correctly to breed either money or children.  
Solanio claims that Shylock is heard complaining in the streets about the theft 
of his “two stones”189, his procreative masculinity and the patriarchal role related to it 
having been castrated, stolen and sold. When he insists that “my daughter is my flesh 
and my blood”,190 Salerio retorts that there is “more difference between thy flesh and 
hers than between jet and ivory.”191 Shylock is then not merely a Jew, and so subject 
to the anti-Semitism that permeates Venice, but a Jew who has failed at Jewishness 
and has not been able to produce a proper Jewish offspring. If Shylock is neither 
Christian nor Jew, where does he stand? The insults that the Christians use after the 
theft, such as “dog”192 and “old carrion”193, imply that, because of his inability to 
control his daughter, Shylock is less than human, a simple animal with no human 
morality or conscience. Metzger is right to point out that Jessica’s ability to integrate 
into Christianity emphasizes Shylock’s status as an alien,194 but it is perhaps Jessica’s 
theft more than her conversion that is essential to the rhetoric that is used to demean 
and ridicule her father. It allows the Christians to critique his business sense and mock 
his sexual potency, but also to call into question his status as an actual person. 
 In a state of confusion after these losses, Shylock conflates his daughter and 
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the stolen ducats. He cries out “My daughter, O my ducats, O my daughter”,195 the 
losses so interchangeable that one collapses into the other. He fantasizes that Jessica 
were dead at his feet “and the jewels in her ear”196 or “in her coffin!”197 She and the 
ducats are one and the same, property that has been nicked and needs to be returned to 
its casement. These reactions would not be a surprise to Jessica, who has anticipated 
and in a sense provoked them in the way she designed her elopement. While fleeing 
her house, she tells Lorenzo that she will return inside for a moment to “gild 
myself/With some moe ducats, and be with you straight.”198 Jessica casts herself as a 
daughter-ducat or, in this case, a wife-ducat. She halts the escape scene because she 
does not quite look the part yet; she needs to be more gilded, more weighed down by 
her father’s jewels, more the sign of his ruin and more the confluence point of his 
paranoid dreams. She has managed to hone in on the mise en scene that would most 
affect him, a mise en scene informed by Shylock’s anxiety about her contact with the 
shallow foppery of the Christians, his deep antipathy for the Christians in general, and 
the jealously with which he guards his money. Shylock reinforces this knowledge 
when, on the night of her escape, he tells her he had a “dream of money bags”199 and 
that this dream makes him “right loath”200 to leave his home and meet the Christians. 
Jessica, with this information, allows her father to come home and see, in a sort of 
nightmare logic, that either his money bags have sprouted legs and fled in the shape of 
his daughter or his daughter has changed into a ducat and been carried off in a 
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Christian’s pocket. It is almost as if she is marking off a checklist of Shylock’s most 
debilitating fears, and has found a way of incorporating them into the plot and 
iconography of her elopement. This may sound sadistic, but the point is that her own 
masochistic suffering will be more pronounced and dynamic if she knows that her 
father is also suffering: she makes him suffer so that she can feel guilty and ashamed. 
 Jessica’s theft does more than rob her father of his property and his rights over 
her as a Jewish daughter; as Anita Sherman notes, the theft disrupts his “understanding 
of the world”,201 pulling the emotional and spiritual rug out from under his feet. The 
precepts by which he has led his life are proven false or naïve, and ultimately inferior 
to the Christian way. His thrift, which seemed so vital to his success and his sense of 
self, has ended in betrayal and loss; meanwhile, Bassanio’s careless risks have earned 
him financial and sexual triumph.202 Bassanio’s success is almost a flaunting of the 
power of Christian faith, and a mockery of Shylock’s antiquated relationship to a God 
who can’t help him protect his money or his children. Shylock has taught Jessica the 
proverb “Fast bind, fast find”,203 instructing her to lock up her goods and ration them 
carefully with a “thrifty mind.”204 But thrift is not a virtue in this Christian 
community, and she instead spends her ducats freely, including fourscore in a single 
night.205 Jessica is not punished by society for her behavior, but is welcomed and 
presumably encouraged to spend more. If Shylock’s financial sense is proven 
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outdated, his emotional life is shown up as misplaced and empty. Jessica sells her 
mother’s ring “for a monkey”;206 her legacy carries as much value as an exotic pet or a 
hated Christian husband. If hearing about Jessica’s spending feels like being 
stabbed,207 hearing that she sold the ring is like actual torture.208 Shylock recalls that 
he “had it of Leah when I was a bachelor”209, a sentimental connection to his marriage 
and the wife he has lost, but also a reminder of his early days in the Jewish community 
as a young man. Jessica’s sale rejects this past and its history, tradition and duty. 
Shylock’s values and beliefs, the way he interacts with society and religion, his inner 
life, are all revealed to be outdated and irrelevant. Jessica gives her father a more 
thorough and practical economic lesson than he was ever able to teach her, 
demonstrating that cash and emotion circulate in this Christian community with a 
callous spontaneity that brooks no sentimentality and knows no past or tradition.  
 I dwell so much on how Jessica’s elopement has affected Shylock because the 
ruin and humiliation she has caused him affects her as well. In the first place, while 
her theft casts Shylock as symbolically impotent, the implication does not bode well 
for her either; if her father is impotent, she may not be his legitimate child. If she is a 
bastard, she would be morally suspect to an early modern audience that was highly 
suspicious of illegitimacy and its influence on human nature. It would also mean that 
she had no right to the ducats she absconded with; she has stolen property she would 
never have inherited. If she really is Shylock’s child, her prospects are not much 
better; her origins and right to the ducats may be legitimate, but she would never be 
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accepted by the Christian community that will unfailingly recall her ancestry and 
denounce her for it. Launcelot jokes (his jokes often have a bitter seriousness at their 
core) that Jessica’s one chance for Christian salvation is to “hope that your father got 
you not, that you are not the Jew’s daughter.”210 This would make her, however, a 
morally corrupt bastard who cannot be trusted. Jessica cannot win in either case. If she 
is a legitimate heiress, she is a Jew who cannot be converted and is therefore undesired 
by Christian society. Early modern rhetoric suggests a Jew will always be a Jew, even 
if they have they have converted in public and live as a Christian. Adelman reminds us 
that Jessica has “converted religiously but can never convert her blood”;211 she will 
always be an alien element. On the other hand, if she is not a Jew and can live an 
authentically Christian life, she is illegitimate, untrustworthy, and unacceptable to the 
respectable Christians who she hopes to live amongst. 
Jessica and the Christians 
 The Christians do not bombard Jessica with solemn condemnations of her past 
or finger-wagging lessons about Christian virtue; instead, they mock, humiliate or 
ignore her. She is made the butt of Launcelot’s jokes, for instance. He needles her and 
insistently points out that she will never quite belong; he claims that Lorenzo did 
wrong to marry and convert Jessica, because Christian society had members “enow 
before, in as many as could well live one by another.”212 This set-up leads into a punch 
line about pork prices: the value of pigs will rise because of demand from converted 
Jews who would have rejected it before. His ultimate point, of course, is that Jessica is 
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unwanted, inconvenient and disruptive to the system that has been getting along so 
well without her. Jessica is visibly upset about this joke, as Lorenzo alludes to when 
he asks her “How cheer’st thou, Jessica?”213 Her husband, instead of consoling her, 
asks her what she thinks of Portia. The implication is that Jessica is at such an 
insignificant place on the social ladder that simply talking about Portia, so clearly her 
superior, will make her feel better. Jessica begins to praise Portia’s divine qualities, 
which she calls “Past all expressing.”214 She opines that Portia is such a perfect 
woman that if Bassanio were to mistreat or cheat her “he should never come to 
heaven.”215 Lorenzo uses similar language earlier in the play to describe Jessica, but 
the end result is very different. This is not exactly the loving praise that he applies to 
Portia. He states that if “e’er the Jew her father come to heaven,/It will be for his 
gentle daughter’s sake.”216 Shylock’s sole virtue is having fathered a daughter like 
Jessica, and that alone might be able to win him Christian salvation. This compliment 
certainly resembles Jessica’s praise of Portia at first; she is so wonderful that simply 
interacting with her might bring about spiritual redemption. Lorenzo’s admiration is 
undercut, however, by what he says next. He hopes that, as far as Jessica is concerned, 
“never dare misfortune cross her foot/Unless she do it under this excuse:/That she is 
issue to a faithless Jew.”217 Lorenzo will not able to blame misfortune if it comes 
down on Jessica’s head; she is, after all, a Jew, and she deserves what she gets. The 
difference between Jessica and Portia is obvious. Portia is a paragon who needs to be 
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worshipfully respected, while Jessica is just good enough that her father does not seem 
completely worthless. It might be assumed that Lorenzo would not be rejected a place 
in heaven for mistreating or cheating Jessica – Jew that she is. 
Jessica seems to be aware of this comparison between her and Portia. She 
presents the following scenario as she continues to praise Portia:  
  …if two gods should play some heavenly match 
  And on the wager lay two earthly women, 
                        And Portia one, there must be something else 
  Pawned with the other, for the poor rude world 
  Hath not her fellow.218 
 
If Jessica and Portia were both placed on a scale, Portia would prove that she has 
inherent worth and that there is something special within her that even the gods would 
recognize. Jessica, on the other hand, must to be weighed down if she is going to have 
any value; her father’s ducats are all that make her literally worthwhile. If she had not 
gilded herself, she might not even have been allowed on the scale. Portia appears to be 
so much Jessica’s social and spiritual better that the thought of criticizing her would 
be unimaginable. The latter, even weighed down with ducats, can never compare. She 
is a coin that can be “pawned” and that only acquires value as it is exchanged and 
added to other coins. Portia is instead like a unique treasure, whole and complete in 
and of itself, needing no addition and nothing to make it seem valuable. Jessica does 
have some distinctive worth as a Christian convert, but she is never extolled as a soul 
won over to Christ; in fact, the other characters seem to be completely uninterested in 
this aspect of Jessica. If they mention her spiritual life, it is to refer to her Jewish past 
and her continued status as an “infidel.” Jessica is something like a counterfeit coin; 
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she looks the part and has been given the right weight, markings and so on, but the 
Christian community has identified her as false and refuses to pass her in their 
economy. Portia, on the other hand, is immediately recognizable as an authentic piece, 
and she is the gold standard by which Jessica is found lacking. Lorenzo does not 
dissuade Jessica from thinking of herself as inferior to and less than Portia, reassuring 
her of her worth or validating her own identity as valuable. He instead claims that 
Jessica should be grateful to have married him, since he is as divine a man as Portia is 
a woman: “Even such a husband/Hast thou of me as she is for wife.”219 Lorenzo is as 
genuine a coin as Portia, and it is through his influence and sponsorship that Jessica is 
able to register as a coin at all to the other Christians. If they see her as a forgery that 
they do not want to circulate, they can at least identify her as currency. This slender 
reward seems to be one of the few social benefits of Jessica’s conversion. These are 
problems that Portia (or at least the Portia of Jessica’s imagination) has never had to 
worry about; she is accepted by everyone she meets, and even her disguise at the end 
of the play passes flawlessly. 
 In their first interaction together, Portia reaffirms Jessica’s idea of herself as an 
inferior woman who is barely worth enough to be allowed in Portia’s presence. Their 
meeting begins soon after Bassanio solves the riddle of the three chests, when 
Lorenzo, Jessica and Salerio suddenly arrive in Belmont and bring Bassanio news of 
Antonio. When the three of them approach the newly-made couple, Bassanio leaves 
Jessica out of his greeting: “Lorenzo and Salerio, welcome hither…By your leave,/I 
                                                                                                                                            
218
 3.5.69-73 
219
 3.5.74-5 
  86 
bid my friends and countrymen,/Sweet Portia, welcome.”220 Portia responds that the 
two men are “entirely welcome”221 in Belmont, but does not extend the same 
sentiment to Jessica, who is left conspicuously unacknowledged. Jessica is neither 
Bassanio’s friend nor his countryman, and is not granted the privilege of recognition. 
Later in the scene, Jessica makes a bid at being accepted into this exclusive group. She 
offers information about her father’s plans for Antonio, claiming she has overheard 
how far his resentment is prepared to take him: 
  When I was with him I have heard him swear 
  To Tubal and to Chus, his countrymen, 
  That he would rather have Antonio’s flesh 
  Than twenty times the value of the sum 
  That he did owe him; and I know, my lord, 
  If law, authority, and power deny not, 
  It will go hard with poor Antonio.222 
 
If there is some truth to the scene that Jessica narrates (which is entirely possible given 
Shylock’s similar rhetoric elsewhere in the play), it is undercut by her attempt to curry 
favor with this group that is disposed against her. Adelman finds that this is an overly 
obvious plea to win the hearts and minds of the Christians,223 and Ephraim sees her 
tale of scheming Jews as too “lurid”224 to have any real credibility. Portia and the other 
Christian characters must feel the same way, because they ignore what she has said. 
Once Jessica has finished, Portia turns to Bassanio and asks to hear more about his 
friendship with Antonio. Jessica’s little speech is her only dialogue in this scene; it 
comes unprompted and is paid no mind. Her thoughts are not chastised, but are also 
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not given any heed. Not even her husband supports or at least responds to her. Portia is 
too bright a light, and she overshadows Jessica completely; all attention is directed to 
her. If Jessica had begun her life as a Christian, she might be merely uninteresting 
when compared to the wildly lauded Portia, but as a former Jew, a thief and a possible 
bastard, Jessica is actively excluded and rejected. It is clear that if Jessica were 
interested in a life of comfort and acceptance, she should ironically have remained a 
Jew; though she would be ostracized by the Christians, her own community would 
have given her an identity. In her current situation, she finds no acceptance from either 
side of the social and religious divide, and is left continuously adrift both personally 
and spiritually.  
Jessica's Pleasures 
 Jessica has ultimately designed this situation herself and is responsible for the 
position she finds herself in. She has made her bed, and now must lie in it. The 
question is whether she sees this as undesirable. I submit that Jessica's sculpting of the 
scenarios that lead to her situation is vitally connected to the experience of pleasure. 
This pleasure is based on disgrace, shame, and presenting oneself as an outsider and 
social reject. The way she organizes her elopement, her treatment of her father and his 
subsequent mental breakdown, her awkward relationship with her husband and the 
Venetians, her tortured connections with both Judaism and Christianity – all of these 
aspects of her life can be seen as pleasurable if we understand them as part of a 
masochistic narrative. There is a moment during Jessica’s elopement that is perhaps a 
paradigmatic example of how these pleasures operate. Jessica escapes from her house 
dressed as a boy so that she will not be identified by anyone, but she feels embarrassed 
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that Lorenzo and his friends will see her in this disguise. She looks down from the 
window and says: 
  Jess.: I am glad ‘tis night – you do not look on me –  
  For I am much ashamed of my exchange… 
 
  Lor.: Descend, for you must be my torchbearer. 
 
  Jess.: What? Must I hold a candle to my shames?225 
 
Jessica asserts that she is “ashamed” to be seen in her current state (whether because 
she is in the middle of stealing her father’s ducats or because she is dressed as a boy), 
and tells Lorenzo that she is “glad” he is not able to see her. Lorenzo’s immediate 
response is that Jessica will bear a torch for him, exposing her to everyone and 
bringing her feelings of shame out into the open. Jessica seems to react with surprise, 
but she soon after offers her infamous lines about gilding herself with more ducats and 
says that she will be with him right away. This moment fits perfectly into a 
masochistic narrative: Jessica claims that something will make her uncomfortable, her 
partner demands that she do it, and she not only complies but goes above and beyond 
by covering herself in coins and inviting even more ignominy. Now she will not only 
be seen as a scandalously cross-dressing thief, but she will wear the stolen objects all 
over her body. Her response to Lorenzo’s humiliating demand is to actively 
exaggerate it by adding her own props to it. She has not necessarily directed Lorenzo 
to ignore her anxious reservations (unless he has an extraordinary sensitivity to his 
wife’s masochistic interests), but the fact that he has done so becomes a vital 
centerpiece to the masochistic scenario she has arranged. In the rest of this section, I 
will detail how these pleasures work and what rules they abide by. 
  89 
 It is of first importance to note that masochistic pleasures assign worth and 
value in a very different way than a traditional economy of money or emotions. When 
Jessica escapes from her home, she throws a casket full of ducats down to Lorenzo 
and tells him that “It is worth the pains.”226 What is worth what in her statement? Does 
she mean that the pain of being a humiliated outcast is worth the price of the ducats? 
In an older article on the play, Camille Slights complains that scholars have been 
overly critical of Jessica, and are unfair to call her mercenary or criminal.227 Slights 
finds that Jessica’s elopement with Lorenzo is honestly about her true love for the 
Christian, and her theft of the ducats is an attempt to finance their life together. She 
has not stolen the money for personal gain but to help support her and her husband, 
since he has little money himself; thus, Slights determines that Jessica’s “willingness 
to marry a man without means, in fact, demonstrates relatively little concern with 
wealth”228 and the authenticity of her feelings. If I do not agree with the content of 
Slights’ argument, I think that her basic point is right in a roundabout way; Jessica’s 
interest is not really in the money at all, or at least not in the money in and of itself. 
This does not mean, of course, that she does not steal the ducats for personal gain. It is 
simply that the ducats themselves are not where that gain comes from. Their monetary 
value is effaced and they are given a different kind of “worth” as props in Jessica’s 
mise en scene. She gains pleasure not from the ducats, but through them; the ducats 
are a vehicle to bring her pain, which is what has real value. The “pains” she refers to 
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are the pains of leaving her community and entering a circle of strangers, the pains of 
sacrificing the easy stability of lineage and family history, and the pains of betraying 
her father. The “it” she refers to is the masochistic pleasure she gains from those pains. 
The ducats are useful as intermediaries; they are objects she knows it will pain her 
father to lose, which will in turn cause her shame and dishonor. They allow Lorenzo to 
mock her as an “unthrift”229 thief and her father to wish her dead, her former 
community to see her as a fallen woman and her new community to see her as 
untrustworthy and criminal. In this sense, the ducats are certainly valuable and carry a 
great deal of weight, but this has nothing to do with the worth assigned to them in any 
external economy. Jessica repurposes her father’s ducats as coordinates in her 
masochistic fantasy, ignoring their “official” value and recasting them as theatrical 
props in an unofficial, personal economic system. 
 Jessica's masochistic pleasures are grounded in the structure of contracts, 
which inform so many relationships in the play. Jessica breaks a tacit contract with her 
father and community, a contract based on heritage and tradition, and enters into a 
more explicit contract defined by marriage and baptism. Pleasure seems to be 
impossible, at least in this play, without being connected to a contractual obligation. 
Jessica, then, is not so far removed from Portia, who also finds pleasure in contractual 
thinking and in the idea of exchanging herself. She weds Bassanio and seems to give 
up her wealth and property, but consistently reminds him that she is entering into a 
contract with him. Portia’s ring is only loaned to Bassanio: he must fulfill certain 
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conditions of the marriage contract if he is to keep it.230 Portia is a moneylender who 
has made an investment. Her deference to her husband’s wishes, her paying off his 
debts and helping Antonio, is her way of managing and protecting the “loan” that she 
has made.231 The pleasure of her marriage is predicated on a contract being signed and 
fulfilled. Jessica’s pleasure has a similar configuration, but with an important 
difference; while, as Amanda Bailey notes, Portia “positions herself as a creditor 
rather than a prize to be handed over”,232 Jessica seeks out the experience of being 
made into a piece of property to be sold or traded. Portia owns Bassanio where Jessica 
is owned by Lorenzo, the latter willingly putting herself into a situation of contractual 
bondage. She more than permits this to happen: she organizes it, designing a narrative 
whereby her goods, social reputation, and spiritual life will be placed firmly in 
Lorenzo’s hands. This fact is all the more striking when one finds that wives did not 
need to give up their property to their husbands, as the popular imagination about early 
modern England might believe. On the contrary, the courts upheld petitions by wives 
to protect their property against being taken over by their husbands.233 English 
audience members, so many of who were involved in litigation at some point in their 
lives, would not necessarily have seen Jessica as a mere woman without any property 
rights under the law. In an English context, Jessica would have the legal wherewithal 
to prevent Lorenzo from dipping into her funds, but she does not draw on these 
resources. The idea that there is an alternative to her situation might even be an 
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additional source of pleasure. It is ultimately the case that there is no fighting over the 
ducats and Jessica does not despair that she is being taken advantage of. Lorenzo does 
not take her money; she gives it to him, and in this way is in as much control of her 
pleasure and the financial condition associated with it as Portia is. She has no need for 
a trial because she has designed and bound herself to this contract on her own terms. 
 The contract Jessica has made with the Christian community permits her the 
use of anti-Semitic sadism – which becomes, in her case, uniquely masochistic. The 
citizens and government of Venice take a certain sadistic pleasure in their treatment of 
the city's Jews; they are insulted, spit on, segregated and politically manhandled. This 
anti-Semitic sadism is a special privilege of Venetian citizenship, which is of course 
predicated on belonging to Christianity. Jacques Lezra points out that Jews, by 
definition, cannot join in on this pastime; the objects of institutionalized cruelty must 
be restricted from participating in it themselves if it is going to have a pleasurable 
effect on those that perpetrate it.234 Jews can only join in when they themselves 
convert. They are then asked to enjoy the fact that their old self is dead and can be 
observed from afar as an object of ridicule. Lezra finds that conversion in the play 
“means learning to love one’s (legal) death. (Or one’s death as a member of a 
religion.)”235 The new self that emerges has earned the right to hate the former self, 
and should luxuriate in the separation that has occurred. If Shylock does not feel truly 
content at the end of the play, it might be because he cannot appreciate that what he is 
feeling is one of the rewards of conversion. The anti-Semitism he has been permitted 
does not hold any interest for him. Jessica, on the other hand, is perfectly situated to 
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take advantage of this newly available pleasure; it is exactly in line with the 
masochistic program that she has performed throughout the play. Jessica becomes a 
Christian and gains the right to anti-Semitism, which means that she can inform 
against her father and his colleagues, as I discussed earlier, and stand by in silent 
complicity as her former religion is denigrated and her father's name is dragged 
through the mud. This may seem like the sadism of the Christians, but it has a very 
different result in Jessica's hands. She will never register as a real convert to her 
insular and suspicious new countrymen, meaning that she is still a Jew in their eyes 
even when she gains the privileges of a Christian. When they denigrate and insult her 
old religion and father, there is always an implicit glance at Jessica herself. If Jessica 
participates in and helps to cultivate their anti-Semitism, she is contributing to a hatred 
and mockery that will ultimately be directed back at her. She is officially allowed to 
join in on the rites and pleasures of anti-Semitic sadism as a Venetian citizen and a 
member of the Christian community, but her participation is finally masochistic. Her 
fellow Christians are the walls of an anti-Semitic echo chamber that reflect back at her 
the cruelty she shows her father and the distaste that she expresses for her old religion. 
 The critics I cite in this chapter almost universally find that Jessica has been 
mistreated and abused by her husband and his Christian friends: Adelman finds that 
her behavior toward them is “absurdly self-denigrating”;236 Ephraim argues that she is 
made into a sort of curiosity piece to be constantly leered at and prodded, neither 
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Christian nor Jew, and thus is a site of cultural anxiety;237 and Lupton submits that she 
has lost so many connections to her father, her community and her former identity that 
“she appears to have lost the capacity even to measure what she has given up.”238 
Their statements are certainly true, but they presuppose that Jessica is a submissive 
recipient of these effects and that she is at the mercy of the Christians and their desire 
to shame and belittle her. Masochism, however, is not about submissiveness in the 
traditional sense, but a carefully-plotted passivity that the masochist guides and 
controls. Metzger claims that, as Jessica banters with Lorenzo in their last scene 
together, it is possible to read her not as flirting and playful but bitterly regretting her 
decisions.239 What Metzger and other critics who have written about Jessica do not 
account for is the idea that bitter regret might itself be a form of play, and if flirtation 
isn’t exactly the right word for play based on bitterness and disgrace, it obviously 
carries a potent, deep-seated erotic charge. In appearing to relinquish control, Jessica 
is ultimately in full control. The irony is that while the particular tension of Jessica’s 
masochism comes from her inability to fit in with the Christian community, 
masochism is a governing principle of erotic life in Venice. Jessica fits in better than 
she may know. Her father is only able to muster an “I am content”240 when he is 
stripped of his identity and made a “homeless, rightless, de-covenanted refugee”,241 
but Jessica not only finds pleasure in this process – she invites it on herself. If the 
Christians of the play see Jews as theological enemies because, among other reasons, 
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of their “failure to master the flesh”242 and control their sexual behavior and desires, in 
this sense Jessica is not an enemy at all and not so alien to them. She is rather like 
Antonio; both bind themselves into contracts that lead to constraint and hardship but 
also produce the singular pleasures of shame and being brought to the brink of 
spiritual and physical ruin. Antonio and Jessica have placed themselves into these 
situations, and if they are not always in control of what happens to them, it is a control 
they have given up for a different kind of benefit. Jessica is Christian at heart – if not 
spiritually or culturally, then in the way that she has designed and scripted her erotic 
life. 
 I feel that one of the most convincing proofs for the reading that I am 
proposing is that Jessica is not actually treated with disdain by all of the members of 
her husband’s community. The critics I have referred to tend to regard Jessica’s 
loneliness and outsider status as a totalized effect that informs every interaction she 
has in the play. This is not, however, entirely true. These critics pin much of their 
attention on Jessica’s relationship with Portia, which I detailed earlier; Jessica sees 
herself as completely inferior to Portia, and she can only relate to her in wildly 
embarrassing praise. Portia, for her part, ignores or sneers at Jessica. This 
characterization of Jessica and Portia is certainly apt, but I want to reiterate that 
because Jessica has designed the emotional and aesthetic mise en scene of her 
encounters with Portia, the latter might not be as interested in degrading and shaming 
Jessica as she wants her to be. Jessica’s masochistic script exaggerates her distance 
from Portia and places her in a pleasurably uncomfortable, humiliating situation. 
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Portia is not necessarily a willing or conscious participant in these scenarios, and so 
they do not always go as a masochist might have planned. For instance, when Portia 
leaves Belmont to help rescue Antonio, she entrusts her estate and servants to Lorenzo 
and Jessica: 
  Lor.: Madam, with all my heart 
  I shall obey you in all fair commands. 
 
  Por.: My people do already know my mind, 
  And will acknowledge you and Jessica 
  In place of Lord Bassanio and myself.243 
 
Portia is willing to have Jessica take her place, and even for her servants to treat 
Jessica just as they would their mistress. If Portia ever looked down on Jessica, she is 
– at least in this case – prepared to see her as her equal. When Jessica hears Portia’s 
decree, she offers her a humble blessing: “I wish your ladyship all heart’s content.”244 
Despite what critics have said about Portia’s treatment of Jessica, her response is kind, 
gentle and friendly – “I thank you for your wish, and am well pleased/To wish it back 
on you. Fare you well, Jessica!”245 This has none of the haughty contempt that so 
many critics find in Portia’s behavior toward Jessica, unless a theater company wanted 
to stage the scene as venomous and sarcastic. I instead see this exchange as evidence 
that Jessica might not actually be the outcast that she has cast herself as, alone in an 
alien world and compelled to grovel at the feet of a gloriously divine Christian woman 
like Portia. Scholars have been quick to identify and corroborate her masochistic 
narrative, and consistently point out that Portia either ignores or humiliates Jessica, but 
I have not read a single argument that mentions this scene between the two women. 
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Critics, it would seem, are so caught up in her story that they have not paused to 
consider its artificial, constructed nature – they take it at face value. This may be 
because there is such a large disconnect between what the play seems to present in 
these scenes and what it has also shown Jessica creating for herself. She is isolated, 
alienated and humiliated, but she has directed and cultivated these feelings. 
Helena has a vital line of dialogue that addresses this issue: “I do affect a 
sorrow indeed, but I have it too.”246 Jessica and Helena do experience pain and shame, 
and the humiliation that they suffer is not merely an erotic game without any real 
consequences. However, at the same time, they “affect” this pain and shame, turning it 
into something else, using it as fuel for a masochistic project and recontextualizing it 
as a source of pleasure. The same is true if we flip the formula. They affect the pain 
they experience – designing it, manicuring it, managing it – but the fact they have 
created it themselves does not mean that they are unharmed by it or immune to its 
effects. If we call a character a masochist, we are not making light of her oppression or 
claiming that it is not oppression after all. It also does not mean that we are trying to 
invalidate the feelings of those who have been oppressed, suppressed and ostracized, 
or attempting to claim that people who experience these hardships all secretly enjoy 
what has happened to them. I feel that these are the reasons that taking pleasure in 
masochism has been so hard for some critics to discuss. They are afraid of saying the 
wrong thing, of being offensive, of making a statement that might be perceived as 
anti-feminist, hegemonic or simply insensitive. These concerns are absolutely 
understandable, but they also block scholars from seriously considering how 
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characters might enjoy the experience of pain and how they might arrange it for 
themselves. Helena and Jessica both design and direct humiliating, harsh situations 
where they will be made the subject of mocking gossip, ostracized by society, 
condemned by their religions, and regarded with disdain by the people they love. 
While it is never explicitly stated that they take pleasure in these situations, I have 
tried to explore that possibility in this chapter, and to take seriously the idea of 
masochistic pleasure. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
Bondage, the public marketplace, and Antonio’s body as a commodity in The 
Merchant of Venice 
 
 In the first chapter, I discussed how Jessica might find pleasure in the cruel or 
at least discomforting treatment she receives from the Christian community. In this 
chapter, I will detail the specifically theatrical nature of these pleasures; why is it that 
the early modern theater seems to enable or encourage the writing of characters who 
take pleasure in shame, humiliation and pain? Is there something inherently 
masochistic about the experience of performance? What other public forums might the 
stage resemble, and how might this contribute to its effect? I will continue to use The 
Merchant of Venice as my dramatic test case, but I will now turn my focus to 
Antonio’s predicament, the way he organizes it, and the way his feelings are 
dramatized. I will argue, like many critics do, that Antonio is depicted as receiving a 
particular pleasure from the threat of Shylock’s bond: he is able to play a martyr, 
publically submitting himself to the embarrassment of emasculation and the danger of 
a legally-mandated torture session. He can show Bassanio what a devoted and loving 
friend he is, and prove the righteousness of his hate for Shylock. The community will 
watch him undergoing this trial: they will witness him going beneath the knife and at 
the mercy of a fiendish, reviled moneylender. Drew Daniel sharply sums up Antonio’s 
desires by claiming that, while he begins the play in a state of melancholic 
introspection, this interest in knowing himself and being “known by others quickly 
modulates into a desire to be seen and to be seen suffering physical pain.”247 I agree 
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with this reading of Antonio in many respects, and I want to add to it by stressing the 
pleasures that are involved in these desires. Daniel demonstrates that provocative ways 
that that legality and contractual thinking inform a masochistic experience, but his 
major focus is on the theoretical implications of this experience. I argue that is 
essential to extend these thoughts into the very personal eroticism that the play wants 
to explore, an eroticism that is theoretically-informed but also deeply individual and 
intimate. What personal erotic feelings are possible if the play brings together the 
court, contracts, and payment of a debt? How is theatricality related to a dispute over 
money, and how might their interaction contain a sexual charge for someone in their 
middle of it? How are these concepts able to make someone feel good? What is it 
about the theater that makes it so particularly primed to depict these pleasurable 
feelings? 
Antonio’s pleasure differs from Jessica and Helena’s in two important ways. 
He also feels shame and humiliation, but his experience is much more public; he is put 
on display and practically exhibited in front of the leering Venetian courtroom and, by 
extension, the theater audience. He also faces actual danger and could very well die in 
the middle of Shylock’s procedure. Antonio’s erotic interests are clearly of a much 
different degree than Jessica or Helena’s; his desires are profoundly physical and more 
literally painful. The trial scene offers an erotic portrait of a man taking his sexual 
feelings to their limit. He puts his life on the line for his desires, and we are asked to 
watch; at the same time, it is the fact that his life is on the line and people are watching 
that fuels his fantasy.  
Due to its intensity and the public nature of Antonio’s fantasies, the trial scene 
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might be called pornographic. Ian Moulton, however, asserts that while contemporary 
audiences perceive pornography as something that should be read or watched behind 
closed doors, early modern erotic stories and images were not necessarily thought of 
as private.248 There was a lengthy public tradition in the early modern period of erotic 
ballads, graffiti and plays, and people were accustomed to seeing erotic performances 
of one kind or another in the company of others. What if, this scene seems to suggest, 
an individual receives sexual fulfillment from the public nature of these scenes in 
addition to – or, perhaps, instead of and in place of – their ostensible, traditional erotic 
content? 
The trial scene makes clear that both the theater and the court rely on this kind 
of pornographic theatricality. Like the court, the theater asks its audience to closely 
watch a person in a state of tense suspense, scrutinizing the character’s behavior for 
evidence of guilt or a tragic ending, innocence or a comic resolution. The theater also 
draws on and recalls other arenas of legal spectacle like flogging, stockades and 
executions, which invite their audience to watch and learn (perhaps putting into 
perverse practice the Horatian interest in entertaining while educating) from scenes of 
shame, degradation, torture and death. While many scholars have convincingly argued 
that this relationship to the law and public punishment implicates the theater in a 
brutally repressive political system, I want to focus on the personal dimension of all 
this theatrical legality. What does it mean to invite the brutally repressive into one’s 
sexual life, or to luxuriate in and receive pleasure from a brutally repressive situation? 
What does it mean to think of a government’s oppression as an opportunity for play, 
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personal enjoyment and erotic fulfillment? How do we reconcile the violence of the 
English judicial process with the idea that this very violence might be the focus of an 
individual’s erotic life? How can we think of the scaffold as a pornographic stage? 
These events were exciting and compelling to thousands who gathered to see human 
beings being beaten, torn apart and killed; even if they were not sexually aroused by 
what they saw, their revulsion or fear was overcome by an intense titillation.249 This is 
an essential background for thinking about Antonio’s erotic experience and how it is 
dramatized. I will begin this chapter by sketching the influence that the courts had on 
the theater, and how legal punishment was a vital element in staging a pornographic 
effect.  
I will spend the last section of this chapter by discussing the market; I argue 
that its iconography has as much of an impact on Antonio’s desires and how they are 
depicted as the theater or the court does. Antonio is like a commodity put on out 
display, haggled over by two parties who make very different bids for the right to 
claim him. Jessica also casts herself as an object to be bought and sold, but her 
relationship to the market is much more implied and hinted at from afar. Antonio, on 
the other hand, is a merchant himself, and has been made into one of his own goods; 
his body is a piece of property that can be sold off, not much different from a bag of 
spices or a case of wine. The scene also resembles an animal sale, with Antonio a cow 
or sheep that is put on stage, prodded and prepared to be sliced open. He is, of course, 
not an adequate specimen, but is more like, as he puts it, “a tainted wether of the 
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flock.”250 He is not even fit to be butchered, and this fact ironically adds to the shame 
of being put up for sale in the first place. Antonio is nevertheless able to find erotic 
meaning in this situation, putting into practice Valerie Forman’s claim that debt, trade, 
the market and other “new economic practices required the English to reconceptualize 
loss itself as something productive.”251 Antonio’s debt, along with the humiliation and 
danger that it brings, is transformed into a source of pleasure. I call his pleasure 
economic not only because of its connection to his debts and the contract that he has 
signed, but also because of how it treats sexual pleasure and erotic feelings as goods to 
be traded, exchanged and bargained with. This pleasure also demonstrates how the 
market continued to be understood in erotic terms during and beyond the early modern 
period; it would soon develop into one of the most significant metaphors for how 
people imagined their erotic life. My goal is not to claim that the market exerted an 
insidious control over sex lives in early modern England, but to argue that its 
contractual language made it ideal fodder for a sexual desire based on passivity, 
submission and control. I will conclude the chapter by showing how the concepts I 
have explored in these first two chapters are foundational for the latter parts of my 
project, which deal with wittols (or knowing cuckolds) and the relationship between 
the stage and the audience; both issues are grounded in the idea that there is a certain 
profit to experiencing pain or shame. 
The Pornographic Theater 
 
 The English theater was an intense place. It crowded hundreds of strangers into 
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a relatively small space, and then bombarded them with sights and sounds: the 
heckling, the cries of salesmen, and the smell of other theatergoers must have been 
overwhelming. The audience also had to be aware of pickpockets and con artists who 
trolled through the crowd looking for marks. There was then the small matter of a play 
to watch and pay some attention to. The situation was primed to bring sensations to 
their highest point. When antitheatricalist tracts claimed that theater audiences would 
be led into wantonness, prostitution, blasphemy and other immoral acts, they might 
have been on the right track; the atmosphere of the theater heightened the senses and 
intensified feelings, inviting the sort of decadent, lustful behavior that the tracts 
condemned. What antitheatricalists most complained about was the fact that, because 
of the theater’s overwhelming environment, people acted against their better natures 
and did not really realize how they were feeling or what they were doing; Ellen 
McKay’s research has shown the ways that these writers bitterly (but perhaps 
insightfully) argued that the theater’s greatest threat was in its “skill at baffling our 
powers of discernment.”252 They could not agree on exactly what the theater would 
inspire its audience to do or where it would lead them, but antitheatricalists were 
certain that it aroused all sorts of sexual desire: for men, for women, for one’s wife, 
for prostitutes, for boys, for girls, for actors. Even the theater’s most ardent defenders 
recognized how affecting a theatrical experience could be: they admitted in their own 
tracts that the theater assaulted its audience with sensory spectacle and infected them 
                                                                                                                                            
251
 Tragicomic Redemptions: Global Economics and the Early Modern English Stage. (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008) 1 
252
 Persecution, Plague & Fire: Fugitive Histories of the Stage in Early Modern England. (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2011) 92 
  105 
like the plague.253 It seems that there was nothing easy or safe about this performance 
space: it was a hotbed of emotions, feelings and anxieties, wildly contested but also 
very attractive to audiences who paid for exactly this sort of volatile experience. 
 The theater seems to have cultivated this experience and made it a selling 
point. It knew what its audiences wanted, and it offered an environment of lurid 
creativity where these expectations could be met. Early modern scholars often divide 
these audiences into small, unique groups: the poor, the rich, groundlings, patrons, 
those who sat on the stage, those who saw the theater as an alternative to bearbaiting, 
etc. Their point is usually that the theater had to cater to an incredibly diverse group of 
people, appealing to some at this moment and others at the next. I would argue, 
however, that the exciting, salacious, and controversial setting of the theater had a 
broad appeal to many different types of people, and might not have had to constantly 
alter its content and tone. Jeremy Lopez asserts, for instance, that it may be beside the 
point to insist on dividing up early modern audiences into discrete sections; these 
plays aimed at providing a broadly appealing experience that would hook as many 
viewers as possible.254 If the theater knew what its audience wanted and conducted 
itself accordingly, the audience was just as aware that they were getting what they 
wanted. Lopez claims that an attitude of self-consciousness linked the theater and its 
audience,255 with each side always aware of what the other was trying to do. The plays 
that emerged from this environment tended to push the envelope more and more 
throughout the seventeenth century, seeing what they could get away with and testing 
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the waters of how far audiences might want to go. Their death scenes, especially 
depictions of executions, became more imaginative and graphic; they lingered on 
taboo subjects like incest, and even tried to make incest something palatable and 
sympathetic; and there are very few tragedies from the early seventeenth century that 
do not involve rape or scenes of sexual violence. While some theatergoers may very 
well have been disturbed by these plays, it is unlikely that they were incredibly 
shocked or surprised; if drama was becoming increasingly violent, manic and garish, 
this is exactly what audiences paid for.  
 Critics have often connected the intense violence of these plays to the spectacle 
of public executions; they assert that the theater appropriated the energy and imagery 
of the scaffold for its own use. They argue that these plays, staging scenes that are so 
similar to official torture, unintentionally reflect and validate the strategies of 
government power. This reading was a central conceit of New Historicism, and has 
now become a critical commonplace. I agree that there is some truth to this insight, but 
I want to push it in another direction for a number of important reasons. First of all, 
Lorna Hutson has cautioned against investing too much in this reading. She points out 
that these critics have been heavily influenced by Foucault’s writings about the 
‘spectacle of the scaffold’ and the theatrical nature of official power; while Foucault is 
incredibly helpful and enlightening, his comments about the scaffold are specifically 
about France and not England or anywhere else in early modern Europe.256 It is 
irresponsible to transpose one context to the other for the sake of a good theory. It may 
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also be true that executions have not so much influenced the theater as each has had an 
influence on the other; executions may have been just as inspired by the theater as the 
other way around. Margaret Owens suggests, for instance, that public executions and 
the plays that staged them were so indebted to one another that it is difficult to know 
exactly where the imagery and drama of the scaffold originated.257 Francis Barker 
offers what is perhaps the harshest critique of New Historicists when he states that 
constantly harping on the theatricality of public executions (or the political 
significance of theatrical executions) threatens to turn the torture and execution of 
thousands of real people into nothing more than a toothless aesthetic exercise.258 I 
present these alternate perspectives not because I want to discredit the idea that the 
theater and public executions were intimately linked – on the contrary, it is an 
important part of my argument – but to propose that insisting on public executions as 
the inspiration behind theatrical violence might be on the wrong track (or, at the least, 
a critical dead-end). I do not think that focusing so intensely on public executions 
allows us to account for the pornographic qualities that I will tease out of these plays; 
so, while executions are certainly vital to the theatrical violence I am writing about, I 
want to locate that violence’s origin in a different and more immediately erotic sort of 
legal spectacle. 
 I am interested in public punishments that are more grounded in humiliation 
and shame than unbearable torture and death: thieves in the stocks, prostitutes carted 
through town, criminals flogged or whipped in the square. I argue that these publish 
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punishments are where the early modern theater learned how to produce a 
pornographic effect, and where audiences developed the tools for watching erotic 
dramas. Public whipping was a sentence that was broadly applied to many different 
crimes, and as such was an extremely common occurrence in the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth century;259 it was an event that anyone could easily have stumbled upon 
during a chance walk to the market. Criminals were often stripped naked for their 
flogging, in order to shame them in the eyes of their friends and neighbors. Sarah 
Toulalan notes that, because this was such a common sight, the public became 
comfortable with “watching the whipping of naked flesh and possibly enjoying the 
spectacle too.”260 Flogging gained even more erotic meaning because it was often used 
to punish sexual crimes like rape, adultery, prostitution and forcing servants into 
sodomy. The criminal’s body was almost overcharged with sexual tension, and the 
circumstances of public punishment were designed to excite and titillate as much as 
they were intended to teach viewers a social lesson. Onlookers were not expected 
passively to watch these punishments, but were encouraged to join in; when a criminal 
was locked up in stocks, viewers were expected to shout insults, throw stones and 
even urinate on the helpless prisoner. This exchange between the criminal and the 
viewer was so intensely physical and emotional that it took on a potently erotic 
character. It was also, of course, a deeply theatrical experience. Jeremy Lopez states 
that, for defenders of the theater like Thomas Heywood, an “ideal performance is one 
where there is a sense of physical and emotional connection between audience and 
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actor.”261 The spectacle of public punishment is then, in some ways, even more 
theatrical than the theater itself; it intimately connects the person who is suffering and 
the person who is watching them suffer. 
 I argue that this experience and its pleasures are dramatized in the trial scene of 
The Merchant of Venice. Antonio is essentially put out on display like a criminal in the 
stocks, and is helplessly prone while the community ogles at and pities him. The deep 
sense of shame that results from this situation creates an erotic tension that also leads 
to a deep sense of pleasure. This pleasure is built on the fact that Bassanio, his 
intimate friend, watches him and realizes that Antonio is suffering for him; on the 
embarrassment of being emasculated by his powerless position in the court and 
feminized by the implied threat of castration; and on the way that he resembles an 
animal or set of goods being sold at the market and available to whoever makes the 
best case. I want to explore how these pleasures work and what they look like when 
put into practice, what feelings they evoke and how they recruit and rely on the 
presence of spectators. What building blocks is this pleasure made of, and what 
images, narratives and cultural locations are important to it? Is it something that we 
can identity, or will it always remain hidden in the person experiencing it? Antonio 
offers a compelling dramatic test case for these ideas, and his desires are emblematic 
of the approach that the early modern theater begins to take to staging sex and erotic 
feelings. I will begin my discussion of these issues by outlining the terms of Antonio’s 
desires: what do they look like, and where we can find them? 
Scholars of The Merchant of Venice continue to debate how Antonio desires or 
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whether he even desires at all. Is he a gay man? Is he neither straight nor gay, but 
merely a typical early modern person who cannot be anachronistically placed into one 
of these categories? Is his relationship with Bassanio only intimately homosocial or 
has their friendship been sexually consummated? James O’Rourke, while arguing that 
Antonio is an early example of a dramatized gay identity, claims that the play offers 
“no suggestion that Antonio has an active sex life.”262 These critics mirror Antonio’s 
friends Salarino and Salanio, who try to figure out what makes Antonio so “sad”263 
and wonder whether it is love or anxiety over his ships being lost at sea. I want to 
argue, however, that Antonio’s desires are hidden in plain sight and have always been 
available (if we consider the play from a certain perspective). I am not going to make 
any claims about whether Antonio is “gay” or not, but will thoroughly consider his 
sexual life and its pleasures – I feel that these are two different questions, and I am 
more interested in the latter. Antonio’s desires are based in being restrained, made 
helpless, humiliated and indebted to such a degree that he cannot pay back those debts 
without suffering pain or even giving up his life. The subjection that he suffers in the 
trial scene seems to come from outside, but he has chosen this situation himself; much 
like Jessica, he designs the mise en scene of a dramatic scenario that is conducive to 
embarrassment, entrapment and vulnerability. This mise en scene is predicated on the 
idea that Antonio has not designed it at all and that he is at the mercy of the court; 
Janet Adelman finds that the play conceals a mysterious “desire that Antonio cannot 
know or allow others to know, projecting it outward as though it had nothing to do 
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with him.”264 If we pay close attention to Antonio’s language throughout the play, we 
will see that what he wants from the trial scene and how he wants it are actually not so 
ambiguous. 
Antonio and Bassanio 
 Antonio’s bond leads to a scenario in which he will be bound and helpless in 
front of Bassanio. When Bassanio comes to Antonio and asks for his help in raising 
money, Antonio instantly assures him that “My purse, my person, my extremest 
means/Lie all unlocked to your occasions.”265 Everything that Antonio has, including 
his body, is open for Bassanio to use as he sees fit. Antonio’s language here already 
evokes pain and torture; he claims that his credit “shall be racked even to the 
uttermost”266 so he can raise the funds that Bassanio needs. The idea that credit could 
be racked and stretched out in pain has its roots in an early modern tradition; Amanda 
Bailey has deeply researched this tradition, and has uncovered many instances in 
which debt bonds were depicted as tools of torture.267 The debtor was even imagined 
as signing a bond with his own blood, making his body into an official part of the 
contract.268 If debtors forfeited a debt, they could, in fact, be held physically 
responsible; the early modern period saw the popularization of debtor’s prisons where 
creditors were allowed to place borrowers who were unable to pay off their debts. 
Popular rhetoric equated a person who forfeited their debts with a slave: both gave up 
their body to an owner who could do with them what he wanted (whether put to work 
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in the slave’s case or thrown in jail in the debtor’s case).269 The dangers of being in 
debt became even more prominent when borrowing for someone else; you became 
liable for another’s misadventures and what Walter Lim calls “the controlling 
particularities of somebody else’s financial situation.”270 You took on these risks 
without the security that the person you were borrowing for would or could pay you 
back.  
Antonio borrows money for Bassanio’s needs, which means that Bassanio will 
be able to travel to Belmont and woo Portia. If, however, Antonio’s ships fall through, 
his friend has no way to pay him back, and Antonio will face hounding creditors and 
the possibility of debtor’s prison. Antonio puts himself in real danger for Bassanio’s 
sake, running the risk of ruining his credit and being imprisoned. Antonio will thus be 
able to demonstrate to Bassanio the depths of his friendship and devotion. When he 
puts himself in debt for Bassanio, his sometimes fickle, cavalier friend becomes 
indebted to him in a spiritual and emotional sense. Jill Philips Ingram claims that this 
was an early modern commonplace: being the “creditor in the emotional balance 
sheet” shared between friends “creates a beloved debtor.”271 Antonio does run a 
number of risks by going into debt for Bassanio, but it will create a significant 
emotional payoff by deepening their friendship. If this benefits Bassanio in the end – if 
he is successful in his quest and becomes engaged to Portia – this is almost irrelevant 
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to Antonio. What matters is that Antonio himself gains pleasure from his situation; 
Bassanio might or might not experience pleasure from his relationship with Portia, he 
might or might not even succeed in winning her hand, but he will know what Antonio 
has done and will witness the suffering that he undergoes. 
The bond that Antonio signs does, of course, involve a much greater danger 
than just risking prison. Shylock and Antonio share a bitter history of distrust and 
contempt, and it is curious that Antonio would want to do business with Shylock in the 
first place. He is not surprised, certainly, when Shylock decides on the terms of their 
debt contract: 
This kindness will I show: 
Go with me to a notary; seal me there 
Your single bond, and in merry sport, 
If you repay me not on such a day 
In such a place, such sum or sums as are 
Expressed in the condition, let the forfeit 
Be nominated for an equal pound 
Of your fair flesh, to be cut off and taken 
In what part of your body pleaseth me.272 
 
Shylock makes this proposal so spontaneously and Antonio accepts it so casually that 
it might not seem as bizarre and deranged as it really is. If Antonio is not able to come 
up with the full amount of money, a chunk of his body will be cut off, and Shylock 
himself will do the cutting. The play does not give an actor playing Antonio much 
time to hesitate or ponder over Shylock’s offer; his response is so immediate and so 
affirmative that there is little space for disdain or sarcasm in the line delivery. Antonio 
instantly claims that he is “content”273 with this deal, and admits that Shylock has 
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shown him “much kindness”274 by his proposal. If we consider the fact that Antonio 
has so many ships at sea and that the play opened with his friends expressing their 
anxiety over possible shipwrecks, he is not in the best position to make such a 
dangerous pact. He can also not expect that Shylock will actually think of their 
agreement as only a bit of “merry sport”, especially when he has been so causelessly 
nasty to this man. Shylock, before he states the bond’s terms, recollects to Antonio the 
“shames that you have stained me with;”275 Shylock reminds him of the times that he 
has spit on him, kicked him, and called him a “cutthroat dog” and “misbeliever.”276 
Antonio does not apologize but assures Shylock that he will someday spit on him 
again, call him names again, and spurn him again. Shylock may claim that his interest 
in cutting Antonio’s flesh is a joke and merely his attempt to “be friends with you and 
have your love”,277 but the acidic scorn that connects these two characters simply runs 
far too deep. Antonio could have gone to another one of the many Jewish 
moneylenders in Venice; we see Tubal, hear of Chus, and there are, one imagines, 
many others who would have loaned Antonio this money. Why has he chosen the one 
creditor that he has insulted, abused and humiliated? It is almost as if this is the very 
deal that Antonio hoped to make from the beginning; he has approached the lender 
who would give him the worst, most unfair terms, and has received what he must have 
expected. He has truly shown his friend how much he cares for him, putting his own 
body at the mercy of a man who has ample cause to hate him and is likely to relish the 
process of torturing him. 
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 Some scholars have seen Antonio’s dangerous, self-abasing bond as a 
renouncing of his personal desires in favor of Bassanio’s desires. He suffers so that 
Bassanio will be able to take pleasure. Henry S. Turner finds that “Antonio decides to 
sign the bond rather than to deny Bassanio, choosing love for his friend over love for 
himself.”278 Turner also feels, however, that Antonio will not receive much in return; 
the fact that Bassanio allows Antonio to risk death shows that he is not really a friend 
at all, and proves that Antonio’s drastic actions will not actually win Bassanio’s 
affection.279 Antonio has ruined his credit and given up his body for no good reason. 
Steve Patterson complains about Antonio’s bond too, arguing that his plan, to pledge 
“money and his own flesh for a gentleman who has given nothing in return, does not 
seem likely to earn a profit or produce domestic tranquility.”280 These critics argue 
that Antonio does not get anything out of his situation and does not receive any profit 
from it (whether financial or emotional). I propose that Antonio is not relinquishing 
his own desires and pleasures; on the contrary, he is indulging them. This is exactly 
what he wants and what he arranges for himself. He is being used because he wants to 
be used, being tortured because it is the sensation of torture (and the feeling of people 
watching him being tortured) that gives him pleasure. If Bassanio is uncaring or 
mercenary in his relationship with Antonio, if he accepts the possibility that his friend 
will suffer because it benefits his wallet and will win him the girl he wants, this is all 
the better; Antonio’s sacrifice falls on a deaf heart, exaggerating his suffering and 
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making it more pleasurable. Bassanio’s behavior is actually conducive to Antonio’s 
desires, and not an obstacle to them; he is being more of a friend by not caring about 
Antonio than if he worried over him and forbid him from accepting Shylock’s bond. 
Antonio’s decisions imply that this sort of emotional tension is vital to his pleasure: 
when you brutalize me, or especially when you allow me to be brutalized, you are 
doing exactly what I want. 
 Antonio’s bond with Shylock has a much different valence than the agreement 
that he has made with Bassanio. The latter has been roped into watching Antonio 
suffer; he has been recruited to witness the pain and bondage that Antonio has to 
undergo. It is not important, however, that Shylock watches Antonio – what is 
essential is that he acts on Antonio and that others watch him acting. Shylock is not a 
witness, but an actor in Antonio’s scheme. Shylock has not only agreed to lend 
Antonio the necessary money, but has also been cast as an actor in Antonio’s narrative 
of imprisonment and mutilation. Antonio has insisted on making a deal with the one 
moneylender most likely to harm him because Shylock is the only one capable of 
playing the exact role that he requires: an uncompromising enemy who will relish the 
opportunity of making him suffer and who will be seen as an uncomfortable, alien 
threat to the citizens who are gathered at the trial. 
Antonio and Shylock are further linked because the former is a masochist and 
the latter is a usurer. The idea of masochism is entirely self-serving: the “profits” of 
masochism go nowhere but to the masochist and do not benefit the economy. This was 
the same accusation made against usury – Walter Lim finds that lending money at 
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interest was labeled a sort of “unnatural reproduction”281 because it did nothing but 
produce more money. If money was not put to work by being used to buy goods, it 
was not “producing” anything new. It had to circulate and be converted into another 
form. The interest money made from usury did not come from anywhere new – it was 
produced by itself. This led to usury’s association with sodomy, which was also 
decried as self-serving, unnatural and unproductive.282 The sodomite also makes 
nothing new and wastefully spends all of his reproductive powers on sinful pleasure. 
Tracts and pamphlets claimed that usury and sodomy were therefore sick and corrupt: 
they prevented the healthy flow of society, stymieing the circulation of money and the 
production of children.283  
These tract writers could not, however, speak out against masochism; it was 
not yet a concrete discourse that could be railed against. Masochism was not 
technically defined until the late nineteenth century, when Krafft-Ebbing wrote about 
it in his influential Psychopathia Sexualis. If we take into account early modern 
theories of usury and sodomy, however, we can easily speculate about the charges that 
tract writers would have made against masochism. These practices, much like usury 
and sodomy, have also been conceptualized as unproductive and selfish, and would 
similarly have been called unhealthy and corrupt. I argue that this is, at least, the case 
in Merchant of Venice; the play’s conception of masochism is inspired by the way that 
usury and sodomy have already been vilified. Antonio’s monologues are colored by a 
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“language of pathological contamination”,284 and it is clear that he considers himself 
sick. He calls himself a “tainted wether of the flock”,285 a sheep that is sickly and 
castrated, of no use to anyone and even actively dangerous to the community. He must 
be culled so that he does not contaminate other, healthier sheep. Antonio claims to be 
diseased produce; he is the “weakest kind of fruit”,286 an unripe, unnecessary and 
undesirable good that no one would want to purchase. Antonio associates his feelings 
with sickness and corruption, just as if he were accusing himself of being a sodomite 
or a usurer. The important difference is that while someone accused of sodomy might 
feel ashamed of such accusations, a masochist actually cultivates and acts out these 
shameful charges. 
This may be one of the reasons that it is difficult for Portia to tell Antonio and 
Shylock apart when she enters the courtroom; one of her first statements is, “Which is 
the merchant here and which the Jew?”287 Shylock should, however, be fairly easy to 
identify; Portia would know he was Jewish because of his “gabardine”288 and, we can 
assume, the long beard and fox-hemmed hat that traditionally accompanied it. How is 
it that Antonio could be mistaken for a Jew? He has not even spoken yet, and has 
revealed nothing about himself or who he is. There is, then, something about his self-
presentation that makes him indistinguishable from anti-Semitic images of sickly and 
effeminate Jews. Antonio, like Shylock, is tainted by the idea of sickness and 
corruption; the latter because he is a Jew and a usurer, and the former because he is an 
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implied sodomite and masochist. James O’Rourke finds that Antonio is internally 
conflicted because his desires are at odds with traditional Christian values of 
productive sexuality; his treatment of Shylock is therefore a projected self-loathing.289 
I argue that what the play depicts, just beneath the surface, is the exact inverse: 
Antonio does not project his self-loathing onto Shylock but takes many of its elements 
from him. Shylock is exactly the sort of hated, harried and pathetic figure that he 
wants to be. Antonio also wants to be despised, mocked and seen as a sickly, 
undesirable outcast. 
Antonio’s Masochism 
Turner, Patterson and other scholars may be uncomfortable with my reading; 
they tend to see Antonio as a naïve older man who sacrifices all he has for a predatory 
hustler. I want to imagine that Antonio is in control of his own helplessness. If he is 
mistreated, I argue that this is the point of his erotic fantasy. If he relinquishes his 
body and seems to relinquish control of his free will, it is because giving up his body 
is an expression of a different kind of control and a different kind of freedom. If 
Bassanio appears exploitative and abusive, it is because Antonio has recruited him to 
perform this role. I agree with Drew Daniel in calling Antonio a masochist; he gives 
up control of himself and needs to be watched and observed giving up that control. He 
cannot simply torture himself in private, without anyone to watch or comment. 
Masochists need observers – giving up control loses its erotic meaning if there is not 
another person there to create a sense of structure and narration. Antonio requires 
Bassanio in all of his fickleness, shallowness and selfishness to witness what he is 
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going through and to show him just how useless his bid for affection will be. Bassanio 
has married Portia and left him behind, but Antonio will nevertheless be put under the 
knife for his friend’s benefit as that friend watches on in confusion. If he does not have 
this audience and co-author (unwitting though Bassanio may be), the torture and 
shame that he puts himself through would lose their pleasurable tension. This is one of 
the essential ingredients of a masochistic experience: Daniel defines it as the 
“collaborative impulse”290 of masochism, and reminds us that a masochistic fantasy 
demands a cast of players who can participate by merely watching. He states that the 
trial scene is almost like a masochistic “ritual”,291 a sort of theatrical performance that 
requires an attentive audience. Antonio has placed himself in a position whereby 
Bassanio and Venice’s citizens “are nearly forced to preside over his suffering and 
death in a gruesome spectacle.”292 This may horrify them and make them squirm in 
their seats, but it is exactly this sort of experience that a masochist thrives on.  
Antonio, like the other masochists I discuss in this project, is responsible for 
his situation; he has signed on the dotted line and fully agreed to the exact experience 
that he has during the trial scene. His status as playmaker is predicated, however, on 
constantly disavowing that he has had anything to do with the play he performs in. 
Jessica and especially Helena are slightly more open about the fact that they have 
designed the mise en scene of their masochistic scenarios. Antonio, on the other hand, 
is insistent about his helplessness and complete lack of agency. He tells Bassanio that 
this situation is really nobody’s fault, and that Bassanio should certainly not blame 
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himself. Fortune is at fault: 
Give me your hand, Bassanio, fare you well; 
Grieve not that I am fall’n to this for you, 
For herein Fortune shows herself more kind 
Than is her custom…293 
 
Antonio gives all the credit to Fortune and its whims, and does not acknowledge that 
he has had any part in what has occurred. He is its victim and is helpless to change 
what has happened; he is happy, at least, that he has been able to help Bassanio in the 
midst of his suffering. Antonio’s disavowal is disingenuous: he is the one who went to 
Shylock, the very person who would want to do him harm and the last person he 
should have signed a debt contract with; he agreed to Shylock’s conditions knowing 
full well how dangerous they were; and he repeatedly told Bassanio how prepared he 
was to suffer for his sake, suggesting that he has specially sought out the condition he 
finds himself in. The play is explicit about the fact that Antonio is an architect of his 
own distress. He denies this role because it allows him to present himself as a helpless 
lump of flesh, tossed and turned on the sea of life. He styles himself as someone who 
is feeble and powerless, dangled in the air and at the mercy of higher powers that he 
cannot understand. In Antonio’s case, the pleasure of designing a masochistic scenario 
is made more powerful by the constant denial that he has had anything to do with it. 
Shylock is not a threat because he will cut a pound out of Antonio – this is what 
Antonio wants. He is a threat because he insists that Antonio is not a helpless victim; 
that he has signed a legal contract; and that he has placed himself in this scene with 
full knowledge of what would happen to him. If he talks too much, he might spoil one 
of the central premises of Antonio’s masochistic fantasy. 
  122 
Antonio’s fantasy put him in the company of De Flores, the grotesque anti-
hero of Middleton and Rowley’s The Changeling. Gabriel Rieger argues that De 
Flores, who loves the haughty Beatrice-Joanna, fantasizes about “being brutalized for 
the object of his desire and degraded, even beyond the point of servant.”294 He wants 
to be cut apart and turned into her dancing shoes, to be impersonally and coldly used 
by her while he is quite “literally under her feet.”295 He imagines himself as an object 
that has no say in what is happening to it. The fact that this is his fantasy means that he 
really has a say in having no say; the condition of having no choice is a choice that he 
has made. Antonio likewise wants his body to be turned into material that Bassanio 
can use and exploit. His bond with Shylock actually does De Flores one better, 
bringing this fantasy into reality. It allows his literal flesh and blood, a pound of it, to 
be used as the mortar that will pave the road beneath Bassanio’s feet. He is like a cow 
brought to the slaughter, impotently mooing while he is chopped up for the use of his 
eventual devourer. De Flores quickly abandons his own version of this fantasy, and 
becomes a sadistic taskmaster who coerces Beatrice-Joanna into greater and greater 
moral corruption. Antonio, on the other hand, takes his fantasy and runs with it, 
putting it into practice by agreeing to a bond that will cut into his physical body. There 
is a direct relationship between Antonio’s mangled pound of flesh and Bassanio’s 
financial and marital success; the former has facilitated the latter. De Flores’ fantasy is 
certainly attractive him. He gets a palpable erotic charge out of imagining himself as 
an inanimate object that Beatrice-Joanna can use, coolly enjoy, and dispose of when 
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she sees fits. It is, however, a passing fancy, and he does not follow-up on it. In 
Antonio’s case, this fantasy scenario is dramatized as the driving engine of his erotic 
life. 
Antonio’s fantasy evokes the iconography of Catholic martyrdom: he is a lamb 
brought to the slaughter in the name of a higher cause, willing to lay down his life so 
that his loved ones will not have to suffer. If we look closer, however, Antonio’s 
situation is very different from that of a Catholic martyr; the way that he presents 
himself and the energy that he brings to his performance would most likely have 
exposed him as a pseudo-martyr. Brad Gregory and Sara Covington both offer a 
helpful history of this false martyrdom. Gregory finds that victims of religious 
persecution were often, it is true, very theatrical; they were melodramatic and 
flamboyant, and proudly flaunted their willingness to die.296 Covington expands on 
this Gregory’s research and explains how martyrs saw themselves as imitating Christ 
and the early Christians, and were self-conscious about acting out and fully 
performing the drama of martyrdom.297 However, someone could not become a martyr 
simply by reciting the right lines and looking the part. If a supposed martyr did not die 
for truly religious views – if they died for the own glory, or out of stubbornness and 
pride – they were condemned as a “false martyr.”298 Luther criticized martyrs who 
suffered “for the sake of their own will” and for “self-indulgent spirituality;”299 he was 
disgusted by their selfishness and by the idea that they would co-opt the actual 
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suffering of true believers for their own benefit. Luther and other Christian thinkers, to 
this end, adopted a maxim created by St. Cyprian and later developed by St. 
Augustine: “martyres verso non facit poena sed causa.”300 It is not the punishment, but 
the cause, that makes a martyr: if someone suffers and goes through all the steps of 
becoming a martyr, but does not actually die in the name of Christ and for the sanctity 
of their religious convictions, they are not a true martyr and they have deceived the 
community that watched them be tortured and executed. Antonio, a masochist who has 
created this narrative of martyrdom for his own erotic benefit, might himself have 
been labeled a false martyr. He appropriates the iconography and language of Christ 
for his own use and his own feelings; the torture he is threatened with may look like 
the sort of punishment that a martyr must face, but the cause that he undergoes this 
punishment for is completely personal. Antonio’s masochism delegitimizes him as an 
authentic martyr. 
Drew Daniel’s article on the play is interested in the socio-political 
implications of what Antonio is going through (an emphasis shared by most early 
modern critics), and he discusses Antonio’s pleasures from a theoretical angle. His 
essay understands masochism as a theoretical function that is related to how a 
community is formed, how governments rule and how citizens are expected to think of 
themselves. Daniel argues that Antonio’s bond and his masochistic fantasy is a 
reaction to the strictness and oppressive rule of Venetian power; he claims that 
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masochism plays with that strictness, counters it and subverts it, and that in this way it 
“threatens to rupture and discredit the civic bond”301 of the Venetian community. 
These insights are sharp and enlightening, but I argue that we must also consider the 
role of Antonio’s personal pleasure in this situation. His masochistic narrative has 
definite political implications, but what the play shows is first and foremost a man 
who enjoys the experience of being tortured (or teetering on the verge of being 
tortured) while an audience watches him.  
The erotic appeal of the play is in witnessing this scene play out, and to being 
an implicit part of it as an audience member. I agree that we must be attentive to the 
biopolitical consequences of these desires, but I want to concentrate on the personal 
pleasures that biopolitics make available. What does it mean to invite biopolitics into 
one’s life, into one’s bedroom? I do not want to argue that Antonio is being acted on 
by a monolithic biopolitical system, but that he understands and desires to be acted 
upon by these forces. The play, in other words, imagines a character who can act in a 
situation where he would normally be acted upon, and who is acted upon because of 
his actions. In the next section, I will discuss how Antonio’s body is feminized by the 
position that he puts himself in, and will discuss the pleasurable shame that results. I 
will then show how this feminization connects the trial scene to the early modern 
market: Antonio turns himself into a commodity to be displayed and sold to the 
highest bidder, a sort of coin that can be manhandled and traded. His body stops being 
his own and becomes an object to be exchanged. I will finally discuss how the 
confluence of shame and commodity is essential for understanding the subject of my 
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next chapter: the wittol, who enjoys and profits from the knowledge that his wife is 
cheating on him.  
The Feminized Body 
 Gail Kern Paster has argued that early modern rhetoric tended to see women as 
“leaky vessels”302: they are like cups that cannot hold all the liquid that they contain, 
and are constantly springing leaks and inadvertently letting that liquid flow out of 
them. They cannot help but let out streams of tears, urine, blood and other discharges. 
Men, on the other hand, are able to control these liquids; their ability to do so is a sign 
of masculinity, discipline and civility. The virtue of bodily control became more and 
more significant to early modern theories of decorum, and Paster demonstrates how 
philosophical texts, conduct manuals and plays claimed that women could not “be 
counted on to manage their behaviors in response to historically emergent demands of 
bodily self-rule.”303 These texts opine that women should feel ashamed and 
embarrassed about their leakages; they thus formed a sort of proto-theory of shame 
that grounded shameful feelings on an inability to control the body and its leaky 
fluids.304 Men could be affected by these leakages in their weaker moments; during 
sex, when drunk, while being flogged. The point was to bridle them as much as 
possible, maintaining self-control and not letting the public notice any slippages. If a 
man were to let his guard down by pissing his pants at the local tavern or not dressing 
a fresh wound, staining his clothes and leaking his bodily fluids all over the street, he 
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would be branded as feminine and ridiculous.305 This man has shown that he cannot 
control himself and does not know how to act like a man. In an early modern culture 
that was so obsessed with appearances and decorum, this was a decisive faux pas; 
women might be expected to leak, but a man should be able to master his bodily 
functions. 
 This is one of the central reasons for Antonio’s shame. If his flesh is cut off, he 
will begin to leak blood all over the court like a menstruating woman. Paster calls him 
a “distinctly feminized victim”,306 and is prone at any moment to having his fluids 
forcibly released; he will be cut open, helplessly exposing his innards in front of the 
community and showing that he does not have any manly self-control. He cannot 
control what his body does, and this incontinence is shamefully emasculating. 
Christian Billing claims that Antonio’s potential injuries will cause him, like the 
women of early modern conduct manuals, to undergo an experience of “corporal 
instability.”307 It is not simply that he will bleed or spread out his waste in public – it 
is that his inability to control his bodily functions speaks to a larger inability to control 
the limits of his body and to maintain the border that divides where he ends and others 
begin. If men are able to hold in their fluids and demonstrate to the public that they 
have a stable body, they will also be able to maintain a stable identity and be sure of 
themselves. If Antonio lets loose all the fluids inside him, it will be difficult to decide 
exactly where his personal boundaries lie, and his self-identity will become muddled. 
It may even be effaced; his inner life would be voided by his literal innards spilling 
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out on the courtroom floor. This was a problem that, according to conduct books, 
women faced all the time: their identities were in constant flux because they were 
constantly leaking. Paster finds that this made women unreliable and unable to be 
trusted;308 men were advised to not discuss weighty matters with women, because they 
could not know who they would be speaking to from one day to the next. Women 
were characterized as living in perpetual shame because of these failings, while men 
have the tools to keep their bodies steadfast and their identities stable. Antonio has 
arranged a scenario that will allow him to luxuriate in the shame of feminine 
instability, leaking out his blood, tears and monologues. This will cause him shame 
and paint him as unmanly, but that is not a bad thing – it is a foundational part of his 
masochistic pleasure. Antonio has entangled himself in an elaborate legal, economic 
and emotional situation so that he can experience the state of shame that was ascribed 
to early modern female experience. 
 Antonio is further feminized because he is placed in such a vulnerable and 
passive position. His body is completely at the mercy of the court, and Julia Lupton 
demonstrates how Antonio is constantly reminded of the “ability of his flesh to be 
pierced.”309 The court and the men who run it will decide how his body is treated, 
what it can do and how it can act. He stands in contrast to Portia and Shylock, who 
should ostensibly be the most feminine characters in the courtroom. Portia, however, 
dresses as a man, shows masculine initiative, and proves that she has an ingenious 
skill with legal rhetoric and logic. Shylock also defies femininity; even though Jessica 
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stole his “stones” and Jewish men were often parodied as feminine, Lupton argues that 
Shylock is “a figure of fixation rather than fluidity.”310 He knows what he wants and 
how he wants it, trusting in the solidity of his bond and the legality of his claim. 
Antonio, on the other hand, does not seem to have any initiative at all, and simply 
allows these events to happen to him. He admits that this is exactly how he wants to 
present himself to the court: 
I do oppose 
My patience to his fury, and am armed 
To suffer with a quietness of spirit 
The very tyranny and rage of his.311 
 
Antonio makes clear that he is not going to raise a hand in his own defense; he will 
wait with “patience” while the court decides whether or not his body should be picked 
apart. It does not matter how much “tyranny and rage” is levied against him or how 
criminal and unjust Shylock’s bond might be: Antonio will “suffer” these events in 
patient silence. His passivity is, however, a calculated position, and what seems to be a 
“quietness of spirit” is an active performance and that continually insists it is being 
played. I am not trying to argue that this makes Antonio “masculine” instead of 
“feminine”, or attempting to prove that he is actually manly after all. I simply want to 
notice how the passive femininity he presents to the court is an active role that he has 
chosen and arranged. It is a role he has prepared for; he is “armed” with his 
helplessness, and will use his passive “quietness” to actively “oppose” Shylock’s 
aggressively vigorous behavior. If he looks and acts like an exposed and defenseless 
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woman who has no say in what happens to her, this requires just as active and 
committed a performance as Portia displays by playing Balthazar. While her 
performance disavows any vulnerability – she must be steadfast, uncompromising and 
smarter than her debate partner – Antonio’s performance insists on his vulnerability 
and the understanding that his life and body are completely in the hands of the court.  
 Antonio’s passive role also feminizes him in a different way: it transforms him 
into a piece of property. The play stresses how both Portia and Jessica are understood 
as property that can be bought and sold; they are women, which means that they can 
be appraised, traded or hoarded away by the men in their lives. I have shown how 
Jessica is a character who exploits this narrative of female commodity, turning herself 
into a coin that can be stolen away from her father. Antonio places himself in a similar 
role; he is made into a sack of goods, a case of spices or fine linen that is haggled over 
and then auctioned off. His body is dragged back and forth between the court and 
Shylock, each one trying to claim ownership and assert their right to do what they 
want with him. He is suspended in the middle of these two parties, seemingly unable 
to do anything about his situation. He is something like livestock; the court ultimately 
debates how and where Antonio can be cut open and sold off as meat. Shylock may 
not plan to eat Antonio’s flesh, but what he does with the flesh is irrelevant – it is 
debated over in much the same way that it would be at the marketplace. The difference 
between Antonio and livestock is that the former can speak: he arranges and cultivates 
this experience for himself, and designs a role in which he can appear to have no 
voice. Goods and animals do not, of course, have a say in what is happening to them, 
and, as I discussed earlier, debtors were often described as slaves; the market is, then, 
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an ideal situation for someone who gets pleasure from appearing helpless and at the 
mercy of what other people want. Antonio’s status as a merchant and the play’s 
insistent references to trade, debt, and contracts do more than create an atmosphere of 
risk and chance – they evoke a culture of bondage, of people understanding 
themselves as commodities, of desire intermingled with ownership and being owned. I 
argue that the way the marketplace works and how people participate in it are all 
primed to offer exactly the experience that Antonio designs for himself. 
Commodities 
 
 The culture of the market is implicated in every scene of desire or attraction 
that we see in the play. The play depicts sexual feelings as inextricably bound to the 
market and market concepts like trade and debt. The play’s understanding of desire is 
entirely market-driven, so much so that it becomes impossible to tell where economics 
ends and where desire begins; Simon Critchley and Tom McCarthy argue that, for this 
play, “desire is an economy, to be both experienced and expressed in purely economic 
terms.”312 Jessica gilds herself with coins before eloping; Bassanio needs to put on a 
show of riches in order to court Portia (who he was interested in because of her 
wealth); and Antonio signs himself into a debt contract so that he can fulfill his own 
erotic interests. In all of these cases, money is not just an intermediary that helps make 
desire possible; making or losing money is itself a powerfully erotic activity, and 
dealing with the market is as potent as expression of desire as any physical sexual act. 
This was not simply a dramatic device; by the end of the sixteenth century, the power 
of the English market had grown exponentially, and the ability to jump social classes 
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led to an insistent obsession with credit, debt and trade. In this milieu, where the 
market and personal identity are so caught up in one another, people could think of 
themselves as part of the market. The pamphlets that compared debt to slavery 
demonstrate that people were able to imagine themselves as goods that could be 
bought and sold, and that debt and credit might put them in situations where they 
would end up being owned or owning others. My reading of the early modern is 
especially inspired by Jim Ellis’ claim that the market’s influence led to a point where 
“a property of the self becomes a property in the other sense.”313 The things that a 
person intrinsically “owns” – a body, a mind, a feeling, a desire – can actually be sold 
and traded to someone else. This intermingling of economics and identity “encourages 
or demands the rethinking of the borders of the self;”314 if people can own themselves, 
they can therefore be owned by others. What I have always thought of as most 
inherently and inalienably mine is, in fact, property that can be severed from me and 
sold off if I cannot pay back my debts. I am not a self-contained, private person, but a 
commodity that can be placed on the open market. 
 If you are a potential commodity, your body is constantly open and exposed to 
the public. This meant that men who participated in the market were often depicted as 
weak and feminine (this is one of the central anxieties behind images of cuckolds in 
early modern plays and ballads, as I will discuss in the next chapter). They were 
exposed to the prying hands of the community, open to exploitation by their enemies 
and other people who would drain them of their riches and resources. The rise of debt 
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and credit meant that money was no longer seen as something to be stockpiled and 
stored away, but as part of a network of exchange in which it constantly changed 
hands.315 The market also re-popularized the classical conceit of usufruct – the concept 
that the public may have a right to your property or goods. In usufruct, you do not own 
property: you are only using it for a time, and others may come to use it later.316 
Usufruct was also the legal term for pieces of land that were held by groups of people 
who could all use and profit from it at the same time.317 Anyone could have a stake in 
anyone else’s money or property. The popularization of these economic ideas 
contrasted with all of the tracts and pamphlets that promoted masculine images of 
autonomy, self-reliance and impenetrability. If men could be exploited by someone 
else at any moment, if their finances and property could be put in the hands of 
someone else at any time, their masculinity would be in constant peril. Laura Mandell 
has shown that polemicists would, later in the seventeenth century and into the 
eighteenth, attempt to placate this anxiety by blaming women for all the negative 
effects of the market.318 Women’s participation in the market was classified as an 
effect of their “inordinate sexual appetite”319 and desire for new things, leading to 
inflated prices and an overreliance on foreign imports. While these unattractive 
aspects of the market were attributed to women, the activity of male merchants could 
then be valorized as honorable and virtuous; men dealt with the market to ensure that 
their own homes and England’s national economy would be disciplined and self-
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sufficient.320 
In the late sixteenth century, however, these arguments had not been made yet, 
and the market was still a place of social and personal risk. This is one of the anxieties 
that the play draws on when it depicts Antonio’s masochistic desires. He is going to be 
cut open during the trial scene and exposed in front of the community, which will 
make him appear weak and easily exploitable. His insides will be pulled back for all to 
see, and he will no longer be the private, self-contained and impenetrable man that 
was expected in early modern society. Antonio becomes a public commodity that has 
no privacy and that everyone gets to manhandle and trade amongst themselves. His 
body is like a sack of goods open to the highest bidder. Antonio tells Bassanio that he 
does not regret paying his friend’s debt, “For if the Jew do cut but deep enough,/I’ll 
pay it presently with all my heart.”321 He seems to mean that he will pay the debt with 
all of his “heart” – in other words, his affection and friendship – but he also simply 
means that he will be paying it off with his flesh, blood and organs. His actual body is 
transformed into the goods that will be used to pay Shylock back; Critics have 
traditionally felt that Shylock, though he appears to represent the new market, actually 
rejects profit in pursuing his bond for Antonio’s flesh. Shylock himself admits as 
much, of course; he claims that a “pound of man’s flesh taken from a man/Is not so 
estimable, profitable neither,/As flesh of muttons, beefs, or goats.”322 Amanda Bailey 
finds, however, that because the play depicts money and flesh as equivalent forms of 
property, distinguishing between the two or stating that one is rejected in favor of the 
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other is creating “a false dichotomy”323 that does not actually exist. Shylock is willing 
to accept Antonio’s flesh as repayment of the bond because, on some level, he sees it 
as a form of profit; it may be less of a profit than mutton or beef, but his suit is 
financially sound, even if it is only in a symbolic sense.324 Shylock never stops being a 
creditor, and while he seems to be pursuing a fruitless bond, he is actually making sure 
that he recovers the money he is owed. Antonio’s bond is predicated on the fact that 
the value of his flesh is equal to the money that was originally lent out, as well as on 
the fact that Shylock will find it worthwhile to accept repayment in this way. 
Antonio’s flesh may not be worth as much as a goat’s, but it still carries a symbolic 
market value. Shylock is making a good deal on at least some level: Antonio’s body is, 
in some sense, worth something, and Shylock recognizes this symbolic value. 
The idea of becoming a coin is precisely the sort of fantasy that a masochist 
might crave. You are turned you into a public object without any say in how you are 
being used and traded, in the process effacing your identity and free will. However, 
being put into public circulation is not random or lawless, and this is essential for a 
masochistic scenario to be successful; masochists find pleasure in pain and humiliation 
because there is a delicately designed script underwriting these feelings. The market 
was regulated by a series of economic rules that were being codified at the end of the 
sixteenth century, and that would become more stable during the seventeenth 
century.325 These rules tried to ensure that the market was completely logical even at 
its most merciless, making it an attractive setting for masochistic scenes. In fact, the 
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market and masochism have a natural affinity for one another because they work much 
the same way. If you buy, sell, invest or incur debt in the market, Valerie Forman 
describes this as a is “multi-stage process” in which “goods or money are converted 
into a form that can be used to purchase different goods.”326 The point is not to buy 
once, sell once, invest once or take on debt once; you buy to sell, take on debt to buy, 
and invest to give out credit to others. Masochism works through a similar multi-part 
process of investment, conversion and transformation. It is not as simple as saying that 
one receives pain and this produces pleasure; to put it in economic terms, one takes on 
the “debt” of pain, humiliation and helplessness. The burden of this debt and the 
necessity of paying it off are not, however, hardships that are incurred in order to pay 
the rent or pay back gambling losses; they are ends in and of themselves, and are an 
investment that will end up in pleasure. The masochist receives more pleasure with 
every debt; the goal is not to get rid of debt, but to build it up and live within it. Their 
erotic life is defined by constantly being in thrall and in debt to a contract or a 
bondsman (always, of course, on their own terms). 
This debt is paid back by selling it off to onlookers and observers – citizens at 
the marketplace, an audience at a trial, one’s closest friends and lovers. The 
masochistic scene, much like currency, must be “bought into” and believed by those 
who participate in it. When consumers ordinarily buy a product at the market, they 
presumably know what they are getting or what they are signing up for. In the case of 
these masochistic narratives, however, participants may not realize that they have been 
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recruited in order to validate or activate someone else’s erotic fantasy. They might not 
necessarily be aware that they have been cast as actors in a staged story, which means 
that the masochist must become a sort of salesperson. How can I make these people 
believe that I really am as horrible, tainted and unworthy as I want to appear? How do 
I sell my narrative so that this gathered audience will believe that this is really what is 
happening to me and that this really what I feel? Masochists need to learn the tricks of 
the market – how to sell a product, how to convince consumers that their goods are 
worth buying, how to use the public space of the market as an opportunity to reach a 
wide, varied audience. If their narrative is not sold off, if the gathered crowd and the 
intended participants do not buy into it and believe it, the masochist will not have 
accomplished his or her objective, and their desire will be unfulfilled. The sight of a 
man who is persecuted by a villainous Jew, alone and in need of pity, is far different 
from the sight of a man who has obviously arranged this scene for himself and is 
acting it out for some mysterious purpose. If the masochist’s poor salesmanship gives 
rise to the latter reaction, his or her erotic narrative has failed (unless, of course, this 
failure was the very point of that narrative all the time). 
In this sense, masochistic salesmanship has a theatrical quality. Much like an 
actor, the masochistic needs to give a convincing performance. The audience needs to 
believe in what both the masochist and the actor feel, or else they will not be able to 
invest themselves in the narratives being sold by these performers. If an actor fails to 
convince his audience, he might get a lesser role when the next play comes around, or 
the audience may spread bad word-of-mouth about this production; if a masochist fails 
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to convince his or her audience, however, an entire erotic structure will crumble. One 
of the great tensions in this play is the relationship between theatricality and 
masochism: two levels of performance are required by the actor playing Antonio, and 
each is intricately bound up with the other. On the one hand, a theatrical performance 
is an economic event; the main purpose of a play is that an audience must be enticed 
into attending it, and for this reason it needs to market itself as something provocative 
or unexpected. The erotic interests of The Merchant of Venice are constructed as such 
in order to appeal to the theater-going public and to compete with other plays on the 
theatrical market; the play depicts an unintuitive and compelling form of desire that 
might interest a savvy, cynical audience. On the other hand, these erotic interests are 
powerfully connected to the market. Masochistic desires thrive on a relationship to the 
market: its logic and language are sources of inspiration and potent models for how to 
design and perform an erotic narrative. The play depicts erotic desires for an economic 
purpose, but the characters in the play use economic systems to articulate those erotic 
desires. This tangle is one of the reasons that the play can seem so confused or 
conflicted about how to present the erotic feelings that Jessica and Antonio 
experience: it wants to make money by staging these desires, but those desires can 
only express themselves by being bound up with money or at least the idea of 
exchange, commodity, trade and contractual obligations.  
I argue that the market and its logic offers raw material for The Merchant of 
Venice; it provides a language that the play can use to articulate and dramatize the 
desires of characters like Antonio. The alienation, vulnerability and humiliation that 
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one might suffer in the market become possible templates for a masochistic 
experience. These images show a masochist how they might appear impotent and 
useless in front of their friends and neighbors, how they could present themselves as 
failures, how they might be regarded as untrustworthy, sickly, unwanted or 
undesirable. Contractual thinking is one of the vital vocabularies that early modern 
masochists were able to draw from. Drew Daniel finds that contracts, precisely 
because of their “neutral language” and unemotional legalese, are sites for “a plethora 
of libidinal investments.”327 Contracts can be filled in with the erotic interests of those 
who agree to them, and, due to the way they can bind someone into a situation that 
will lead to their own downfall, these erotic interests are most often masochistic. The 
rise of contracts and contract law in England coincided with recognition – at least in 
the period’s plays – that these contracts could be used as vehicles for finding pleasure 
in the experience of pain and humiliation. 
The drama originally set its depictions of masochism on the continent; 
masochism was a “practice of foreign Catholics”328 like Antonio or Helena and not yet 
an English concern. In the next two chapters I will show that, at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, theater began to make masochism into a much more English 
issue. It first located these desires in English merchants and shopkeepers, and would 
soon enough point out the masochistic relationship that theatrical audiences had to the 
plays they paid to see. I will first discuss the figure of the wittol. Wittols are cuckolds 
who know that they are being cuckolded, but who actively encourage and enjoy this 
fact. The wittol is a counterintuitive concept in early modern studies, which has taken 
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for granted a culture of male anxiety and paranoia about female chastity. Wittols offer 
us a chance to turn this assumption on its head; these men actually wanted to be 
cuckolded. This is a significant development in my argument because it localizes 
masochism in a very much English context – wittols were most often depicted as local 
English people, and the implication was that your local grocer or next-door neighbor 
could be involved in this lifestyle. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
The benefits of being a wittol in early modern city comedies 
 
 Conventional wisdom about early modern masculinity states that men were 
wildly paranoid about being cuckolded. This was a pervasive fear, and it was 
considered one of the most shameful things that could happen to a man. What if, 
however, there were a type of man who actually enjoyed the fact that he might be 
cuckolded? What if he invited other men to sleep with his wife, and what if this idea 
made him extremely excited? In this chapter, I will explore exactly this figure, who 
defies so much of the conventional wisdom that scholars have long rehearsed about 
masculinity, male anxiety, gender dynamics and social expectations for men in early 
modern England. Early modern criticism has traditionally held that becoming a 
cuckold was the ultimate horror for any early modern men. If a man’s wife cheats on 
him, this means that he does not have any control over her: she can do what she wants, 
and is not impressed with his demands or desires. When this happens, the cuckolded 
husband is exposed as foolish, gullible and, above all, impotent, unworthy of being 
seen as equal with other men. This is a concept that flies in the face of critical 
assumptions about what men wanted to be and what would be complete anathema to 
them. Wittols encourage their own humiliation and sometimes step in to ensure that it 
continues; if a wittol’s wife planned to end an affair with her lover, a wittol would 
work behind the scenes to mend the relationship and keep it going. Wittols are 
especially happy if these affairs bring in revenue: wittols often blackmail their rivals, 
or even establish agreements that state the rival can sleep with the wittol’s wife as long 
as he supports the wittol’s lifestyle, pays his rent, provides for his children, loads his 
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table with food, etc. Wittols are emasculated, usually in a very public way and right in 
front of their friends and neighbors, but they don’t mind and are content with the 
personal and financial profit that they have received. 
 In an early modern culture that seems so obsessed with chastity, domestic 
mastery and the anxiety of being cuckolded, the idea of a wittol might seem like a 
bizarre fantasy. Why would these men enjoy the experience of being cuckolded? What 
are they getting out of it and how could they possibly experience any pleasure from 
this situation? The culture was, however, fascinated with these figures, and writers 
capitalized on this fascination in ballads, poems, jokes, songs and plays. The complete 
incongruity between wittols and what we have come to expect from early modern 
attitudes toward cuckoldry must have made for morbidly provocative entertainment, 
especially since audiences and readers were expected to abide by rules of sexual 
propriety in their own lives. Wittols were not, however, simply fantasy figures who 
were good for a joke or an interesting dramatic twist; they represented, it is true, a 
shockingly subversive and uncomfortably amusing concept, but they were also very 
familiar to the average English citizen – the word has its origins in the late medieval 
period, and it was popularly used by English poets, playwrights, and balladeers.329 The 
cuckold was a popular and decidedly English figure, and people could often identify 
cuckolds in their own communities. It should be specified that, while there are a small 
number of historical accounts that back-up this claim, this chapter is especially 
concerned with the culture of rumors, hearsay, and urban discourse that developed 
around cuckolds. Neighbors often asserted that certain cuckolds were well-aware of 
                                                 
329
 “Cuckold.” OED Online. Second Edition, Oxford UP. February 11th, 2003. 
  143 
their position but were helpless to stop it, and some community members even 
claimed that some cuckolds actually consented to their role. If wittols had not actually 
existed, they would probably have been imagined by an early modern culture of gossip 
and leering scrutiny.  
 I argue that wittols experience a great deal of pleasure, and that they profit 
from their situation in both financial and sexual terms. They cultivate and revel in the 
feelings of shame, dishonor, and inadequacy that accompanied being a cuckold; these 
inadequacies and disgraces are not obstacles to expressing their sexuality, but the 
means through which they express their sexuality. They are bad husbands, bad 
householders and bad community members, and it is this shame that drives and 
defines their desires. It is a shame that is so potent and fulfilling to them that they 
actively strive to remain wittols as long as possible. I want to discuss their desire as 
masochistic, and to build on the insights of psychoanalysis to think about the wittol as 
a type of masochist. Wittols, like the other masochists we have witnessed, do not 
simply find pleasure in pain: this experience is highly structured and very deliberately 
scripted and staged. Wittols bind themselves into contracts that allow them control 
over what seems to be an oppressive and humiliating situation; they seem to be getting 
the worst of it, but they have agreed to and are ultimately in command of their own 
disgrace. They have designed and are responsible for their status as a cuckold, and this 
becomes the prime engine of their erotic feelings. 
 There is a sense that early modern attitudes about masculinity actually 
encouraged this sort of masochistic logic. If husbands could not tame and manage 
their wives, they were culpable for any cheating that they suffered; women might not 
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be able to control themselves, but men should be able to control women and were 
ultimately responsible for their behavior. Jennifer Panek argues that the paranoid and 
insistently anxious culture of early modern England “holds a woman's chastity as her 
highest value, and a husband's failure to guard that chastity as his lowest 
humiliation”.330 There was also, at the same time, a pervasive assumption that all 
husbands would be cuckolded at some point, no matter how thoroughly they 
supervised their wives and how minutely female sexuality was policed. The 
contradictions inherent in these two concepts naturally created a sense of anxiety; if 
men had to incessantly monitor every action their wives made, and yet still could not 
keep them from cheating and shaming them in front of the community, they had to 
find some avenue of control and mastery through which they could prove they were 
still a successful citizen and householder. The idea of wittolry offers early modern 
men the chance to gain power and control through the very fact that they are powerless 
and without any control. Panek claims that because a wittol takes “control of his wife's 
adultery,” he therefore “paradoxically evades the stigma of the cuckold.”331 This 
fantasy of maintaining control might account for the wittol’s popular appeal, and 
would explain the regular presence of these figures in plays and ballads. I argue that 
the personal and spiritual profit that the wittol gains is important, but that it is also 
essential to consider the literal, monetary profit they receive. 
 There was a popular connection between cuckolds and the economy; it was 
almost axiomatic that cuckolds were rich, and that there was some tie between being 
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wealthy and being unable to satisfy or properly watch over one’s wife. Cuckolds were 
mocked in spite of their wealth, and their money was seen as tainted and coming at too 
high a price. What, however, is this relationship between cuckolds and wealth? What 
is it based on? How did cuckolds become rich in the first place? The most common 
cuckold narrative was that of the wealthy merchant and his bored, un-stimulated wife. 
The wife is always seduced by an enterprising stranger who takes what he wants. The 
man who takes what he wants is depicted as having less money, but he has the 
freedom to decide his own affairs and has earned the respect of other men. The 
merchant who takes what is given to him, on the other hand, is rich but easily 
exploited and is ultimately not respected by the community. I argue that this was an 
expression of an anxiety about “taking” something from someone else, like a 
charitable handout, or being “given” something that one has not claimed as their right. 
Early modern Englishmen were supposed to “take” things by force or ingenuity, and 
not be given them; even poets praising or appealing to their patrons asserted that it was 
their own talent that warranted patronage and not charity or need. The idea of being 
given something that one has not earned, whether respect, privilege or money, is 
emasculating. Men should never take, and they should certainly never be “taken in” – 
fooled, gulled or exploited. They need to do the taking themselves. Merchants were 
rich, but they also were associated with passive taking – sitting back complacently 
while other people worked hard to buy their wares. I will illustrate this point by 
discussing Massinger’s comedy A New Way to Pay Old Debts, a play in which 
characters are deeply horrified at the thought of taking anything from anyone else. 
Wellborn, the play’s young hero, bends over backwards to make sure that he receives 
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nothing that he has not worked and fought for, and he ultimately takes what he wants 
from the play’s villains.  
If the characters in Massinger’s play cannot stand the thought of taking 
anything from anyone else, wittols find pleasure in taking and want to “take” as much 
as they can. They take it and like it, and are either unconcerned about how their 
community will perceive them or are actually proud of their situation. They are happy 
to profit from the fact that other men are sleeping with their wives; this profit usually 
consisted of money or extra leisure time, but it could also lead to the abstract, 
masochistic sexual gratification that I discussed earlier in this project. I will examine 
how these different pleasures were imagined in early modern texts, and will first read 
songs and ballads like “The Merry Cuckold” and “Fortune’s Bounty.” These poems 
illustrate the personal and economic profits that could result from performing the role 
of an impotent but also wily cuckold who takes what he does not deserve from his 
wife’s lovers. The narrators of these poems are extremely happy about their situation, 
and are not ashamed about how the community might see them. They are happy to 
“take it” from the men who are sleeping with their wives if it enables them to live a 
life of ease and luxury. They do not, however, necessarily receive an erotic charge 
from these relationships: they exploit the expectations that society has placed on them 
as men and husbands, and are able to financially and personally profit. 
I will conclude the chapter with a close reading of Middleton’s city comedy A 
Chaste Maid in Cheapside, a play that directly dramatizes a wittol’s erotic pleasure. I 
will focus on the character of Allwit, a very merry cuckold who relishes the fact that 
he is being cuckolded and finds that he is much happier than any normal husband. He 
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profits enormously in financial and social terms; his table, his children and his wallet 
are all provided for by Sir Walter Whorehound, the pimp and con artist who has been 
cuckolding him for years. He also, however, enjoys great personal satisfaction, and 
sees Sir Walter as the god who is giving him all that he could ever want out of life. 
These feelings are potently erotic and sexual, and Allwit is explicit about how good 
this situation makes him feel. It is important to note that he is in complete control of 
his experience as a wittol, and actively cultivates it throughout the play. He not only 
wants Whorehound to continue cuckolding him, but sets in motion a plan that 
guarantees he will cuckold him and him alone; Allwit does not want to share the gains 
of his wittolry with anyone else. It is also remarkable that he suffers none of the 
dangers and pitfalls that other wittols face in many ballads and pamphlets about 
cuckoldry: he is successful and happy but is also respected by his friends and 
neighbors. The members of his community are either unaware that he is a wittol or 
know about his situation but respect him anyway as a husband and householder. 
Allwit is a potentially unique figure in this regard: aware of his own sexual interests, 
willing to live a lifestyle that supports those interests, and respected by a community 
that would ordinarily regard him as ridiculous and deviant. He may be a very rare 
character, but Allwit’s explicit eroticism offers us a vivid portrait of how a wittol 
might design, cultivate and luxuriate in the pleasure of his wife cheating on him.   
 The concept of the wittol is vital to this project because it makes the structures 
of masochism immediate to English playgoers and readers. The masochism that we 
noticed in The Merchant of Venice was a potent illustration of how these desires could 
be dramatized in the early modern period, but it was also presented as abstract and 
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foreign; the masochism of wittolry, however, is often depicted as much more local. 
The average English person was invited to see members of their own community 
reflected in the wittol, and were even asked to imagine themselves in the role and to 
consider how they would behave if they were in the wittol’s shoes. The wittols I am 
discussing in this chapter were not French or Italian, across the sea and easy to ignore 
as foreign oddities; they were the barber from around the corner, the merchant down 
the street, your own neighbor or even a friend or a relative. These texts about wittols 
made explicit the idea that masochism was an option open to anyone, even the 
audience member at a play or the person reading a pamphlet or a ballad, and that there 
could be a very different way for English people to think about the forms through 
which they gain pleasure and profit. 
 This point about wittols is also important to make because early modern 
criticism has paid very little attention to this figure; it has only been a small group of 
scholars, among them Jennifer Panek, Gary Kuchar, Daniel Juan Gil and Elizabeth 
Hanson, who have taken an interest in wittols and the ways that they defy accepted 
notions about early modern masculinity. I want to add to this conversation in two 
ways. Firstly, I will relate wittolry to masochism, which gives wittolry a new 
centrality in discussions about the development of sexuality in the early modern 
period. If we want to understand early modern sex, we will need to seriously consider 
figures like the wittol and ways that they dovetail with emerging trends like 
masochism. Secondly, I want to draw attention to the figures that defy early modern 
scholarship’s popular assumptions; I feel it is essential that we question these 
assumptions so that we can continue to get a more nuanced picture of early modern 
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society. In this chapter, I will attempt to overturn some of these assumed notions, and 
to suggest that wittols are an area where can we start to question much of what we 
have taken for granted about early modern gender roles and erotic expression. 
Male Anxiety, the Community, and Cuckolds 
 
 This discussion about cuckolds must begin with an overview of early modern 
masculinity. Young men in early modern England were able to ascend to manhood 
when they got married. Ira Clark’s research has found that marriage gave a man 
“access to privileges and assigned him responsibilities in the community that were 
disallowed earlier in life.”332 This was because managing a family, supporting a wife 
and maintaining a household were seen as evidence of self-control and maturity. 
Alexandra Shepherd’s work (which has been a vital resource for how I understand 
early modern masculinity) supports this claim; she finds that, because the household 
was looked on “both as a primary unit of society and as a microcosm of the polity”,333 
mastery of one’s wife and family consequently connoted a mastery of broader social 
and political obligations. Before marriage, a man could not be taken seriously as a 
community leader and would not be truly respected by his community; he could not 
partake in the benefits of a patriarchal society, and was looked down on as inadequate. 
The transition to gaining this mastery was, however, fraught with anxiety over the 
supposedly natural unruliness that lurked in the spirits of all women. Plays, poems, 
misogynist pamphlets and popular rhetoric held that women were all scandalously 
unruly, and that marriage was an opportunity for that unruliness to be expressed while 
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hiding it beneath the disguise of a legal, spiritual union. These texts held that when a 
woman was married, it was almost instinctual for her to also become wasteful and 
promiscuous. Mark Breitenberg argues that one of a husband’s jobs, and perhaps the 
most important way that he could demonstrate his personal and social mastery, was to 
establish “control over his wife, her propriety in sexuality, obedience in activities, 
humility in dress, manner and language”334 and so on. Young wives were closely 
scrutinized by the community, but young husbands were even more closely watched 
for how well they could manage and bridle their unruly wives. Husbands had to rely 
on the sexual chastity of their wives to validate their own identity;335 their positions in 
the community rested on how well they could secure that chastity and suppress these 
unruly desires. If they were unable to control their wives and were proven to be weak 
and impotent, they lost all of the social benefits that they had gained as male 
householders and were forced to forfeit their obviously fraudulent claim to 
manhood.336  
The community was intent on keeping a strict watch on the power dynamic 
that existed between married couples; Laura Gowing finds that noticing, gossiping 
about and judging how thoroughly a husband controlled his wife’s sexuality was a 
project that “demanded and encouraged the active participation of ordinary neighbors, 
women as well as men.”337 The supposed unpredictability of female sexuality was a 
threat to the male-centric legal and moral system that tried to apply order to the 
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community,338 and husbands were seen as the first line of defense against unruly 
female desires that would otherwise disrupt social peace. His neighbors were then a 
policing force that was enlisted to make sure a husband did his duty and prevented an 
unbridled woman from ruining their quality of life. The neighborhood response to any 
failure was intensely public; husbands who did not meet proper social standards were 
publically harassed, and information about their homelife was loudly gossiped about 
and communally commented on. Anne-Marie Kilday and David Nash’s research into 
the public treatment of inadequate husbands has shown that by “shaming transgressors 
in the full glare of the public gaze, communities hoped to publicize scandal, to rectify 
bad behavior and also to warn others of the likely consequences of similar 
indiscretions.”339 It was not enough for a husband to be shamed – other husbands had 
to know that they would be equally shamed if they could not keep their wives under 
control. 
Anne-Marie Kilday and David Nash’s work has been instrumental in 
understanding how these faulty husbands were treated by the community. If a husband 
proved to be inadequate enough, if he repeatedly allowed himself to be cuckolded or 
did nothing as his wife flaunted her lack of restraint, he was made the subject of 
“rough music”: his neighbors would make loud, humiliating noises whenever he came 
into town, scream out catcalls, bang pots together under his windows, and so on.340 
The point was to make his life miserable, and to remind him of the community’s 
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judgment even when he was in his home or about to fall asleep. The targets of these 
public disgraces were mostly men;341 women were more commonly ostracized through 
silent shaming, which was just as ritualized but much less spectacular and explicit. 
The act of “rough music” was not only about making loud noises and being 
obnoxious, however; it could be dangerous and violent on top of being humiliating.342 
Husbands would sometimes be taken from their beds in the middle of the night, 
dunked in the local lake, pelted with rocks, beaten with rods, covered with manure and 
then deposited back on their doorstep. If a man did not fulfill his responsibilities, if his 
ineffectualness prompted his neighbors to take action against him, his actual body 
would have to be shamed and taught a lesson. If men were not socially and physically 
disciplined in this way, the thinking went, the community would be overrun with 
deviance, immorality, crime and other consequences of unmanly laziness, impotence 
and bad housekeeping. 
The popular imagination allowed for one area, at least, where a weak and lazy 
husband might actually gain from his lack of control and mastery: his pocketbook. It 
was commonly held that there was some connection between being a cuckold and 
being wealthy.343 Plays, ballads and pamphlets about men who have been cuckolded 
by their wives also tended to depict those men as wealthy merchants who were flush 
with cash and otherwise extremely successful. Merchants, much like widows, were 
familiar allegories for wealth and commerce. Elizabeth Hanson offers a particularly 
helpful insight when she argues that widows were depicted as being themselves pieces 
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of property, a living, anthropomorphic form of currency; she claims that this was 
because a widow, “like money, changes hands and in doing so changes men’s 
fortunes.”344 Widows became symbolic of the treasure and upward mobility that 
young men had to strive for. Merchants, on the other hand, came to represent the way 
that cash and property passed quickly from one owner to another, meaning that no one 
held onto a specific form of wealth for very long.345 Merchants need to patiently 
endure the changing face of the marketplace, taking what they can, when they can; 
even in times of prosperity, a merchant must “accustom himself to allowing wealth 
and commodity to pass from his hands into that of another.”346 This made them ideal 
symbols for cuckoldry, since cuckolds must also sit by passively while something of 
value is transferred out of their hands and into the hands of another man. This was also 
a way to make merchants into figures of ridicule, displacing the anxiety that some 
might feel about the wealth and social mobility that the merchant class was very 
quickly accumulating.  
In some sense, the insistence on portraying merchants as cuckolds was a way 
to make sure that this rising merchant class was popularly understood to be ridiculous 
and impotent. If merchants were able to make so much money, and were able to do it 
so quickly, there must surely be something wrong with them. It is up to people who 
are lower on the economic ladder, whether they are compelled by anxiety, envy, or 
aristocratic patronage, to find a flaw in this ascending class and fully exploit it, even if 
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that flaw is only an imagined one that is found more in folk tales and ballads than in 
the actual, lived experience of people who made their wealth on commerce and trade. 
The notion of merchants being cuckolds meant that while these men might have a 
great deal of money, and while they might supposedly be lording all of their gains and 
riches over people who do not have as much as they do, these merchants are actually 
weak and vulnerable in an extremely intimate and sensitive area. If merchants have so 
much wealth and are capable of buying whatever they want (even land or a title), but 
are also being duped in the bedroom by their wives, how much is all of their treasure 
really worth? Is it better, in other words, to be poor and in total command of your 
desires, than rich but an impotent fool who has no mastery over his sexual life? If you 
are a regular person watching plays and listening to ballads about the merchants who 
seem to have so much where you have so little, it may seem empowering to believe 
that merchants are nevertheless complete failures when it comes to pleasing and 
controlling their unruly wives. 
This relationship between cuckolds and wealth was only a popular fantasy, of 
course, but it is true that cuckolds often profited from their situation. It was common 
for a cuckold to receive at least some financial support or remuneration from the man 
who was sleeping with his wife; this was often because the man who was doing the 
cuckolding feared being blackmailed or didn’t want the cuckolded husband to cause a 
fuss and stop the adulterous relationship from continuing. He would probably not 
grow rich like the cuckolded merchants in plays and ballads, but he would receive 
some extra help to provide for his family’s table and at least slightly fatten his own 
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wallet. Alexandra Shepherd submits that if a cuckold actually did profit from his 
situation, he was protected against one of the more debilitating charges made against 
weak husbands: that they had no credit and were not worth doing business with.347 The 
profiting cuckold could show the community that he still had some value as a business 
partner and as someone they could trade with, give credit to and invest in. The price 
for being a financially sound cuckold was that a husband still had to live with the 
shameful knowledge that his wife was cheating on him. They also need to live with 
the knowledge that their prosperity is entirely in the hands of someone else, and that 
they have personally not done any work to gain this wealth. 
Giving It and Taking It 
 
 This was a price that was far too steep for many early modern men. If Stephen 
Greenblatt’s writings on self-fashioning have demonstrated how much men worked to 
present themselves as self-made and self-reliant, there was an equal effort to stave off 
any attempt to give them something or support them. I argue that early modern 
masculinity was partly founded on a fear of taking anything from anyone else. They 
may accept help, patronage or charity in private, but in public they would need to 
distance themselves from it or at least appear like they have merited such support 
through their own natural excellence. They have, in other words, deserved that support 
and claim it as their right. This was the stance taken by so many poets and playwrights 
who were aided by wealthy patrons; they honor and praise their patrons, but their most 
common compliment was that a patron had the good taste to fund such a worthy and 
deserving writer as themselves. If a man did not prove how deeply he merited this sort 
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of patronage or support, he would be seen as idle and lazy, the type of person who was 
willing to accept money or social positions that he had not actually strived for and 
earned. This would do a great deal of damage to his social and personal credibility, 
and would hamper his ability to climb the social ladder later on in his life.348 Early 
modern men were supposed to take what they wanted through their own ingenuity and 
cleverness, and were looked down on for openly taking handouts. If a man did receive 
some gains that he did not actually work and strive for, such as some sort of specious 
patronage or a handout clearly intended as charity, a key skill was being savvy enough 
to act like this help was very much well-deserved. 
This tension between taking from others and taking for oneself is at the center 
of Philip Massinger’s city comedy A New Way to Pay Old Debts. In this play, the 
main characters express a great horror of taking something that they have not appeared 
to deserve. They vigorously defend themselves against any attempt by characters to 
give them aid or help, and loudly proclaim that they could never live with the shame 
of accepting these offerings. The most outspoken character in this regard is Wellborn, 
the play’s young hero; he is an aristocrat and former landowner who lost all of his 
property and wealth to the machinations of Sir Giles Overreach, a sadistic and 
ambitious member of the nouveau riche. When he is unable to pay his tab at the local 
tavern and is forced to leave the bar, Wellborn is offered money by his well-meaning 
friend Allworth. Wellborn rejects this offer completely, and cannot disguise how much 
he hates the idea of taking this sort of charity from anyone. It is the last thing in the 
world that he would ever do: 
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Money from thee? 
From a boy? A stipendiary? One that lives 
At the devotion of a stepmother 
And the uncertain favor of a lord? 
I’ll eat my arms first. Howsoe’er blind Fortune 
Hath spent the last of her malice on me – 
Though I am vomited out of an alehouse, 
And, thus accoutred, know not where to eat, 
Or drink, or sleep, but underneath this canopy – 
Although I thank thee, I despise thy offer.349 
 
Wellborn is dressed in rags, has no food, no shelter and no prospects, but he refuses to 
accept the help that Allworth has offered to him. The shame of taking this money 
would be overwhelming – especially because it would happen in public, in sight of the 
whole community and directly in front of the bar that he has just been ejected from. 
The fact that Allworth needs to rely on his stepmother and the tentative support of a 
patron for his money would only make Wellborn’s shame all the more pronounced. It 
is better for him to suffer in silence, because this alternative would be honorable and 
manly. He may have nothing to his name, but at least he has his pride and the respect 
of the community. He can currently blame all of his problems on “blind Fortune” and 
struggle against them; if he starts to receive handouts and becomes a charity case, he 
cannot claim to be persevering with manliness and honorably fighting against his 
situation. Wellborn needs to maintain this image so that he can become a community 
leader when he regains his lands and wealth. 
Sir Giles Overreach is rich enough to not have to worry about taking anything 
from anyone else, but he has an equal fear of anybody taking something from him. He 
is always on his guard against being cheated or manipulated, and assumes that anyone 
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with any sort of claim on his money is a liar or con artist. When Wellborn insinuates 
that he cheated him out of his lands and owes him a debt, Overreach cries out, “I in 
thy debt? Oh, impudence!”350 The idea that Wellborn would have the ability to take 
something from him is insulting. Overreach’s claims to male identity and his path to 
financial success are entirely built on taking from others and cheating and exploiting 
them, and he cannot risk gaining a reputation for letting others take from him. When 
his daughter expresses pity for the degraded state of an aristocratic lady, Overreach is 
incredulous: “Pity her? Trample on her!”351 If a man like Overreach shows pity or 
lends out a helping hand, he may be exposing himself to a cheat, a thief or simply a 
charity case; any of these people would be able to drain him of his funds and reveal 
him before the community as a sucker and a man who can be easily taken from. He 
would be exposed as a naïve, inurbane mark who can be easily taken advantage of and 
has no real business sense. He would be, in other words, the person that Wellborn 
refuses to become: the type of person who has no idea how the economy works, who 
is willing to give away his money and goods, and who can be easily exploited and 
milked of all that he is worth. If he doesn’t know how to keep this money and 
property, he doesn’t deserve it – and it can go into the hands of someone who knows 
how to take it and thus actually deserves to own it. 
Overreach is adamant that anyone who tries to take from him or beg something 
of him must be pushed away. He even feels this way about his friends and relatives: 
We worldly men, when we see friends and kinsmen 
Past hope sunk in their fortunes, lend no hand 
To lift ‘em up, but rather set our feet 
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Upon their heads to press ‘em to the bottom.352 
 
It is not enough for Overreach to distance himself from these charity cases – he needs 
to actively press them down and make sure that they stay as low as possible. If 
Overreach gives them an inch, they make take a mile, and he cannot allow this 
happen. Alexandra Shepherd argues that, in the eyes of the community, a man who 
spent too much of his time providing for others and diverting “resources from the 
household economy was labeled as dishonest, negligent, and unseemly.”353 When 
Overreach violently repels anyone with the slightest claim on him, he is not only being 
jealous of his bank account: he is protecting his masculine image, and ultimately 
preventing any of his friends and neighbors from calling him wasteful or a bad 
manager of his household’s finances. In an early modern culture where reputation 
counts for so much, Overreach is not willing to take any chances with how he will be 
perceived. He wants to be seen as impenetrable and self-sustaining, incapable of being 
exploited or ripped off; at stake are both his personal wealth and his image of himself 
as a true man. This is the core concept that informs Wellborn and Overreach’s 
profound anxiety over how they are seen by others: Wellborn is paranoid about being 
thought of as someone who takes charity, and Overreach is paranoid about being 
thought of as someone who gives charity.  
It is important to note that Wellborn and Overreach seem to take no pleasure in 
their paranoia. Their anxiety is purely utilitarian: this is a matter of survival, of being a 
successful member of society, of proving that you are the right kind of man and the 
right kind of person. The culture of giving and taking is not an occasion for feeling 
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good or enjoying oneself; it seems to specifically ignore or suppress these pleasurable 
sensations. When Overreach criticizes one of his associates for being too interested in 
fine food, he tells him that “We must forget the belly/When we think of profit.”354 
While most people might gain profit with the ultimate goal of satisfying their bellies, 
Overreach sees profit  and gain as ends in and of themselves. He does not need or 
want to think of his belly, and dedicates all of his energy to making money and 
vigorously defending his status as a landowner and a man. Overreach is so anxious to 
portray himself as financially successful and an unimpeachable master of his 
household that he has blocked out any feelings that would get in the way of that goal: 
he is “insensible of remorse, or pity,/Or the least sting of conscience.”355 This also 
means that he is insensible to the pleasures of anxiety and discomfort, pleasures that 
have often been eagerly expressed by characters in other early modern comedies. 
When Overreach’s plans are undone and all of his backroom schemes are exposed, he 
does not express any thrill or refer to any pleasurable tension; he bitterly complains 
that he has been made to look like such a fool that his anger and frustration have 
become “ridiculous.”356 There is no hint of delight in these lines: they are impotent 
without any showing any excitement about that impotence. 
The play itself shows no interest in pursuing the possibility of such pleasures, 
and is rather insistent on that refusal. While the masochists we have seen in earlier 
chapters placed great importance in the idea of contracts and the notion of being 
legally obligated to fulfill a humiliating task, the characters of this play treat those 
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contracts with contempt and disrespect. In the play’s final scenes, Wellborn is able to 
take his property back from Overreach because the deed that they signed has been 
irreparably defaced. Marall, one of Overreach’s henchmen, has double-crossed his 
boss and burned away the contract’s text with acid; all that is left of the contract is a 
blank sheet, a “fair skin of parchment.”357 This would be a disastrous event to a 
traditional masochist – contracts are one of the defining forces in a masochist’s erotic 
life, and one of the principal ways that masochists arrange their personal and sexual 
narratives. The characters in this play do not regard contracts with any erotic 
sacredness or fetishistic value; they are pieces of paper that can be altered, signed, 
ripped apart or lost without any effect on their desires. Contracts are a means to an 
end, and not an end in and of themselves. In Overreach’s final scene in the play, he 
observes that he might as well have had “made a contract with the king of fiends”358 
than with Wellborn and all of his clever machinations. Antonio and his Christian 
friends also claimed that their adversary was as bad as an inhuman devil, but Antonio 
was happy to bind himself to that fiend and accept all of the uncomfortable pleasures 
that would result. Overreach, however, has no interest in this choice; he sees no erotic 
charge in binding himself to someone who will abuse and exploit him. He can only see 
the unattractive and ruinous shame that he will suffer as a man who has been cheated 
out of his property. 
Taking It and Liking It 
 
 Wittols – men who encourage and enjoy the idea that their wives are cheating 
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on them – do not mind this shame. They actually want to “take it” from someone else; 
they want to be the weaker man, to be exploited and cheated, to look like they cannot 
manage their finances, their households or their wives. In return, they receive a profit 
that allows them to support a leisurely lifestyle without sweating to maintain their 
table or keep up their social image. While regular cuckolds who profit from their 
situation usually do so in a passive way – accepting money to keep quiet, for instance 
– a wittol actually plans and organizes his own cuckolding, setting the terms of when 
it will happen, how often it will happen, and how much of a payment they will receive. 
This was a very subversive way of making money: it flew in the face of the accepted 
notions about masculinity that were discussed earlier in this chapter, notions that were 
popularly understood as the pillars of an ordered and decorous social life. These 
notions lent themselves to the sort of paranoia and anxiety experienced by the 
characters of A New Way to Pay Old Debts, constantly looking out for any hint that 
they are being exploited or seen as a charity case. Jennifer Panek determines that this 
anxiety meant that “marriage and householding could appear as an intolerable burden 
rather than as part of the welcome privileges of patriarchy.”359 Owning a house and 
being a husband became an exhausting job that was never quite over – men were 
expected to be on constant patrol, incessantly policing their own behavior and the 
chastity of their wives. The idea of the wittol offered an escape from this burden, a 
way for men to counter any anxiety and make a very unique kind of profit. Wittols are, 
therefore, a “wish-fulfillment fantasy figure”360 for men who might otherwise feel that 
they have been constrained by the duties that society has placed on them. The ballads, 
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songs and plays that depicted wittols often showed wittols taking back a sense of 
control and power that had been lost to them. 
The wittol can achieve this power and control by coming to an agreement with 
his wife or his wife’s lover. The wittol is being cuckolded, but he gets decide when 
and how often the lover can visit his wife, dictates what will happen between them, 
and can cut the relationship off or restart it as he sees fit. This agreement often takes 
the form of a sort of contract; this contract is sometimes verbal, but can also be a 
physical document that is signed by all of the participating parties. Some ballads and 
plays describe this contract as almost lawful, making the agreement between a wittol 
and his wife or his wife’s lover into what Panek’s research has found was considered 
“legitimate and profitable business deal.”361 In an anonymous ballad called “The 
Merry Cuckold”, the titular cuckold has struck a bargain with his wife: she can spend 
as much time with her lover as she likes, but she must also milk this lover for money 
and then give a healthy portion of it to her husband. The narrator argues that being a 
cuckold does not have to be miserable; if a cuckold sees himself as a wittol and 
actually agrees to his situation, what others assume to be miserable can actually 
become extremely profitable. If his wife shames him, he does not need to despair or 
feel that he is being made a fool of. He is, in fact, perfectly content with everything 
that his wife is doing: 
While she at home 
Is taking her pleasure, 
Abroad I do roam, 
Consuming her treasure.  
If all that she gets, 
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I share a good share, 
She pays all my debts, 
Then for what should I care.362 
 
This situation might be anathema to most early modern men, but the narrator of the 
poem has fully embraced it: he encourages it, wants it to continue, and has no desire to 
leave his unfaithful wife. He is getting exactly what he wants out of his wife; he “will 
not her let”363 and remove her from his household. The narrator of the poem has 
nothing to worry about because he is in command of this situation, and he decides how 
and when it works. He is a good businessman: his debts are paid for, he has an excess 
amount of leisure time, and he has ample money to spend while he travels wherever he 
wants. He has not had to actually work for any of this money, and has “taken” all that 
he has from his wife and her lover. When the narrator claims that he does not “care” 
about what his wife is doing, he means that he responds to this condition in a 
completely different way than other men would. It doesn’t matter that the community 
looks down on him – he is rich and happy. It is notable that “pleasure” and “treasure” 
are rhymed; in this context, these two words are meant to go together, and it is natural 
that accumulating wealth is bound up with the sensation of feeling good, even if this 
means your wife is sleeping with another man.  
 In “Fortune’s Bounty”, another anonymous poem, I argue that the financially 
successful cuckold who appears at the end of the poem is actually a wittol. The poem 
begins with the figure of Fortune deciding that she wants to learn who in England can 
call himself “the most wretched of mankind.”364 She assumes that this man must be a 
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cuckold, and she declares that “every horn’d unhappy spouse”365 in the country must 
report to her hall and tell her about the misery that they have suffered. She plans to 
award a massive purse to whichever cuckold can prove himself to be the biggest 
cuckold in the land. This might seem like it would be a miserable and pathetic event, 
full of painful and traumatic stories. It turns, out, however, that this gathering becomes 
a “merry time”,366 with Fortune constantly changing her outfits and appearing so 
spectacular that she “caus’d the cuckolds to adore her.”367 The many cuckolds present, 
including lawyers, physicians, teachers and clergymen, tell her exaggerated and 
hyperbolic tales about their adulterous wives, each jockeying for position and trying to 
come up with the best story.  
Fortune, however, is displeased; these cuckolds are much too ashamed of their 
status, and she commands that “shame let me no more behold.”368 She wants them to 
be proud and forthright, and to stop squabbling over who is the most miserable. In the 
end, a “bold Heroick Don”369 strides forward and reports something to Fortune; in the 
hubbub, no one is able to hear what he says, but Fortune immediately cries out that he 
“deserv’st the purse.”370 The poem never states exactly what the heroic don told 
Fortune, but we might speculate it is something very different from what the other 
cuckolds have narrated; since their stories all involved the despair and misery that they 
have suffered under their tyrannical, adulterous wives, the don’s report must be the 
complete opposite. I argue that he revealed himself to be a wittol – a cuckold who is 
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unashamed of his status and actively cultivates it for his personal gain. This would fly 
directly in the face of what every other cuckold reported to Fortune, and, considering 
the connection between wittols and great financial gain, it would explain why the 
heroic don wins Fortune’s prize purse. He wins the day and walks away with a purse 
filled with gold, and I submit that this is because he is a wittol who is unashamed of 
his status and sees no reason to leave his cheating wife. 
 The one reason that a successful wittol might want to divorce his wife is if she 
no longer cheats on him, and therefore fails to fulfill her end of their agreement. The 
point of being a wittol is that your wife cheats on you according to your will; if she 
stops her cheating, or refuses to cheat, this, and not being cheated on in the first place, 
is what might ironically prove that a man is impotent and incapable of making firm 
domestic decisions. Wittols completely reverse the whole idea of male power and 
control: what was once a sign of weakness becomes, in the hands of the wittol, a sign 
of dominance. Wittols can only be called weak when they fail to depict themselves as 
weak, and they are only truly cheated if they are not being cheated on and profiting 
from that cheating. It is through being cheated on that wittols experience sexual 
mastery, which means that not being cheated on paradoxically represents their lack of 
sexual control. When owned by a wittol, the horns of a cuckold even connote what 
Francisco Vaz de Silva calls a certain “transgressive virility”371 that shows how much 
command and control they have over their sexual lives. Wittols may well want to 
appear impotent, as this may increase the profits that they gain from their wittolry 
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(luring more men into attempting to cuckold them), but they can also boast of a certain 
kind of potency.  
 The wittols in these ballads were most likely intended to be provocative, and to 
shock readers with the way that they fly in the face of convention and receive some 
special gain from a situation that was ordinarily thought of as entirely disastrous. The 
poems seem to regard the wittol with a kind of distant bemusement; they do not 
approve of the wittol’s way of the life, but they are not exactly critical of it. The wittol 
inhabits an ambiguous place in these poems, and these figures tend to be described 
with a certain cautious respect. The reader is never asked to look on a wittol with 
contempt or disgust; at the same time, this type of lifestyle is never advocated as 
something that just anyone should try to mimic. The wittol is presented as someone 
who lives on the fringes, a person who engages in an excitingly taboo behavior, but 
who is also a familiar figure who the reader might recognize from the world around 
them. It seems that wittols are so contradictory, so mixed-up and governed by 
opposing interests, that any depiction of them cannot actually reconcile those 
contradictions. The reaction that the reader of these ballads is intended to have is 
extremely hard to determine, and it is likely that they would have been left in a rather 
confused state: the wittol is at once inviting, attractive, repulsive, frightening, 
dangerous, intriguing, and both wildly alien and very much familiar. 
The Masochistic Wittol 
 The wittols depicted in poems like “The Merry Cuckold” and “Fortune’s 
Bounty” do not necessarily get sexual pleasure from their experiences, but there is 
another type of wittol whose erotic life is entirely governed by his status as a cuckold. 
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This sort of wittol receives pleasure when his wife cheats on him: Gary Kuchar 
explains that a wittol “pursues his own social castration, secretly delighting in the 
thought of his own humiliation at the hands of another man.”372 I call this experience 
masochistic because these wittols find erotic satisfaction in the very places that are 
most hurtful and humiliating, and in the very situations that society tells them they 
should not feel good. Their satisfaction, as in masochism, is not random or arbitrary, 
but is governed by a very precise series of scripts and contracts that the wittol arranges 
and designs himself. In Jonson’s comedy Volpone, the wittol Corvino “sells” a night 
with his wife to Volpone, and aggressively hints that this exchange “will provide him 
with licentious pleasure as well as material profit.”373 He desires to see his wife as a 
commodity that can be sold,374 and the money that he makes from this deal is 
secondary to how sexually excited it makes him. He is the one in control of this 
arrangement – he does not stand idly by and watch while his wife does something 
without his consent, but supervises and approves every step. Volpone is willing to do 
business with him, and he does not have to worry about this deal falling through: 
Corvino is so turned on by the idea of being cuckolded that he will make sure 
everything goes according to plan. I want to discuss this masochistic breed of wittol 
for the rest of the chapter; I will first discuss how psychoanalysts think about wittols, 
and will then do a close reading of Thomas Middleton’s city comedy A Chaste Maid 
in Cheapside. In this play, the character Allwit has lived for years on the bankroll of 
the pimp and scoundrel Sir Walter Whorehound; in return, Whorehound sleeps with 
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Allwit’s wife, fathers his children, and seems to be the true master of the household. 
Allwit does not, however, express any despair about his situation – he loves every 
minute, and could not be happier about the financial and especially erotic gains that he 
receives from his wittolry. 
 Psychoanalysis does not use the term “wittol”, but a number of psychoanalytic 
theorists have written about the idea of a cuckold who enjoys being cuckolded. In Roy 
Baumeister’s study of the social impact of masochism, he describes a cuckold’s 
fantasy: in this scenario, a husband is dressed in women’s underwear and spanked by a 
group of people, and then is tied up and forced to watch while his wife has sex with 
her lover.375 Baumeister claims that this fantasy features many “different features of 
masochism”376 such as loss of control, pain, humiliation, etc. But is it still masochism 
if these different features are stripped away, and all that remains is the cuckolding 
itself? Baumeister is unsure about this question; he concedes that masochism does not 
need to be explicitly sexual,377 but does not say whether or not cuckoldry alone can 
qualify as masochism. I argue that it definitely qualifies as masochism: it thrives on 
emotional and spiritual tension, it emphasizes staging and role-playing, and it is 
predicated on the use of a contract to which all parties agree and which dictates how 
and when the scenario will take place. I hope that I can intervene in psychoanalytic 
opinions on cuckoldry, and that the argument I am making in this chapter points 
toward a more expansive definition of masochism and masochistic practices. The 
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concept of a wittol – a cuckold who wants to be and arranges for himself to be 
cuckolded – should be classified as a masochistic role. 
 Allwit of Middleton’s A Chaste Maid in Cheapside is a powerful example of 
this masochistic wittol. In Gary Kuchar’s reading of the play, he argues that Allwit 
makes explicit the pleasures of the cuckold that are only implicit in other city 
comedies,378 luxuriating in the shame that he experiences. The wittols of other 
comedies and poems do not normally take account of the idea that the situation they 
are in might make them feel good; Allwit, on the other hand, is completely conscious 
of this fact, displaying a “self-awareness that his predecessors lacked.”379 Allwit is 
always in complete control of his situation, and is very upfront about how much he 
wants it to continue. He orders his wife to keep cuckolding him, and arranges an 
elaborate plot that will make sure that Whorehound will remain his wife’s lover. 
Jennifer Panek argues that Allwit is the ultimate male fantasy: he subverts 
conventional wisdom about male roles, and “simultaneously evades the responsibility 
to provide for his household and removes himself from the site of cuckoldry anxiety – 
he is not jealous precisely because his arrangement allows his wife no scope for sexual 
disobedience.”380 Allwit is, in many ways, the perfect example of the masochistic 
wittol – completely in control and wildly turned on by the idea of his wife sleeping 
with another man. He is the sort of figure that I have been building up to discussing all 
throughout this chapter, and I will demonstrate how deeply he enjoys being a cuckold, 
how he scripts himself into this role, and how he works to ensure that this situation 
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will not be obstructed or hindered by any other character in the play. 
 Allwit’s first monologue about life as a wittol is a spectacular example of how 
prosperous and enjoyable it is to be a humiliated, emasculated cuckold. When Allwit 
hears that Whorehound is coming to town in order to visit him and his wife, he 
gleefully exclaims “The Founder's come to town!”381 The Founder is a title that Allwit 
has given Whorehound; Allwit almost worships him, honoring the fact that 
Whorehound provides for his table and allows him to a life of leisure, and considers 
him to be the founding force in his masochistic world. Whorehound is less a man and 
more like a God, a sort of cosmic entity who defines everything about Allwit, how he 
lives and what he can do: 
I am like a man  
Finding a table furnished to his hand 
As mine is still to me, prays for the Founder 
“Bless the Right Worshipful the good Founder's life!” 
I thank him, he’s maintained my house this ten years; 
Not only keeps my wife, but ‘a keeps me 
And all my family. I am at his table; 
He gets me all my children, and pays the nurse 
Monthly or weekly; puts me to nothing,  
Rent, nor church duties, not so much as the scavenger.  
The happiest state that ever man was born to!382 
 
Whorehound provides for Allwit in every single way, and his family has been 
completely taken under the pimp and con artist’s wing. Allwit is at Whorehound’s 
“table” and not his own, and everything that he eats and partakes of has been provided 
for him by a more successful, competent, socially powerful man. This is not a fact that 
fills Allwit with anxiety or that causes him to doubt himself and his role as an early 
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modern man. He embraces it, and even has a morning prayer with which he thanks and 
blesses his almost sacred provider. In the meantime, he does not have to spend a cent 
on anything, and every financial obligation imaginable – the rent for his home, the 
money he puts in the saucer every Sunday at mass, the spare change he keeps on hand 
to pay the ironmonger who sells him odds and ends – is handled by Whorehound from 
afar. Allwit calls this the “happiest state that ever man was born to”, and is overjoyed 
that he has been placed in such a submissive role. He is not afraid to say that another 
man has given him the things he owns, and he actively advertises it with pride and 
self-satisfaction. 
The most surprising and perhaps radical thing that Allwit has been given is his 
children; the group of children being raised and cared for under his roof (a roof that is, 
admittedly, “maintained” by another man), have all been sired by Whorehound. It is 
striking that Allwit refers to them as “my children” despite the fact that he is fully 
aware that Whorehound is their father; he has accepted the responsibility of 
recognizing them even though he had nothing to do with their birth. This situation is 
very similar to a common fantasy in contemporary cuckold narratives; in these 
narratives, the cuckold (or, in more modern terms, the ‘cuck’) “fantasizes about having 
the woman impregnated by the cuckholder. In these cases, the cuck accepts parental 
responsibility of the cuckholder’s offspring.”383 In this scenario, the cuckold enjoys 
the social shame that comes with raising another man’s children as his own – it shows 
that he is himself impotent, that he does not have the masculine energy to create a 
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child in his own right, that he is weak and powerless and that his wife must turn to 
another man to have children and even to receive sexual gratification. Allwit happily 
inhabits this role, and does not try to cover it up or hide it from the community: he 
wears it as a badge of pride. He has not actually suffered the fate of an impotent and 
helpless husband who must now reconcile himself to raising another man’s children, 
but he is very happy to live as if this is what has happened. Allwit has arranged this 
role for himself, and he very much wants to live this lifestyle. 
Allwit can easily talk about his wife’s cheating, and does not feel any shame or 
anxiety about it. He is even able to calmly and cogently explain that he is a cuckold if 
he is ever accused of not being a cuckold. When Whorehound visits Cheapside early 
in the play, he runs into Allwit and asks him how Mistress Allwit is doing. Allwit tells 
him that his wife is “after your own making, sir. She's a tumbler, i’faith, the nose and 
belly meets.”384 He means that his wife is as ready as ever to receive Whorehound, and 
that the pimp has made her into a “tumbler”: her legs are constantly behind her head, 
and she is prepared at any moment for a roll in the hay. Whorehound misunderstands 
Allwit, however, and takes his joke to mean that Allwit has been sleeping with his 
own wife – a fact that would negate the contract between them. Allwit is specifically 
not allowed to sleep with Mistress Allwit, and can only serve as her caretaker when 
Whorehound is not in town. Allwit realizes how his comments might have been 
interpreted, and starts to sweet-talk Whorehound out of his sudden anger. It is clear 
that Allwit is the savvy one in this dialogue, and that he is able to manipulate 
Whorehound with ease; in an aside, Allwit states that “‘tis but observing a man's 
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humor once, and he may ha’ him by the nose all his life.”385 Panek argues that it is 
obvious that “Allwit's smiling deference to Whorehound is all a carefully controlled 
game”386 and that he is never at a loss for what to say or how to react to what 
Whorehound wants from him. Whorehound may think that he is the one in control of 
this situation, but he is constantly playing into Allwit’s hands. Whorehound is able to 
think that he is in control because this is the role that Allwit has scripted for him in his 
erotic drama where he is helpless and impotent and Whorehound is commanding and 
masterful. 
When there is a risk that Whorehound may marry the goldsmith 
Yellowhammer’s daughter, Allwit is stirred to action. If Whorehound becomes legally 
married and begins to live like a productive member of society, he will no longer visit 
Mistress Allwit and no longer make Allwit into a cuckold. This is something that 
Allwit cannot stand for: 
I'll stop that gap  
Where’er I find it open. I have poisoned  
His hopes in marriage already, 
Some old rich widows and some landed virgins – 
And I’ll fall to work still before I lose him. 
He’s too sweet to part from.387 
Allwit works behind the scenes to disrupt any plans that Whorehound has to form an 
ordinary marriage, and makes sure that the only relationship Whorehound has is with 
his wife. The idea that Whorehound will get married is a “gap” that Allwit needs to 
fill; closing up these gaps is what will make Allwit’s connection to Whorehound 
complete. It doesn’t matter how Whorehound feels – what matters is that Allwit is able 
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to fulfill his erotic scenario. Whorehound may have mastery in the scenario itself, but 
Allwit is the one who has mastery over that scenario and who decides whether it will 
continue or not. Whorehound does not get to stop cuckolding Allwit until Allwit says 
so, and Allwit does not have any interest in ending this relationship. Whorehound is 
“sweet” to him because the pimp and conman perfectly embodies the traditional image 
of the cuckholder that I discussed earlier in this chapter: he is a man who seems to take 
what he wants, honored by society for his craftiness and ingenuity, exactly the sort of 
person able to hoodwink an incompetent and impotent husband. Allwit needs 
Whorehound to keep playing this role, because he is the perfect counterpart to the 
powerless cuckold Allwit wants to be seen as. 
 Whorehound, unaware of how deeply he is under Allwit’s thumb, pities the 
man that he is cuckolding: after speaking to Allwit, he scornfully remarks that “When 
man turns base, out goes his soul’s pure flame;/The fat of ease o’erthrows the eyes of 
shame.”388 Whorehound sees Allwit as such a helpless dullard that his ability to see 
the shameful situation he is in has been irretrievably retarded. Allwit, in 
Whorehound’s estimation, is not a true man, and his heart has been clouded over by 
sloth and impotence. Allwit, on the other hand, regards Whorehound as the fool, and 
feels a bit sorry for him: 
In troth, I pity him. He ne'er stands still.  
Poor knight, what pains he takes! Sends this way one,  
That way another, has not an hour's leisure.  
I would not have thy toil for all thy pleasure.389 
 
In Allwit’s eyes, Whorehound is not experiencing true “pleasure”: the pleasures that 
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Whorehound feels require too much “toil”, and Allwit finds this distasteful and 
ultimately unattractive. Whorehound is the one to be pitied, and not Allwit – the latter 
is always in control and never out of his comfort zone, while the former is constantly 
on the move, always toiling away, and never able to actually enjoy himself. 
Whorehound claims that Allwit’s senses have been dulled by living as a wittol, but the 
truth is that the latter is completely sharp and aware of what is going on. There is 
never a moment in the play in which Allwit is fooled, in which someone pulls the 
wool over his eyes, or in which he does not understand what is happening to him and 
around him. Allwit is, on the contrary, the most masterful and competent character in 
the play: he organizes the play’s central romance and constantly subverts 
Whorehound’s attempts at marriage, all to preserve his status as wittol and to make 
sure that he can continue to inhabit this erotic role. 
 Allwit, realizing that Whorehound is beginning to be more trouble than he is 
worth, ends their partnership by stealing all that he can get from his former patron. 
Whorehound is, in the end, left penniless; Allwit hoodwinks him, ruining a good 
marriage prospect and tricking him out of his fortune and property. Whorehound rails 
wildly at Allwit, accusing him of being “worse than slave or villain”390 and a bitter 
“poison to my heart.”391 Allwit responds to Whorehound’s accusations with a sarcasm 
meant to rub in just who is in charge and who has been the more successful member of 
their partnership. Allwit wryly states that Whorehound has “been somewhat bolder in 
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my house/Than I could well like of”392 and asserts that the pimp and con artist is no 
longer welcome there. Allwit has lost all interest in the man who was once such an 
important element in his erotic fantasies. If Whorehound has no money and has lost all 
of his social standing, he is not a suitable cuckholder – he is just a loser, broke and 
without any prospects. Allwit states that since Whorehound is “now to be rid of all”393 
and completely void of all of his money and property, he is “right glad”394 to be “so 
well rid of him.”395 Allwit, and not Whorehound, had the power to end their 
relationship whenever he felt like it. Whorehound realizes this much too late – he has, 
after all, assumed that he was the one duping and exploiting Allwit – and exits the play 
wounded and dejected. 
 In all of this, Mistress Allwit is her husband’s equal partner and is pleased with 
the situation. They have a happy marriage, and the arrangement between them is 
mutual and free from any tension; Mistress Allwit appreciates her husband’s erotic 
interests and is pleased to cuckold him, but also continues to respect him as a husband. 
When Whorehound demands that Mistress Allwit betray her husband and help him in 
his own backhanded schemes, she sarcastically responds, “Alas, sir, I am one that 
would have all well,/But must obey my husband.”396 She only cheats on Allwit 
because he has enlisted her in his erotic game, and she does not actually see him as 
foolish or impotent. Late in the play, after many of the subplots have been resolved 
and Whorehound has been ousted from his position as masterful cuckholder, Allwit 
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and his wife lovingly look over all that they have gained from Whorehound’s 
patronage: Allwit brags that they are “stocked with cloth-of-tissue cushions to furnish 
out bay windows”397 and enough furniture to “lodge a countess”,398 and Mistress 
Allwit suggests that they rent out rooms in their home and “take a house in the 
Strand.”399 They do not despise each other, feel jealous of each other, or get angry at 
each other for what has happened with Whorehound; they exchange no insults and 
reveal no hurt feelings. They plan, instead, to do as they “were wont to do”400 before 
Whorehound – live the life of a traditional married couple, maybe even moving onto a 
fashionable London street. Allwit and his wife will ultimately look like any other 
couple, an affectionate pair moving up in the world and accompanied by their many 
children. There does not seem to be anything unhealthy about their relationship, and it 
appears that their erotic life is fully scripted, wholly reciprocal and entirely 
consensual.    
 What is essential to note about Allwit and wittols like him is that they are very 
much local figures: these are all English characters enmeshed in English culture, and 
they are not foreigners with strange values or alien traditions. Middleton’s play does 
not, for instance, take place in a European city or some rural backwater that would not 
be recognizable to an urban audience; Karen Newman reminds us that the play is set in 
“the center of commercial London and in perhaps its most prosperous street.”401 These 
are people that an audience member might know; wittols aren’t necessarily Italian 
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merchants or French aristocrats, but might be a butcher, a banker, a lawyer, the 
husband down the street or even one’s next-door neighbor. The implication is that 
masochism is not something that only happens over there, to them and in line with 
their weird way of life; it can happen right here in England, and it can be practiced by 
ordinary English people. It turns masochism, or at least the logic of masochism that 
underwrites wittolry and similar erotic practices, into something familiar. It is true that 
Allwit is supposed to be surprising, subversive and a bit ridiculous, but he is also 
successful, happy and in control of his own life. Masochism does not need to be a wild 
and mysterious experience that destroys someone’s life and defines everything about 
the way that they relate to the world: it can be ordinary or even boring. These 
depictions of wittols might have been one of the first, though perhaps accidental, 
attempts at normalizing a sexual fetish and depicting an erotic lifestyle as something 
less than aberrant and that any member of an audience or reader of a pamphlet might 
actually be able to partake of themselves. These texts argue that wittolry might be 
strange or undesirable, but that such a lifestyle has its own pleasures, benefits and 
values. 
 Wittols, in other words, demonstrate that masochism can be English. Your 
neighbors might be masochists, or are at least able to recognize the logic of 
masochistic pleasure in the people around them. In my last chapter, I will elaborate 
more on these specifically English instances of masochism. I argue that a number of 
English texts depict a masochism that actually reaches out to the audience and the 
reader, creating a masochistic dynamic between the people reading or watching and 
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the text itself. I will show how plays and poems are able to insult, ridicule and abuse 
their audience while also encouraging them to continue watching or reading, and I 
argue it is no coincidence that these texts were so immensely popular and successful. I 
will focus on Ben Jonson’s city comedy Bartholomew Fair, which depicts a popular 
local fair filled with con artists, grifters and scammers; the play actually imagines 
itself as one of those con artists, and casts the audience as the rubes that it is going to 
sucker. This relationship is made masochistic by the play’s induction, which presents 
the audience with a special contract that they are asked to sign before the play begins: 
the viewers must take in and take on all that the play wants to give them, and they are 
legally bound to enjoy it. If they do not enjoy this abuse and complain about it later, 
they will have broken the terms of the contract and will have failed to fulfill their end 
of the masochistic bargain. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
Insulting the audience and masochistic spectatorship in Bartholomew Fair 
Critics of early modern drama are traditionally attuned to the twists and turns 
of dramatic language, focusing in on the social, cultural, and political implications of a 
given play’s dialogue. What does it mean that a particular character’s dialogue always 
includes an enjambment? What indecorous desires are concealed in the character’s 
seemingly chaste and poetic remarks? This attention to character and language is one 
of the great strengths of early modern scholarship, but the intensity of that attention 
has led critics to regularly ignore one of the most important figures in any drama: the 
audience. Jennifer Low and Nova Myhill argue that audience reaction has “been 
curiously set apart from the experience of the drama of the period”402 and is not 
always taken into account when scholars are analyzing a dramatic work. In this 
chapter, I want to turn to the audience and how audience members relate to the plays 
that they watch. I am especially interested in plays that insult and abuse their audience. 
Many early modern plays, especially city comedies, regularly insulted and ridiculed 
the audiences that came to see them, informing them that they were uncultured, 
foolish, and ignorant. This was not, however, always a bad thing – these same plays 
were also extremely popular, and people were willing to pay for a ticket in order to be 
subjected to this treatment. If audiences were constantly asked, as Theodore Leinwand 
claims, to “question their adequacy”403 and think of themselves as ridiculous and 
incompetent, it seems that the play-going residents of early modern London were able 
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to see all of this vitriol as a fine source of entertainment. 
Why should this be what audiences desire? What would have been appealing 
about spending your afternoon getting called a fool? I argue that the masochistic 
structures that I have analyzed throughout this project do not need to be restricted to 
the stage. The members of an audience can, themselves, have a masochistic 
relationship with the stage, with the play, with the characters that they are watching 
and listening to, and even with the actors and playwrights that created those 
characters. The theater itself might even be a masochistic location, and someone might 
go to a play in the hopes of being pick-pocketed or accosted by a pimp or some other 
unsavory figure; to thrill at the danger of catching the plague; or, as I will argue here, 
to be abused, insulted and humiliated by a play that they have paid good money to see. 
If the audience asks to be abused, if the audience pays for the experience of being 
insulted, does this mean that they have authority in the theater? If the actors and 
playwrights are the ones doing the insulting and abusing, does this mean that they only 
have control at the pleasure of the audience? If we consider these questions in a 
masochistic light, it is the audience that has control. The balance of power in this 
dynamic is very similar to the structure of a masochistic scenario: audience members 
pay to participate in a situation in which they will be humiliated, and they are 
ultimately in control of their own abuse. When audience members pay to enter a 
playhouse, they also enter into a sort of contract: they agree to observe the play that is 
going to be performed for them, but that play must be performed in a particular way 
and satisfy certain conditions in order to earn any applause. 
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In this chapter, I will focus on the question of what it means to be a 
masochistic spectator. I will pursue this question through a close reading of a city 
comedy that is especially interested in its audience and how that audience is watching 
the play: Ben Jonson’s acerbic Bartholomew Fair, a sharp-tongued and mean-spirited 
account of con artists and the marks that they prey on. The play seems, at first, to be 
more a work of sadism than a document of masochism. The grifters and con artists 
who populate the play exploit anyone and everyone they can, and are merciless in the 
way that they needle, provoke, and venomously ridicule anyone who they think is 
stupider than them, less hip than them, or socially and culturally beneath them. The 
attitude that these characters have toward anyone that they perceive as inferior is 
similar to the attitude displayed by Jonson and the members of his inner circle. Jonson 
headed his own group of poets and playwrights: a collection of drinkers, wits, and 
fellow travelers who mercilessly cut down anyone who was not a member of their 
circle. Jonson’s friends style themselves as the only people who actually understand 
how the world works, and they view the rest of humanity as ignorant and foolish. 
These writers, like the con artist characters in Bartholomew Fair, find a sadistic glee 
in manipulating and insulting all of the foolish sheep who are too simple-minded to 
comprehend what is being said to them. Bartholomew Fair’s Winwife and Quarlous 
spend the play prowling after husbands to cuckold and marks to hoodwink, and in the 
meantime turn their bitter barbs on characters like the helplessly idiotic Cokes and 
cowardly Littlewit. This sadistic behavior is their right, because they are superior to 
the masses that surround them. 
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The audience was not safe from Bartholomew Fair’s insults; in fact, the play 
spends much of its comic energy on social satire that lampoons anyone who might be 
watching it. The play is one of Jonson’s nastiest critiques of English culture, and just 
about everyone comes in for some degree of mockery and abuse: locals, out-of-
towners, merchants, customers, government officials, preachers, husbands, wives, and 
pretty much anybody that could be found walking out on an average London street. 
Jonson was notorious for hating his audiences, and Jennifer Low and Nova Myhill 
observe that he expresses a “perennial dissatisfaction”404 with the people who read and 
see his work; Jonson seems perpetually bitter about the fact that he has to present his 
work before anyone at all. He has many poems that taunt and outright mock the person 
reading them, and his plays are filled with offensive caricatures that are primed to 
belittle and demean half of the patrons sitting or standing in the audience. Jonson, in 
order to make sure that Bartholomew Fair’s audience does not complain about being 
mocked, begins his play with a rather unique induction; in this opening scene, actors 
playing the crew and producers of the play make a contract with the audience, getting 
them to promise that they will remember their place and not complain too much about 
what they see and hear. It appears that Jonson’s goal with this contract is to wrest 
control of the stage back for the players, and to remind the audience that having paid 
for admission does not make them experts and does not make their opinion really 
mean anything. Jonson, it would seem, does not appreciate the idea that his play might 
be criticized or commented on by the unwashed locals that he so despised. 
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This all makes it seem like Bartholomew Fair is a sadistic play: Winwife, 
Quarlous and other con artists torment the fair’s unsuspecting marks, and Jonson 
torments an audience that has paid good money to be insulted and told how worthless 
and inadequate they all. If we look at the play from a different perspective, however, 
we will find that it is a deeply masochistic work. This sense of masochism is not 
necessarily reflected in the action on the stage, but in the relationship between the 
action on the  stage and the audience that is watching and responding to it. I argue that 
there is a masochistic character to the contract with the audience in the induction, and 
that this contract creates a masochistic link between the play and the audience. This 
play offers us, then, an example of masochistic spectatorship; the audience that comes 
to Bartholomew Fair has paid to be insulted and treated like ignorant commoners, and 
if they are mocked and lampooned by the play, then this is precisely what they have 
come to experience. The induction’s contract demands that the audience does not 
complain when the play insults them, and orders them to remember their place and not 
think that they actually know anything about what a play is or how the theater works. 
It may seem, at first, that the audience suffers because of this contract; they are 
coerced into obediently sitting and watching a play that will repeatedly mock and 
ridicule them, and they are even denied the ability to speak up and say anything about 
how they are being treated. This is, however, exactly how a masochistic contract 
works; the masochist who seems to be trapped and placed in a position of shame and 
pain has actually put himself there, and he has designed this shame and pain for 
himself. The audience of Bartholomew Fair may not have personally written the 
contract that they sign, but the contract’s language and logic evokes all of the 
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structures of masochism. If both the audience and the playwright agree to sign this 
contract, this means that the former agrees to be insulted and the latter agrees to do the 
insulting. This event is not random or chaotic, and it cannot simply happen at any 
time; like masochism, the insults in this play can only occur when the audience has 
responded in a certain way or expressed itself in a manner that matches the terms 
outlined in the induction’s contract. 
It is difficult to argue that audiences actually understood that they were 
participating in a masochistic contract. I do not want to claim that every person in the 
audience was interested in this masochistic dynamic, or that they were even aware that 
such a dynamic was present or possible. It is impossible, of course, to try and assert 
anything about what these people were thinking or how they felt about what they 
watched. What I want to focus on instead is the play itself, and to notice what kind of 
dynamic it tries to create between the stage and the audience. The induction’s contract 
creates the conditions for a masochistic relationship, and it establishes all of the 
elements that are important to masochistic desire. In this chapter, I will discuss how 
the induction does this work, and what it means to be a masochistic spectator. I will 
begin with a reading of the play itself, analyzing how its con artist character like 
Quarlous and Winwife exploit, cheat, and mock the weaker fairgoers like Cokes and 
Littlewit. I will then discuss the play’s attitude toward its audience; in a sense, the play 
treats its audience much like Quarlous and Winwife treat Cokes and Littlewit, taunting 
and insulting them as ignorant and inferior. This section of the chapter will also 
include some background on Jonson’s own thoughts about the early modern audience, 
and about how he and the members of his inner circle wrote about and regarded 
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ordinary people. These sections will make it seem that Bartholomew Fair is an 
incredibly sadistic play, reveling in the idea of tormenting and ridiculing anyone that 
its author does not like, whether that be a character like Cokes or an actual member of 
the audience. I will ultimately argue, in the chapter’s final section, that this is actually 
a deeply masochistic play, and that we can see how this dynamic works by looking 
closely at the play’s induction and the curious contract that it presents to the audience. 
I claim that this contract is a masochistic document that radically redefines what it 
means to watch a play, and that it offers its audience an entirely new way to get 
pleasure when they come to the theater. 
Bartholomew Fair and the Culture of Nastiness 
 Bartholomew Fair is governed by a sharp-toothed logic in which the strong 
prey on the weak, and in which the weak deserve it because they do not have the 
urbane attitude and street smarts of the strong who exploit them. These con artists are 
smarter and smoother than the average person: they know what to say and when to say 
it, and they deserve to take from people who do not know what to say and when to say 
it. Quarlous and Winwife are the most prominent predators in the play; they are 
constantly on the make, trying to figure out what they can get and who they can get it 
out of. The two of them are notorious skirt chasers, and they are happy to cuckold 
whoever they can.  Littlewit, one of the play’s many marks, is one of their main 
targets, as they both have their eye on his attractive, young wife Win. Littlewit assures 
his wife that there is “no harm”405 in the leering, lusty Winwife, and he allows the 
roguish con artist to kiss her without understanding Winwife’s obscene intentions. In 
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the next scene, Quarlous demands that Win “come hither”406 and kiss him; when she 
rejects his advances, he retorts that “we’ll kiss again and fall in”,407 the idea of “falling 
in” being early modern shorthand for having sex. When Win protests to her husband, 
yelling “Do you see this, John? Look you! Help me, John!”,408 he is not impressed, 
and does not see any cause for concern; he begs her not to be so “womanly”409 and 
such a crybaby, and he claims that she “must not quarrel with”410 Quarlous and 
Winwife. Win scoffs, and calls her husband a “fool”411 for letting these men be so 
familiar with her. He responds by laughing at her, and turns to Quarlous and Winwife, 
amused that his own wife has called him a fool: “A fool-John she calls me. Do you 
mark that, gentlemen?”412 Littlewit is the perfect mark: compliant and oblivious. He is 
not a knowing cuckold, and his name alone makes him a perfect contrast with Allwit 
from A Chaste Maid in Cheapside; Allwit has the wit to know that he is a cuckold, and 
is in completely control of his situation, while Littlewit has no wit at all and has no 
idea what Quarlous and Winwife want to do with his wife. 
 Quarlous and Winwife enjoy mocking and exploiting anyone who they see as 
inferior to them. The two have a good laugh when they meet Cokes, who Adam 
Zucker refers to as a “flighty, naïve, and deeply impressionable out-of-towner”,413 
fascinated by everything he sees and completely oblivious to the way that life in the 
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city works. When the two con artists meet Cokes, a stage direction follows that reads 
“Quarlous and Winwife confer aside.”414 This is the general method that this duo uses 
throughout the play: they encounter someone who they might be able to exploit, move 
off to the side, and then discuss how to best go about their scam. Winwife looks at 
Cokes, and then asks Quarlous if he ever saw “a fellow’s face more accuse him for an 
ass?”415 Quarlous immediately responds, “Accuse him? It confesses him one without 
accusing.”416 When the two have seen adequate evidence of Cokes’ ignorance and 
childishness, and have realized that he has money to spend and no ability to properly 
take care of it, the play delivers another stage direction that reads “Quarlous and 
Winwife confer privately.”417 The point is clear: we’ve found our prey, the hunt is on, 
and let’s talk about how to best go about our work. Winwife suggests that the two of 
them put aside all of their other schemes for the day, because Cokes will surely 
“engender us excellent creeping sport”418 and be a perfect person to cheat out of his 
money and possessions. It doesn’t really belong to him, anyway; such things should 
go to the smarter and sharper, who actually deserve them. The only question is what 
Quarlous and Winwife will enjoy more: keeping whatever they take from Cokes, or 
seeing his buffoonish and ridiculous reaction when he realizes that he has been 
robbed. 
 Quarlous and Winwife wait for Cokes to show up at the local fair, anticipating 
the moment when they can take advantage of some weakness or confusion and get 
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something out of the gullible young man. While they are waiting, they casually insult 
and mock any of the salespeople who offer them a bauble or any passing fairgoer who 
gets in their way. Winwife complains that “these people should be so ignorant”419 and 
considers interacting with this crowd to be an “inconvenience.”420 When another 
character notices his haughty behavior and asks whether or not Winwife is “proud,”421 
the latter responds that he is not proud “of the company I am in, sir, nor the place, I 
assure you.”422 Quarlous and Winwife eventually turn their acerbic wit on Ursula, a 
tapster who is singled out for her obesity. Quarlous jokes that her thick hide would 
“make excellent gear for the coach-makers,”423 and he claims that having sex with her 
would be like “falling into a whole shire of butter.”424 Winwife calls her the “Mother 
o’the Furies”425 and observes that with every second her “language grows greasier 
than her pigs.”426 Quarlous is especially eager to keep up the verbal assault: he calls 
her a “bog”427 and a “quagmire,”428 laughs at “how she drips”429 sweat on the ground, 
and he calls her a “walking sow,”430 in other words, a cow who can stand up on two 
legs. Quarlous and Winwife get so caught up in mocking Ursula that they completely 
miss the arrival of Cokes, and are not around to see Cokes getting robbed by another 
of the play’s con artists. Quarlous states that he and Winwife have had “wonderful ill 
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luck to miss”431 this chance at getting their hands on what Cokes has, but the truth is 
that the two of them are more interested in making fun of other people than they are in 
actually getting some money out of their schemes. Quarlous states that the robbery 
was merely a “prologue”432 and that what will actually be enjoyable is the scene that 
Cokes will make when he realizes that he has been robbed and starts to call for help. 
Quarlous assures Winwife that this will be “spectacle enough,”433 and that the two of 
them should not care about missing out on getting some cash. The young man’s fright 
and helplessness will be all the profit that they need.  
 This makes it seem that Bartholomew Fair is a document of sadism: these 
characters are more interested in causing someone else pain and discomfort than in 
getting a financial reward for themselves. The characters that they prey on and mock, 
like the oblivious cuckold Littlewit or idiotic Cokes, have no idea what is happening to 
them. Littlewit and Cokes are not masochists, and do not arrange for Quarlous and 
Winwife to cheat and humiliate them; they do not have any control or say over their 
situation, and we do not see any scenes that suggest Littlewit or Cokes receive any 
pleasure from being ridiculed and exploited. If characters in the play do willingly 
undergo the experience of pain or humiliation, it is not for their own pleasure or erotic 
benefit. Local judge Justice Overdo, who feels that he needs to enforce the law at the 
fair, goes undercover “in the habit of a fool”434 in order to discover the criminal 
“enormities”435 that will surely take place there. He realizes that this is going to be a 
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difficult project, but he claims that it is “for the public good”436 and that whatever 
discomfort he feels or embarrassment he undergoes will be worth it. Overdo is willing 
to go through whatever happens to him, “come beating, come imprisonment, come 
infamy, come banishment, nay, come the rack.”437 This does not benefit him at all, but 
it is all for the “good purposes”438 of bettering the community and fishing out sin and 
crime wherever he can find it. Overdo is later on beaten by a group of fairgoers, who 
see him as a foolish meddler, and he admits that he “deserved this beating”439 and that 
he was the “one cause”440 of what happened. This entire sub-plot is completely 
opposed to the idea of a masochistic narrative: Overdo acknowledges that he has 
orchestrated all of this himself and takes complete credit for his beating. He doesn’t 
feign ignorance or act like he is helpless, and he does not claim that this beating and 
embarrassment makes him feel good. If he were a masochist, he would insist that he is 
not at fault, that he has been beaten without any good reason, and that he has had no 
part to play in organizing what happened to him. He is, instead, upfront about his 
involvement, readily admits that he is doing this for the community and not himself, 
and, by the end of the play, has been beaten and harassed so many times that he regrets 
that he ever had the bright idea to put this disguise on. 
 Bartholomew Fair does not appear to have any conception of masochism. It 
seems that the governing logic of the play is sadism, and that everyone in the play is 
steeped in that logic to some degree. The characters participate in a pervasive culture 
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of nastiness, mocking each other, beating each other, and trying find out how to 
exploit one another; that is, of course, when they are not running for cover and trying 
to avoid anyone who might exploit them. If this is so, how and where can we find 
masochism in this play? How can this be called a masochistic work? I argue that the 
play’s primary masochistic relationship is between the play and the audience that 
watches it. The play insults its own audience members – it baits them, taunts them, 
mocks them, and reminds them that they are inferior and ridiculous. It develops these 
insults into a masochistic dynamic by opening the play with a contract that the 
audience must agree to before the action of the play can properly begin; by agreeing to 
this contract, the audience will promise to remain silent and obedient, will not 
complain when they are insulted and mocked, and will not profess that they know 
better than the play’s author or that, even, they know anything at all. In the next 
section, I will discuss Jonson’s tempestuous relationship with his audience and 
readers; he was notorious for his contempt of everyone who came to see his plays or 
read his poems, and his inner circle of cronies and fellow poets showed a similar 
contempt for their own audiences. I will build on this background to show how 
Bartholomew Fair’s harsh treatment of its audience echoes Jonson’s bitterness, and 
how the play’s vicious and scornful comments recall Jonson’s disdain for the 
population of early modern London. I will finally turn to the play’s induction and the 
masochistic contract that it makes with the audience, explaining how the play sets up 
this masochistic dynamic and what it means to be a masochistic spectator.  
Jonson and the Early Modern Audience 
 The attitude displayed by Quarlous, Winwife, and Bartholomew Fair’s other 
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con artists evokes the supercilious cliquishness practiced by Ben Jonson himself and 
the circle of friends that he drank and fraternized with. The group included poets and 
playwrights like Robert Herrick, Thomas Carew, John Suckling, Edmund Waller and 
Thomas Randolph, and would gather at local bars like the Mermaid Tavern, toasting 
one another and boasting about how much better they were than the people in the 
outside world. Jonson’s group posited that social success required an acute sense of 
one’s surroundings, of noticing the dress, mannerisms and actions of other people. If 
one is attuned to them, one can see the small details of social life. Lorna Hutson calls 
these moments the “‘close-ups’ of social exchange”441 and she claims that Jonson and 
his group are experts at finding and analyzing those moments; she asserts that their 
poetry and plays demonstrate a keen sense of surveillance and a particular “sharpness 
of observation.”442 Michelle O’Callaghan observes that the group honed this skill “not 
simply through ways of seeing, but also through hearing”443 the minor inflections of 
speech that differentiated people from one another. Jonson’s circle realized, however, 
that others could see and hear them in return; Katherine Maus argues, in her influential 
book on Jonson, that the observations he makes in his poetry and plays take on a 
“paranoid form, a defense of the self against constant threats of incursion or 
disruption.”444 Lorna Hutson develops this insight by arguing that the poetry produced 
by Jonson’s circle demonstrates that its members can “internalize and anticipate 
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everyone else's indifferent or hostile observations,”445 giving them the advantage. This 
defensiveness enables them to present themselves as the height of urbane cultivation, 
as intelligent, quick-witted gentlemen who know how and when to adjust their 
language, dress and manners to the proper and decorous register, and how to shut 
down anyone that might seem like a threat to them. 
It then becomes important for these poets to define themselves against those 
who are supposedly inferior to them. If someone is different, that person must be one 
of the unwashed, stupid or immoral masses that populate the streets and alehouses. 
Maus argues that Jonson’s group follows the classical moralists in splitting “humanity 
into two groups: the depraved majority against an elite class of wise and virtuous 
men.”446 Jonson and his circle are, of course, the latter, upholders of humanistic virtue 
and moral authority in the midst of a sea of ignorance. The circle articulates its 
difference from others in terms that are condescending, contemptuous and at times 
brutal. The masses are, to begin with, “bacon-brains,”447 “loose idolaters,”448 and 
possessed of a “deep and arrant ignorance,”449 but this is tame compared to some of 
their other comments. Herrick’s “The Hock-Cart, or Harvest Home,” written for his 
friend and fellow circle member Mildmay Fane, Earl of Westmorland, is a poem of 
instruction that is addressed to Fane’s peasants. Herrick reminds these peasants to feed 
their cows (or “neats”) as if they were feeding themselves: “Feed, and grow fat; and as 
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ye eat,/Be mindful that the lab’ring neat,/As you, may have their fill of meat.”450 The 
peasants are as much farm animals as the cows that they tend to, feeding and growing 
fat to be strong enough for the labor to come. If this is only implied in Herrick’s poem, 
Jonson is much less understated in his language. In an epithalamion honoring two 
aristocrats, he states this about the unwashed masses: “Th’ignoble never lived; they 
were a while,/Like swine or other cattle, here on earth.”451 These people are simple 
beasts, meant for labor and food, incapable of higher thought and focused on purely 
animalistic desires. Jonson’s circle, on the other hand, is made up of full-fledged 
human beings, and its members have the right to ride, use and eat these animals as 
they see fit. In these poems, one can sense what Lorna Hutson refers to as an 
“exchange of knowing smiles,”452 a shared contempt for the masses that reaffirms their 
own elite status and reasserts just how different they are from the herd that surrounds 
them. 
Jonson, in particular, was not coy about telling his audiences and readers that 
they should feel like dirt, and that they should recognize their inferior status. He 
regularly complained about the fact that his plays were performed for the ignorant 
masses, and not, in Adam Zucker’s astute words, “a clamoring crowd of witty 
critics”453 who would understand all of his classical allusions and sympathize with his 
elitist characters. Jonson did not present his plays to the sort of disaffected, scholarly, 
and sharp-tongued classical moralists who he modeled himself after and who he 
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depicted with such admiring flattery in his Roman tragedies. His audience was, 
instead, the real, smelly, uneducated, and boorish population of early modern London, 
and Jonson bitterly recognized the gap between the audience of his fantasy and the 
audience that actually came (or, quite often, did not come) to his plays. He was 
annoyed with the playgoers that turned up to see his caustic comedies full of obscure 
references, but he was even more annoyed when people did not show up.  There was 
nothing that the audience could do to please him, and everything they did was 
evidence of their stupidity and inadequacy. He did not, therefore, mince words when 
this London audience again and again failed to match up to  his classical ideal.  
Jonson took every opportunity he could to remind his readers and viewers that 
they were more than lacking. Jonson did limit his bitterness to comments in his own 
poems and plays; if given the opportunity, he was happy to vent his feelings whenever 
he could, and he would criticize and ridicule early modern audiences in whatever 
forum was available to him. When John Fletcher’s proto-tragicomedy The Faithful 
Shepherdess was printed in quarto after an unsuccessful theatrical run, Jonson wrote a 
commendatory poem that condemned audiences for their lack of taste and their 
inability to recognize the worth of such a great and original play: 
   I, that am glad, thy innocence was thy guilt, 
   And wish that all the muses’ blood was spilt, 
   In such martyrdom; to vex their eyes, 
   Do crown thy murdered poem: which shall rise 
   A glorified work to time, when fire, 
  Or moths shall eat, what all these fools admire.454 
                                                                                                                                            
452
 “Liking Men: Ben Jonson's Closet Opened.” ELH 71.4 (2004) 1082 
453
 The Places of Wit 101 
454
 “To Mr. Fletcher, Upon His Faithful Shepherdess,” The Works of Ben Jonson (Boston: Philips, 
Sampson, and Co., 1853) 815 11-16 
  198 
The audience, too stupid to appreciate Fletcher’s play (which, to be fair, is extremely 
didactic and often quite boring), deserves to be blinded by a jet of blood. The play has 
been “murdered” by these inattentive, uneducated, confused Londoners, and they must 
be punished. The people who did not see this play are guilty, and Jonson sets himself 
up as judge and jury. He declares that everything that these ignorant “fools” love will 
ultimately be destroyed by the whims of time, and that the greatness of Fletcher’s play 
will, almost spitefully, rise back up and survive long after everything that they care 
about. The irony of Jonson’s vitriol is, of course, the fact that whoever reads this poem 
has actually bought a quarto copy of the play, and this should mean that they are not 
amongst the fools that Jonson is abusing. Jonson does not give the reader any special 
treatment or congratulate him for having bought this play when so many ignored it on 
the stage. Francis Beaumont’s commendatory poem in this same quarto is even 
harsher, accusing its readers of being barely able to read (even though they are reading 
the very poem that insults them), and lumps them in with the uneducated philistines 
who caused the production to fail in the first place. Beaumont claims that when one of 
these ignorant Londoners buys and reads this play, that local idiot’s “very reading 
makes verse senseless prose”455 and completely desecrates a work of art. It seems like 
almost no one is safe from these bitter barbs delivered by these writers – not even the 
very audience members and readers that they relied on to pay for their plays and 
poems, and to make them socially and financially successful. 
 In the end, Bartholomew Fair might stand as Jonson’s most sour comment on 
English life and his contempt for his audience. The play savagely mocks just about 
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every member of the community, from the religious (lambasted as “right hypocrites, 
good gluttons”456) to local shopkeepers (they are “rotten, rougey cheaters!”457). One 
character claims that the only type of people you will find walking the streets of the 
city are “a scattered covey of fiddlers, or one of these rag-rakers in dunghills, or some 
marrowbone-man”,458 and another asserts that people who attend plays, shows, 
bearbaitings, and other  public entertainments are a “debauched company”459 of 
criminals, scam artists, and ignorant losers. The play opines that too many people 
“slavereth” after ale and that tobacco causes them to “stinketh”,460 and finds that at 
any large gathering of people you are sure to be bombarded with putrid breath that 
comes from a diet of “stale bread, rotten eggs, musty ginger, and dead honey.”461 
People with wealth and fancy coaches are “as common as wheelbarrows where there 
are great dunghills”,462 and the customers at a marketplace are “a kind o’civil savages, 
that will part with their children for rattles, pipes, and knives.”463 There is no one that 
gets away easy here, and it seems that everyone, from every walk of life, is called out 
as presumptuous, unlearned, and ridiculous. There is enough material here for just 
about anyone who watches or reads this play to be offended by it; the old, the young, 
the rich, the poor, men, women, people who go to plays, and people who do not go to 
plays are all derided with a scornful intensity that cannot be brushed off as merely 
playful. When Quarlous condemns a group of people at the fair as “a herd of 
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hypocritical proud ignorants”,464 it is difficult to not see this as a reference to the 
audience that is actually watching the play (a reading that is compounded by the fact 
that crowds were so often referred to as a bovine herd or a multi-headed animal made 
up of parts that cannot think for themselves). 
The most mocked and abused character in the play is Cokes. He enjoys things 
too much, is far too trusting, and does not have the tools for surviving an afternoon at 
the crowded, quick-moving marketplace. He shows his purse to passing shoppers, 
practically asking to get robbed by any nearby thief, and he buys whatever cheap 
trinkets and toys that he can, interested in even the most tacky tchotchkes and 
shoddily-made baubles. Cokes has lost most of his money by the end of the play and 
cannot find anyone who will help him out of his situation. He winds up tricked, 
cheated, and exploited by almost everyone at the fair, and is made into a complete 
fool. Cokes is left completely stunned by his downfall, and wanders the streets of the 
fair, asking strangers “do you know who I am, or where I lie?”465 When Cokes is at 
last rescued by his flustered caretaker, he decides to attend the fair’s puppet show, a 
comic adaptation of the Hero and Leander fable. He makes foolish comments about 
the show, idiotically repeating lines and only barely understanding what is happening. 
The classical allusions and political satire are completely lost on him, and he is 
entirely awed by the fact that puppets are moving and talking (even though, as Heather 
Easterling’s research has shown, puppet shows were “a popular and ubiquitous 
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entertainment in Jacobean London”,466 and should not have seemed quite so 
fascinating). Cokes does not have many expectations for this performance; he only 
wants to see, as his fellow theatergoer Knockem puts it, “fine fireworks, and good 
vapors”,467 a spectacle that will hold his interest for an hour and change before he 
grows bored and wanders back off into the fair. He has no idea what he is watching, 
and cannot begin to appreciate the history behind it. 
 Cokes, it would appear, represents the theater audience that Jonson so 
despised. He is gullible, childish, and easily entertained by anything flashy; it does not 
take much work to persuade him that something is good, as long as it is big, bold, and 
cartoonish. In his childish trust, he is willing to spend his money on whatever has the 
best advertisements or asks for his coins with the most convincing bombast. He has no 
taste, no understanding of history, no discernment, and no idea of what actually makes 
for a quality piece of entertainment. Cokes does not understand the culture of the 
theater, he does not follow particular playwrights that produce good work, he does not 
even know how to behave when he watches a play. He is exactly the kind of reader 
and audience member that Jonson hated so much: he has no education, no wit, and no 
class, but he has just enough money to attend the theater and spoil the whole thing for 
everybody else. This is compounded by the fact that Cokes is completely oblivious to 
how ridiculous and offensive he is, and he thinks he is doing absolutely nothing wrong 
by shouting imbecilic comments at the stage. Jonson resented that he had to share his 
work with these customers, and he was never shy about expressing his hostility. The 
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image that the play offers of its theatergoing audience is profoundly negative and 
insulting. The implication is that the people who come to see plays, even the very 
people sitting in the audience and watching this one, are no better than Cokes or the 
many other idiots who sound like him. 
The Induction as a Masochistic Contract 
 If Jonson’s intention is to humiliate his audience and remind them of how 
stupid they are, it would seem that he succeeds: Bartholomew Fair is unsparing in its 
vicious and sharp-tongued appraisal of anyone who does not meet Jonson’s standards 
(and this, it appears, includes everyone in the audience). Everything about the play, 
and everything about the way that Jonson talks about his audience at any opportunity 
he can find, suggests that Bartholomew Fair is a profoundly sadistic document. The 
characters in the play are nasty to anyone who is weaker than them or supposedly 
inferior to them, the play itself indirectly insults the audience watching it, and Jonson 
clearly held everyone who attended his plays in great contempt. Jonson despised his 
audiences so much that he was upset about the fact that these people thought they had 
any agency or control over their experience of a play. He chafed against the 
convention that plays had to ask an audience for approval, and that a play’s merit was 
based entirely on the amount of applause that an audience gave to it at the end. 
Heather Easterling claims that Jonson constantly tried his best to wrest control of the 
stage back to him and his plays, and that many of his plays show an unwillingness to 
admit that audience members had any authority in the theater.468 Jonson wanted to put 
audiences in their place, and remind them who was truly in control. He takes this 
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sadistic attitude toward his audience one step further with Bartholomew Fair’s 
induction. The induction proposes a special contract between the stage and the 
audience. The contract seems to take away all of an audience member’s power; it 
prevents him from complaining; it forces him to remain quiet; and it even demands his 
approval whether he actually likes the play or not. If the audience is going to watch the 
play, all of its members must agree to listen respectfully, to not claim that they know 
better than the playwright, and to remember that they are ultimately insignificant and 
ignorant next to this learned play and its learned creator. 
This might seem like Jonson’s most precise act of sadism yet: you must sit in 
silence while you are insulted, and you do not have the right to react or be offended. 
However, if we closely read the dynamic that the induction creates between the stage 
and its audience, I argue that this contract gives the entire play a sharply masochistic 
character. The contract establishes a masochistic bond between the audience and the 
play. In a masochistic contract, the figure with power is the figure that is being abused; 
this person is actually the one in control and who dictates how the abuse will take 
place and what it will consist of. These contracts bind the masochist to fulfill certain 
conditions and act in a certain way, but the abuser is ultimately the one who is acting 
and performing for the masochist’s benefit. When the play insults and lampoons its 
audience, it is only upholding its end of the bargain that was made in the induction. 
Jonson has cast himself, essentially, as the master to the audience’s masochist. In this 
section, I will closely read the induction, and will ask a number of questions about the 
nature of masochistic spectatorship. What does it mean to watch as a masochist? How 
can we identify masochistic spectatorship? Does watching a play always carry with it 
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some masochistic character?  
 The play begins with a unique induction that cuts off any audience 
bellyaching: if you do not like the play, or you want to complain about the way that it 
insults you, the induction will prevent you from voicing your critical opinion. In this 
opening, two fictional members of the play’s production crew, a Book-holder and a 
Stage-keeper, bicker about how the stage looks and whether or not it would look better 
with different trappings, and debate what the audience’s reaction to the play will be. 
The Book-keeper worries about what “the understanding gentlemen o’the ground”,469 
crowded right next to the stage, will think of the show, and he admits that the author of 
the play has the same anxiety. He then states that there are “certain articles drawn out 
in haste between our author and you, which, if you please to hear, and as they appear 
reasonable to approve of,” 470 the play can then proceed with these anxieties assuaged 
and all parties agreed to how the audience is going to react to what they see. The two 
company members then introduce a Scrivener onto the stage, who carries a lengthy 
contract with him. This contract will bind the audience to uphold the response that the 
playwright expects out of them. In a play that so concerned with contracts, deals, 
exchanges, and the economic processes that make up life in the city, it might come as 
no surprise that this is how the play opens: it is an attempt to put into dramatic practice 
the themes of the play, and it is also an invitation to the audience to participate in the 
same culture of contracts, agreements, and bargains that will shortly be acted out in 
the play they are about to see. The expectation, one might assume, is that this will be a 
funny and light-hearted moment, and that the contract the Scrivener carries will 
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contain a few jokes, some clever turns of phrase, and an enjoyably précis of the 
proceeding comedy. 
This is not, however, what actually happens, and the contract is presented as 
something extremely severe, formal, and intricate. It begins with language that reads 
like an actual legal document; the author of the play is clearly taking no chances with 
whom the contract refers to, and those who agree to it cannot claim that they 
misunderstood how it was presented. There is something deeply anti-theatrical about 
the contract, and it is difficult to see what enjoyment or humor an audience member 
would have found in it. It is boring and official, and it would have been difficult to 
deliver it in anything other than a listless monotone. It is almost as if the author is 
preparing for any lawsuits that may result from this play, and wants to make sure that 
he has taken every possible legal precaution: 
Articles of agreement, indented, between the 
spectators or hearers, at the Hope on the Bankside, in the 
County of Surry on the one party, and the author of 
Barthol’mew Fair in the said place and county, on the 
other party, the one-and-thirtieth day of October, 1614, 
and in the twelfth year of the reign of our sovereign 
lord, James, by the grace of God, King of England, 
France, and Ireland, Defender of the Faith: And of Scot- 
land the seven-and-fortieth.471 
 
This is, without a doubt, a document to take very seriously. The contract is precisely 
specific to the exact time, place, and location of the play, and it evokes James in order 
to confirm its solemnity. If this contract were brought up in court, it would certainly be 
seen as ironclad and incontrovertible. The question to ask, of course, is why the author 
would require such a precise and specific contract, and why he would want to open his 
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comedy with the reading of such an intensely serious document. There appears to be 
an expectation that something will happen in this play that will call for legal action, or 
will drive members of the audience to sue the author of the play and his company. 
This contract, then, will be so thorough and complete that there will be no legal 
question about who is in the right. The playwright is clearly covering all of his bases; 
if anything in this play leads to a trial, he and his acting company will certainly not 
wind up on the losing side. The Scrivener continues to read the document for almost 
another one hundred lines, and, again, it is difficult to see how this is supposed to 
entertain the gathered audience. They are instead made the witnesses to a legal 
proceeding, and the comedy that they have paid to see has been left to the side. 
 The contract expresses a great deal of anxiety about what the audience will or 
will not be able to say after the play is over. It states that all members of the audience 
must agree to “remain in the places their money or friends have put them in”,472 and 
not move about the theater and distract the actors on the stage. The audience must also 
admit that none of its members can claim “more than he knows”473 and assert that the 
play has not accurately represented the fair, that the author has made some error, or 
that there is something wrong with the play. The audience can also not claim that they 
understand the play and can decipher its allegorical significance, asserting that they 
can see “what Mirror of Magistrates is meant by the justice, what great lady by the 
pig-woman, what concealed statesman by the seller of mousetraps, and so of the 
                                                                                                                                            
471
 Ind. 64-72 
472
 Ind. 78-9 
473
 Ind. 117 
  207 
rest.”474 The author states that these claims are nothing more than “inspired 
ignorance”475 and encourages the other audience members to point out whoever makes 
these assertions; this person will be left to the “mercy of the author”,476 who will 
vehemently ridicule them as a “forfeiture to the stage and your laughter.”477 The 
author will respond to any assertion that his play is faulty with a humiliating and cruel 
response, and his reaction will be so swift and sharp that the rest of the audience will 
find it entertaining. The audience may feel uncomfortable, but they will not be able to 
help laughing at the author’s cutting remarks, and the scene will also serve as a lesson 
that demonstrates what will happen if anyone who speaks out of turn. This play is not 
up for debate, and it is not being presented so that ignorant people can comment on it 
and act like they know what they’re talking about. 
The contract goes on to state that any audience member who is willing to “so 
desperately or ambitiously play the fool as to challenge the author”478 about the 
decorousness of the play’s language will meet the same fate as the patrons who 
thought that they could reveal some hidden allegory in the play, and the former will be 
mocked with the very same virulence and nastiness as the latter. The audience is still 
allowed, of course, to maintain their own “free-will of censure”,479 but everyone must 
be silent as possible, and no one is allowed to express his or her opinion on the play to 
anyone else; this would spread a kind of critical “contagion”,480 and the audience must 
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be careful not to take cues from “another’s voice, or face, that sits by him.”481 There is 
also the matter of how much each audience member has paid to enter the play: each 
person in the audience is permitted an opinion according to the “value of his place”482 
and can have no opinion that is worth more than that his place cost him. If a person 
pays “but sixpence at the door”483 and then thinks that he can “censure a crown’s 
worth”,484 he is committing an act that flies in the face of “conscience and justice.”485 
It essential for everyone in the audience to be completely fair and just to the play at all 
times, even when (or perhaps especially when) the play is not fair or just to any of 
them. The play, in other words, is more important than the people watching it; the play 
is not there to entertain the audience, but instead the audience is there to help and 
support the play. The play would not exist if not for the patrons willing to pay to come 
and see it, but this does not mean that attendees should feel too proud of themselves; 
they should appreciate their position and watch silently while the cast and crew go 
about work that no one in the audience is going to understand anyway. 
 This contract establishes that the author of the play is the only figure in the 
theater with any influence or control, and goes to great lengths to assert that the 
audience has power only as long as the playwright allows them to have any. He 
doesn’t even permit much influence from other playwrights, asserting that this play is 
not going involve the ridiculous “tales, tempests, and such like drolleries”486 that other 
authors use; he is not going to indulge in the simple-minded “concupiscence of jigs 
                                                 
481
 Ind. 100 
482
 Ind. 90 
483
 Ind. 95 
484
 Ind. 96 
485
 Ind. 97 
  209 
and dances”487 that the audience might be used to seeing in lesser plays produced by 
lesser writers. There is no room for anyone else to have any authority or impact here. 
This is the author’s domain, and he has complete command over everything that 
happens in it – even the way that the audience feels about what they are watching. The 
contract enables him to insult, offend, and constantly taunt the audience without being 
confronted; if the audience responds negatively, if anyone is upset by what they hear, 
they are impeding on the author’s right to decide how the play is perceived and what 
sort of judgment can be applied to it. The last clause of the contract states that if you 
are an audience member, you must put your “hands”488 together and applaud all that 
you have just heard, even though you are reminded that “you have preposterously put 
to your seals already (which is your money)”489 and do not have much choice in the 
matter. The audience is no longer able to vote with their wallets – if they are offended 
by the play and want to leave, they have already paid for their ticket, and the house has 
made its money off of them. The author looks on all of these customers with 
contempt; they are absolutely ridiculous, because they have paid to see his play while 
thinking that they will be listened to and that their opinion will have some real 
meaning. 
 This ultimately leads to a masochistic dynamic between the audience and the 
stage. In a masochistic contract, the figure with the power is the figure that is being 
abused; this person is ultimately the only one in control and the master of the situation. 
The playwright figure in the induction’s contract does not necessarily trap the 
                                                                                                                                            
486
 Ind. 132-3 
487
 Ind. 134 
488
 Ind. 159 
  210 
audience into obeying his will, and it is actually the other way around: this sort of 
contract is exactly the kind of document that a masochist hopes to encounter, as it will 
legitimize and cement the structure of his or her desires. If the audience is willing to 
be humiliated and mocked, and if they might even see this as a titillating and 
pleasurable form of entertainment, the playwright has locked himself into a situation 
where he must fulfill all of their expectations. When he cuts down an audience 
member, when he expresses his bitterness and hostility, when he claims that everyone 
in the audience is ignorant and ridiculous, he is doing exactly what the audience wants 
and giving them precisely what they want to hear. The contract does not only bind the 
audience to fulfill certain conditions – it also demands that the author of the play 
incessantly maintains the role of the viciously sour abuser who has to pounce on 
anything that the audience says. The playwright is, therefore, the master to the 
audience’s masochist, and, just as in a masochistic dynamic, he is in a secondary role 
where the audience calls the shots and actually asks for all of this abuse. The author of 
the play is not necessarily a sadistic taskmaster, and can instead be understood as a 
coordinate in the audience’s masochistic fantasy. He is the authority figure that the 
audience can latch onto and blame for abusing them, even though they have 
themselves agreed to the contract and all the conditions that it asked of them. 
 There might be, however, the suggestion that Jonson actually places himself in 
a kind of masochistic role. He knows that his audience distrusts him and even dislikes 
him, and yet he continues to present his work to them and puts on plays that he is 
aware will be derided or ignored. Jonson might have realized that Bartholomew Fair’s 
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induction would be chafed against, and that the audience would resent having to agree 
to terms that are so clearly against them and that place them in such a submissive role. 
It is almost as if Jonson is intentionally trying to evoke the audience’s hatred, and as if 
he wants to hear these people mutter under their breath and curse his name. This 
reading has particular merit if we consider the fact that it is Jonson who wrote the 
contract that begins the play; in this sense, Jonson is more the traditional masochist in 
this play than the audience. I am not suddenly arguing that the audience is not placed 
in a masochistic position, or that the induction’s contract does not make them into 
masochists; I want to suggest, instead, that there is a complicated relationship between 
Jonson and the audience, where both sides of the dynamic might actually inhabit a 
masochistic role. If we think about the play in this way, Bartholomew Fair becomes a 
striking source for not only discussing masochism, but for considering the deeply 
tangled relationship between the playwright and the audience.  
The structure that I have described in this chapter is exactly how masochism 
works: the play is filled with humiliating and offensive insults, many of which are 
directed obliquely or even explicitly at the audience, there is a master figure who 
appears to control the action, and there is a contract that strictly dictates how all the 
parties involved will behave and exactly what degradations and insults will be 
performed. The contract is also very specific about when and under what conditions 
these insults will be used. If a member of the audience, agreeing to the induction’s 
contract, begins to feel pleasure in being insulted and offended, we might call this a 
masochistic response. I do not want to claim that every person in the audience was 
interested in this masochistic dynamic, or that they were even aware that such a 
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dynamic was present or possible. I argue that the induction’s language opens up, at 
least, the possibility for a masochistic relationship between the stage and the audience. 
It is not that every audience member participates in this relationship, or that anyone 
yet has the precise language to fully articulate how they would feel about such a 
relationship if it were formed; the point is that this way of watching and interacting 
with a play was now available to anyone who was capable of taking advantage of it or 
who was interested in exploring these kinds of desires. The play has created an 
environment for masochistic desire, and the induction has established everything that 
someone would need in order to involve himself in a masochistic structure. The action 
of the play itself may not be masochistic, and it may seem at first like a sadistic work, 
but the induction’s contract gives the entire play a masochistic quality. It is not that the 
characters in the play are masochistic, or that the play depicts masochistic scenes, but 
that the play invites its audience to watch it and interact with it as a masochistic 
spectator. 
Masochistic Spectatorship 
 If this is so, what does it mean to be a masochistic spectator? How can 
watching be masochistic, and is this a dynamic that is entirely unique to Bartholomew 
Fair? Is this something that can be found in other early modern dramas? I have 
described a number of masochistic scenarios throughout this project, and I have shown 
the ways that masochistic characters like Jessica, Antonio, and Allwit orchestrate and 
very precisely stage all of the humiliation and shame that they go through. They are 
playwright figures, scripting the action that will take place and coercing other people 
into treating them with a particular form of disdain or cruelty; they are director figures, 
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arranging the mise en scene of the these masochistic events and dictating what the 
other characters will wear, how they will present themselves, and how they will 
arrange themselves on the stage; and they are actor figures, performing a role in the 
script that they have written and all along acting as if they have had nothing to do with 
its creation. I have not, however, emphasized a fourth role that all of these masochistic 
characters inhabit: they are, in their own way, audience members, and they often 
simply sit back and watch what is happening to them, making very little comment or 
even not interfering at all. The idea of watching as a member of an audience is an 
essential component of the masochistic experience; it is the perfect subject position 
from which to assert that you have had nothing to do with the events that are 
transpiring in front of you, that you are an innocent bystander, and that you are 
watching out of curiosity or because you have been roped into this situation by 
something that is beyond your control. You, as an audience member, can claim to be 
completely passive, and your claim will be borne out – other people are doing the 
acting, and you do not seem to be doing anything. 
 In The Merchant of Venice, Jessica organizes a series of scenes in which she 
will be able to watch on as other characters humiliate her or abuse and insult her 
father. I have highlighted her passivity in these scenes, noting how her lack of 
dialogue requires her to stand back from the action and submissively accept all of the 
things that the Christian characters are saying about her, her father, and her former 
religion. I want to emphasize that Jessica is an audience member in these moments, 
and that she watches and listens to what the other characters are saying without 
interacting with them or commenting on what they say. She has arranged this situation 
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for herself, but she has the luxury of sitting back and appearing to simply receive all of 
this information without needing to admit that she has helped to orchestrate it. The 
audience watching the play would be able to see Jessica watching on: she is present on 
the stage in almost all of these scenes where the Christians banter with each other and 
commiserate with one with one another about how horrible the Jews are, but she has 
very little to say and nothing to do. If she has no dialogue, she must simply be 
watching on, and she appears to be an audience member as much as the people who 
have paid to see the play, patiently waiting to see how all of this will turn out. In the 
same play, Antonio’s situation makes him look even more like an audience member: 
he watches the events of his trial from the side of the courtroom, seemingly helpless to 
change what the other characters do or to influence what actions they choose to take. 
Portia and Shylock are the actors, not Antonio; he can only watch as his fate is decided 
for him, and he is a merely a spectator off to the side, able to briefly voice his opinion 
or make an occasional emotional outburst, but not able to actually make an impact. 
 The same is true of wittols like Allwit from A Chaste Maid in Cheapside; the 
entire point of being a wittol is that you can watch on while your wife is with another 
man. The wittol might not be in the actual bedroom, but he knows the specifics of 
what is taking place between his wife and her lover, and he can listen to his wife’s 
reports and imagine that he was actually there. I have also, however, shown that it is 
often true that wittols are physically in the bedroom when their wives are having sex 
with their lovers; in these situations, the wittol is sometimes tied to a chair or held in 
place by other participants in the erotic scheme, and in any case is not permitted to 
intervene or interfere with what is happening in front of him. He must keep quiet, and 
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can only watch while his wife enjoys herself and thereby humiliates him. In this sense, 
wittols are similar to the audience of Bartholomew Fair; both parties agree to watch 
something that hurts and embarrasses them, and in either case this is framed as a 
pleasurable experience. The condition of being an audience members means that you 
take what is given to you and you do not yourself influence the action; you do, 
however, have a choice about what you want to watch and how you want to watch it. 
The figure of the wittol and the audience of Bartholomew Fair are both put in a 
situation where they are forced to watch these events transpire in a certain way, and 
their ability to criticize or complain has been taken away from them. If we look behind 
the scenes, of course, we will see the wittol has arranged this whole scenario for 
himself, and the audience of Jonson’s comedy has agreed to the induction’s oppressive 
and intensely restrictive contract. The fact that they agreed to these things before 
anything happened allows them to disavow any responsibility and to act like passive 
audience members when the events in question actually take place. 
 These plays dramatize what it means to watch as a masochist; The Merchant of 
Venice and A Chaste Maid in Cheapside both directly put characters on the stage who 
are not only masochists but who also watch on, as audience members, while their 
masochistic scenarios play out in front of them. I argue that the audience is invited to 
identify with characters like Jessica and Antonio in these moments, and to see a 
parallel between their own experience as spectators and the experience of these 
characters as they watch in their own way. When Jessica stands back from her 
husband and his group of Christian friends, when she is unable to get through to them 
and join in as they deliver their invective and accusations, her behavior seems to echo 
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the audience’s own situation – watching the action unfold, commenting occasionally 
but otherwise unable to actually influence what happens, and generally relegated to 
another side of the stage, away from the characters who have something to contribute. 
Bartholomew Fair makes this parallel much more immediate, and the audience is 
directly put into the position that Jessica, Antonio, and Allwit were in during their 
respective plays. While The Merchant of Venice and A Chaste Maid in Cheapside 
simply put masochistic characters on the stage (though, of course, this is itself an 
extremely sophisticated and complex dramatic move), Bartholomew Fair reaches 
across the stage to its audience; the audience, by agreeing to the induction’s contract, 
becomes the most integral element of how the play understands and depicts 
masochistic desire. In fact, this “depiction” does not take place on the stage at all, and 
is entirely located in the interaction between the audience and the play that they are 
watching.  
This, in a sense, is the pivotal moment that concludes this project. I have 
described a number of scenes, characters, structures, actions, and behaviors that 
characterize the early modern period as a vital moment in the history of masochism. I 
have attempted, in laying out this argument, to not overstate my case, and to be clear 
and honest when I make the point that might be debatable or that could be contested. I 
have tried to point out structures, to give interesting examples, and to draw our 
attention to the potent relationship between desire and performance. The masochistic 
characters that I have analyzed are actors and playwrights, but they are also audience 
members, and the audience members watching these plays can themselves have a 
masochistic relationship with the stage. It was, therefore, possible for everyone in an 
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early modern theater to be engaged in a masochistic dialogue. I feel that this is the 
most significant insight this project offers, and my hope is that this insight allows us a 
new way to think about early modern desire, both on and off the theatrical stage. I will 
finally end this project with a conclusion that ties together many of the ideas that I 
have explored over the last four chapters. What are the threads that link together 
Jessica, Antonio, Allwit, and the audience of Bartholomew Fair? Is there a universal 
experience of early modern masochism that all of these characters share, or do they 
each convey a different shade of masochistic desire? Is it even possible to think about 
sexuality as something that is unified and coherent across all the people who express it 
and enjoy it, or is sexuality something that is always personal and individual? Is desire 
something that is too fluid for us to have a coherent theory of it? Is it possible that we 
can never write about desire in a concrete way? I will deal with all of these questions, 
and sum up my findings, in the conclusion that follows this chapter. 
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CONCLUSION 
 This project has offered a sketch of how masochism developed in the early 
modern period. I have demonstrated what made early modern masochism work, what 
social trends it drew from, how it grew, and what was attractive about it. I have 
discussed masochism from several different perspectives: religious, legal, political, 
sexual, and textual. I have attempted, in framing my project through all of these 
perspectives, to emphasize the importance of individual agency and the fact that 
masochists that are represented in early modern plays are making these choices for 
themselves. In all of this, I have maintained that the early modern market is a vital 
foundation for thinking about early modern masochism, and that the market is an 
essential background for understanding masochistic logic and language. In this final 
section, I will briefly tie together some of the ideas that I have explored throughout 
this project, and I will especially concentrate on how the plays that I have read are 
linked (or are not linked) together. How does Jessica’s form of masochism compare 
with Antonio’s? Is Allwit’s form of masochistic spectatorship similar to what the 
audience experiences in Bartholomew Fair? Is Antonio something like a wittol, and is 
there something about Allwit’s desires that seems religious or political? This 
conclusion is an opportunity to work out questions like these, and to consider the 
universality of the experience of early modern masochism. It might be impossible, of 
course, to paint a completely coherent narrative that can account for the erotic and 
personal experiences of all the characters and figures that I have discussed throughout 
my project. This, however, can be an insight in its own right, and it would suggest just 
how variable and fluid early modern sexuality – or, perhaps, simply sexuality in 
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general – can be. 
 I will begin by summing up some of the claims that I have made in this project. 
I began the dissertation with two chapters on The Merchant of Venice, which was an 
incredibly rich source for thinking about the combination of pleasure and pain. The 
first chapter on Shylock’s daughter Jessica allowed us to start by approaching 
masochism from a religious and political angle. This is the way that contemporary 
critics and writers have traditionally understood masochism; these thinkers often 
connect masochism to political oppression and ascetic self-abuse. Jessica, it would 
seem, tracks perfectly with this critical tradition: she is a Jew who becomes a 
Christian, and an outcast who becomes a citizen, two seismic shifts in identity that 
completely change her religious and political affiliations. I argued that Jessica uses 
political and religious narratives for her own purposes; the play strongly suggests that 
her masochism is a deeply personal choice, and that her masochistic feelings are not 
merely a response to political forces or religious self-hatred. She may use and take 
advantage of these social narratives, but they do not overpower her and decide what 
her desires will be and how they will work. The way that the play actually depicts 
Jessica and her masochistic desires runs contrary to what many critics have argued 
about how she feels after she marries Lorenzo and is awkwardly introduced into his 
circle of Christian friends. This one of the vital insights that I suggested in this project: 
it is important not to be complacent about something like desire, because it might 
actually be more complex, tangled, buried, counterintuitive, and difficult to understand 
than it first appears. 
Antonio, in the same play, also uses these social narratives for his own 
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pleasure. The project’s second chapter, which focuses on Antonio, shifts our 
understanding of masochism to a legal and economic arena. I argued that Antonio 
casts the early modern court and the early modern market as coordinates in his 
masochistic scenario; in doing so, he is able to insert himself into a story where he is a 
helpless object, almost like a sack of goods or a piece of meat, debated over by other 
people who have the right to decide his fate. He is placed entirely in the hands of these 
other people, and the courtroom at the end of the play looks as much like a market 
auction as it does like the setting of a legal trial, as Antonio’s helpless body is 
metaphorically dragged back and forth between Portia and Shylock in a rhetorical tug-
of-war. His helplessness is, however, a carefully designed pose, and he has actually 
orchestrated this entire scenario for himself. In this chapter, I expanded on what it 
means to exploit a social institution for your own purposes. The early modern court 
may have been oppressive and often unjust, and the early modern market may have 
been a volatile and callous forum that lacked any sentiment and was ruled by cold, 
hard money, but these features also made them susceptible to being roped into a 
masochistic fantasy. If you can use the court’s brutality and the market’s viciousness 
to feel good or to at least experience a very particular kind of pleasure, what happens 
to that brutality and viciousness? I argued that Antonio’s desires are subversive, and 
that his masochistic story is a disruptive way of claiming agency and personal will in a 
culture that seemed so repressive and overbearing. Antonio and Jessica take the things 
that should oppress and crush them, and turn those things into the raw material of an 
erotic narrative. If they actually do appear to be oppressed and crushed, it is something 
that they have chosen for themselves, and these institutions lose some of their 
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authoritarian control.  
In the third chapter, I continued to explore how masochism can be subversive, 
and how it can defy some of the most basic conventions of early modern culture. It 
may even defy some of the conventions that contemporary critics have often taken for 
granted about the early modern period, offering us a more sophisticated and nuanced 
view of what it might have meant to be an early modern person. In this chapter, I 
focused on the early modern figure of the wittol, the willing cuckold who knows that 
he is being cuckolded and even eagerly encourages this cuckolding to happen. He 
often profits from this relationship in a financial sense as well, taking money from his 
wife’s lover and living a life of ease without any responsibilities. The nature of this 
figure flies in the face of what critics have always assumed about early modern 
masculinity; the critical commonplace is that early modern men had a violent fear of 
being cuckolded, and closely watched their wives for any hint that they may be 
cheating on them. The wittol does not follow this pattern at all, and he actively invites 
on his head the shame and social humiliation that so many other early modern men 
worked tirelessly to avoid. The centerpiece of this chapter is a close reading of 
Thomas Middleton’s city comedy A Chaste Maid in Cheapside; I focused on the 
character Allwit, an extremely content wittol who happily allows his wife to sleep 
with another man. Allwit not only profits from this relationship, taking money from 
his wife’s lover, but he also receives a palpable erotic charge from the idea that his 
wife is cheating on him with a disreputable pimp. Allwit is, like all of the masochists I 
have discussed in this project, in complete control of his situation, and he has the 
power to end it whenever he wants. He sets the terms of the relationship between his 
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wife and her lover, he decides when and how often they meet, and he has the right to 
cut the lover off if this man does not fulfill his end of the masochistic bargain between 
them. Allwit and wittols like him represent an entirely different kind of early modern 
man – one that subversively takes control by allowing the outside world to think that 
he has given up any sense of control. 
The last chapter turns to the nature of masochistic spectatorship and what it 
means to watch a play as a masochist or, at least, what it means to watch something in 
a masochistic way. The other three chapters deal with characters on the early modern 
stage, but this chapter extends the conversation to include the early modern people 
who were actually watching these plays. I employed Jonson’s Bartholomew Fair as a 
dramatic test case for working through this complicated issue. The play itself appears 
to be extremely sadistic, filled with sharp-tongued characters that prey on the weak 
and ignorant, and there are even many mean-spirited barbs and nasty insults directed 
right the audience watching the play. The masochistic quality of Bartholomew Fair 
can be found, then, in the relationship between the audience and the stage. The play 
opens with an odd induction that asks audience members to agree to a contract that 
limits their ability to complain when the play mistreats or insults them. The audience 
is even expected find the play’s insults charming and entertaining; if they feel 
differently, the induction reminds them that they are too stupid and uneducated to 
really know any better, and it makes sure that they won’t be able to ignorantly speak 
out and poison anyone else’s opinion. The idea of watching as a masochist is a curious 
concept, and I believe it is one of this dissertation’s most valuable insights; in the rest 
of the fourth chapter, I spoke about what it means to be a masochistic spectator, and I 
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showed how the other masochists I have discussed in my project are also spectators of 
their respective masochistic scenes. Jessica watches on as the Christian characters 
mock and insult her; Antonio watches as his trial proceeds and Shylock and Portia 
debate over what will happen to his body; and wittols watch as their wives sleep with 
other men, or even just watch as their wives talk to these men and flirt with them right 
under their noses. These characters are playwrights, set designers, stage managers, 
casting directors, and actors, but they are also audience members who watch the 
dramas that they have created for themselves. 
I have provided this review so that I can talk about the connections between 
these four chapters. I want to see if we can find the links between these different 
concepts, and to test whether or not there is a universal thread that runs through these 
very different configurations of early modern masochism. Is there something similar 
about Jessica’s masochism and the masochism demonstrated by Antonio? It is 
important for Antonio to be seen by people when he is in a state on pain and shame; 
his brand of masochism is founded on the idea of others, whether beloved friends like 
Bassanio or absolute strangers, watching him while he is treated like a helpless animal 
being led to the slaughter. He is, in this sense, an exhibitionist: he receives an erotic 
charge when his body is exposed to the public, and the play’s depiction of his sexual 
desire pivots on these scenes of exposure, humiliation, and vulnerability. Jessica, on 
the other hand, does not want to be seen. It is important for her not to be noticed, to be 
ignored, and to be treated like she does not exist and like she would not be worth 
acknowledging if she did exist. Her erotic feelings are grounded in the idea that she is 
not being watched, and that the people who insult her do not seem to realize that she is 
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standing nearby (or, at least, that they would not care that she was there even if they 
did realize it). It seems that, while these two characters thrive on experiencing 
humiliation and shame, they each require a very different setting to be fully able to 
appreciate those feelings. If Jessica were constantly noticed and the Christian 
characters made a point of interacting with her and talking to her, or if Antonio were 
ignored by the court and the Venetian community, neither would be able to fulfill their 
masochistic fantasies. 
It is not possible, then, to transplant masochists from one context to another. 
The entire point of their masochistic design is that it has been very specifically created 
by them and only for them. Jessica cannot suddenly step into Antonio’s narrative, and 
Antonio cannot suddenly step into Jessica’s. These contexts are unique and intensely 
personal. We might compare, to offer another example, Antonio and Allwit. In 
Antonio’s case, what is essential is the fact that he is helpless to stop something that 
might happen to him. The court may decide that Shylock’s contract is completely legal 
and will be upheld, in which case a pound of Antonio’s flesh will be cut off; the court 
may also decide that the contract is illegal and will not be upheld, in which case 
Antonio will be saved. Antonio has no choice in the matter, and his body will be cut 
into or left intact at the pleasure of the law. Allwit’s desires, on the other hand, are 
based on the idea that he is helpless to stop something that explicitly does not happen 
to him.  
The erotic scenario that Allwit has designed for himself relies on his wife 
sleeping with another man while he seems to be powerless to do anything about it; in 
other words, this is something that happens to somebody else – his wife and her lover - 
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and not to him, and his own body is never in any danger or directly involved in the 
scenario. Antonio’s performance of impotence is based on the idea that his body is 
exposed and vulnerable, able to be touched and mutilated by anyone, while Allwit’s 
performance of impotence is based on the idea that his own body is never actually in 
play at the pertinent scene of shame, and that he does not physically participate in the 
moment when his wife cheats on him. These two conceptions of the masochist’s body 
cannot be reconciled; it would not be possible for Antonio to be removed from the 
courtroom and to have him only hear about what happens in the trial from afar, and it 
would not be possible to have Allwit engage in some sort of ménage a trois with his 
wife and Whorehound. It is also true that these two characters have a very different 
relationship to money: Antonio is ashamed because he has lost all of his wealth and 
property, making him vulnerable, while Allwit is ashamed because he actually gets 
financial support for being in his humiliating situation. These masochistic narratives 
exist in their current form for a very particular reason, and altering them or treating 
them like they have interchangeable ingredients would completely spoil the unique 
masochistic effect of each narrative. 
Bartholomew Fair is an entirely different case altogether; in this play, the 
masochistic scenario is actually a collective experience, and it is supposed to apply to 
the wide variety of people sitting in the theater audience. These people are young and 
old, rich and poor, educated and simple, and the contract needs to establish a 
relationship with all of them. It is not unique and personal, and it is not specifically 
sculpted to exploit all of the minute details of a particular individual’s religious, 
political, sexual, or legal contexts. This is a special exception to the masochistic 
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desires that I have described throughout the rest of this project, and this means that 
there is something very different about the masochistic dynamic presented in this play. 
It operates by a different set of rules, and in some ways it is a much different animal 
than a more traditionally masochistic play like The Merchant of Venice or All’s Well 
That Ends Well. This does not mean, however, that it is any less masochistic, or that 
its masochistic qualities are in some way diluted, and it is one of the points of this 
conclusion to show that there really is no such thing as a traditional form of 
masochism. The masochism in Jonson’s comedy simply works in a different way, 
which is perhaps necessary given the much larger scale of the participants involved 
and the fact that this is a mass, communal event instead of the very precise and deeply 
personal expressions of desire that we have seen staged in the other dramas discussed 
throughout this project. I will take a moment to outline the differences between 
Bartholomew Fair’s masochistic contract and the types of masochism that we have 
seen in other early modern plays, and I will conclude with some final thoughts about 
the relationship between masochism and theatricality. 
The audience members of Bartholomew Fair do not, first of all, design a 
masochistic contract for themselves; Jessica, Helena, Antonio, and Allwit are all the 
very immediate cause behind the masochistic narratives that they perform in, but the 
audience of this play does not get to create anything for itself. The contract in the 
induction is, instead, handed to the audience, and they are expected to agree to what 
the playwright has written for them. The fact that the contract leads to a masochistic 
dynamic is extremely fascinating and compelling, but it might just have easily led to 
something that was more sadistic and harmful to the audience. Secondly, most 
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masochistic narratives involve the masochist being watched by somebody else, or at 
least being conspicuously ignored by somebody who could watch them if they were so 
inclined. In the case of Bartholomew Fair’s audience, there is no observer who can 
watch on and look at them with disgusted curiosity. The entire audience is included in 
this contract, and everyone is equally implicated in the induction’s masochistic 
dynamic. It is not possible for one audience member to turn to another and then shame 
or criticize him or her, because both of these audience members are equally caught up 
in the same embarrassing scenario. Antonio needs to have the attendees of the court 
watching him as he exposes his body; Allwit needs to have the community know what 
is happening to him and what sort of a relationship he has with his wife and her lover; 
and even Jessica, though she takes pleasure in being ignored, has to have an audience 
nearby that she realizes is ignoring her. The audience of Bartholomew Fair is not 
watched by anyone else, and the humiliation of their situation is shared by everyone 
who is present in the theater; the masochistic structure of this play is, therefore, much 
more impersonal than that of the other plays I have discussed, and it has a dryer, more 
legalistic quality to it. 
It seems that it is impossible to chart a cohesive impression of how masochism 
works. These desires are much too fluid and variable, and there are too many ways 
that masochistic structures can be organized and arranged. It appears that each 
masochistic desire is unique to the person who designs or orchestrates it, and that it 
can look very different in each case. The one constant in all of the masochistic 
scenarios that I have analyzed throughout this dissertation is the emphasis on 
theatricality and performance. Jessica meticulously costumes herself with jewels so 
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that she can feel even more ashamed when her father finds out that she has run off 
with his wealth; the trial scene in which Antonio has to suffer the penetrating stares of 
the Venetian public is almost designed as if it were set on a theatrical stage, with 
gathered crowd watching as the principal figures act out a dramatic situation; and 
Allwit expertly performs the role of the cuckolded husband so that Whorehound can 
thoroughly believe that he is helpless and impotent. The most explicitly theatrical of 
the works that I have discussed is, of course, Bartholomew Fair, in which the 
masochistic dynamic of the play is entirely defined by the interaction between an 
audience and the performers that they are watching. I argue that masochism is not only 
a vital insight into early modern society, but is a valuable perspective for thinking 
about the early modern stage. It is a model for watching a performance, and it is a new 
way of thinking about how one might interact with and experience the emotions of a 
staged play. It is also, at the same time, a model for understanding oneself as part of a 
performance, and it suggests that it is possible for everyday life to be a theatrical event 
that is scripted, designed, directed, and acted. In this sense, studying masochism is as 
much a contribution to our understanding of theatricality as it is to our understanding 
of sexuality. I feel that this is my dissertation’s most significant insight, and I 
ultimately hope that the reader comes away from my project with a more sensitive 
conception of early modern desire and how these desires might be articulated on the 
early modern stage. 
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